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I
Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation beinhaltet vier Beiträge zur Steuerhinterziehung und zur Steuerver-
meidung. Der erste Beitrag untersucht die Fragestellung, ob die Nutzung eines Verrech-
nungspreises für interne und externe Zwecke optimal für multinationale Unternehmen sein
kann, obwohl ein zusätzlicher Freiheitsgrad durch die Verwendung eines zweiten Verrech-
nungspreises gewonnen wird. Die Berücksichtigung eines strategisch agierenden Betriebs-
prüfers führt dazu, dass ein einzelner Verrechnungspreis für die steuerliche Berichter-
stattung und die innerbetriebliche Anreizgestaltung verwendet werden sollte, sofern die
Differenz zwischen den resultierenden Strafen im Falle eines nicht-regelkonformen Verrech-
nungspreises hinreichend groß ist. Des Weiteren wird gezeigt, dass ein steigendes Steuer-
satzgefälle zu weniger steueraggresivem Verhalten führt.
Der zweite Beitrag analysiert, ob ein immaterieller Vermögenswert eines multina-
tionalen Unternehmens in einer Division in einem Hoch- oder in einem Niedrigsteuer-
land gehalten werden sollte, sofern die Nutzung in den verschiedenen Steuerjurisdiktionen
nicht unabhängig voneinander ist. Ein hoher Spillover führt dazu, dass der immaterielle
Vermögenswert optimalerweise in der Hochsteuerlanddivision gehalten werden sollte, ob-
gleich dies mit höheren Steuerzahlungen einhergeht. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass
die Einschränkung von Gewinnverschiebungsmöglichkeiten sowohl zu steigenden, als auch
zu sinkenden Investitionen des Unternehmens führen kann.
Der dritte Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern sich die Investitionen einer Firma und die
korrespondierende Steuerberichterstattung gegenseitig beeinflussen, wenn der Jahresab-
schluss als unpräzises Signal für die korrekte steuerliche Behandlung des Sachverhaltes in
einer Betriebsprüfung verwendet wird. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass ein Anstieg, der Kon-
formität zwischen Handels- und Steuerbilanz zu steigendem oder sinkendem erwarteten
Steuereinkommen für die Finanzverwaltung führen kann. Einerseits führt die Erhöhung
der Konformität zwischen Handels- und Steuerbilanz zu verringerten Investitionsanreizen
durch steuerliche Begünstigungen. Andererseits kann eine Verringerung der zu niedrig
ausgewiesenen Steuerberichte, die zu einer Differenz zwischen Handels- und Steuerbericht
führen, erzielt werden.
Der letzte Beitrag analysiert, wie sich Steuern und der Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz auf
die Kapazitätsplanung eines multinationalen Unternehmens auswirken, wenn der Spiel-
raum für die Gewinnverschiebung mittels Berichterstattung durch strenge Regularien
stark eingeschränkt ist. In einer derartigen Situation kann eine Gewinnverschiebung in
ein Niedrigsteuerland mittels entsprechender operativer Entscheidungen erzielt werden,
um so den Nachsteuergewinn des Konzerns zu maximieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass Steuern
und entsprechende Verrechnungspreisregulierung zu einem Anstieg der Überkapazität
führen, da ein Steuersatzgefälle zu einer Reduktion der mit Überkapazitäten einherge-
henden Kosten führen kann.
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Summary
This dissertation comprises four articles concerning tax evasion and tax avoidance. The
first study investigates if a one set of books transfer pricing strategy can be part of a multi-
national’s equilibrium strategy even though two sets of books provide an additional degree
of freedom when transfer pricing is used for tax reporting and internal decision making.
Using a game theoretic model the article shows that the penalty difference between the
transfer pricing regimes in case of a detected non-compliant transfer price critically affects
whether the multinational uses one set or two sets of books. Furthermore, the study shows
that an increasing tax rate differential induces less tax-aggressiveness because high profit
shifting incentives are anticipated by a strategic tax auditor.
The second article analyzes transfer pricing of an intangible while endogenizing its
location choice. Multinationals are often suspected of using transfer pricing of intangibles
to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. However, if spillovers from the use
of the intangible are prevalent and the multinational faces a trade-off between spillover
internalization and tax minimization a ’home bias’ might occur. In particular, for a high
spillover and restrictions on tax avoidance, the intangible is optimally located in the
headquarters which is in the high-tax country even though tax savings could be realized
by locating the intangible in an offshore division. Additionally, the study shows that
curtailing profit shifting possibilities can harm investment incentives.
The third article investigates the interdependence between a firm’s tax reporting and
investment behavior if the financial statement provides a noisy signal regarding the correct
tax treatment of the project to a strategically acting tax authority. The study shows
that the expected tax revenue for the tax authority can either increase or decrease with
increasing book-tax conformity. Increasing book-tax conformity is detrimental for the
investment incentives but leads to less understated non-conforming tax reports.
The fourth article examines how taxes and the transfer pricing regulation affect the
capacity planning of a multinational company. In a situation where tight regulation curbs
the reporting discretion, multinationals can shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions by adapt-
ing real decisions instead of manipulating the transfer price. The article shows that taxes
and transfer pricing regulation increase the probability of excessive capacity. Therefore,
taxes and corresponding regulation are identified as potential antecedents for organiza-
tional slack.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Firms typically aim at maximizing their after-tax profit. Obviously, reducing the tax
liability is an appropriate means. Firms can do so either legally or illegally. However,
fraudulent reporting behavior bears the risk of tax audits which might lead to poten-
tially high penalties and reputational damages. Therefore, the majority of firms focus on
compliance with tax law (The Economist, 2004; Cools and Emmanuel, 2006; Cools and
Slagmulder, 2009) and prioritize preventing disputes with the tax authority above the tax
minimization objective (Klassen et al., 2017). Alternatively, firms can engage in legal tax
avoidance, i.e., in the usage of reporting discretion that is inherent to tax law. Despite be-
ing legal, tax avoidance is perceived as undesirable by the general public (The Guardian,
2007). Therefore, Bankman (2004) indicates that firms which aggressively avoid taxes
may also suffer, like tax evaders, from reputational damages by being labeled as ‘poor
corporate citizens’ even though its tax avoidance strategies are perfectly legal. Because of
this threat, firms increasingly refrain from reporting behavior that is intended to minimize
the tax liability. Without the option to optimize the after-tax profit by using reporting
discretion, firms can alter strategic and operational decisions to maximize their after-tax
income.
Governments and regulators are aware of firms’ tax optimization incentives. Thus,
they are particularly concerned about collecting their owing taxes (Wall Street Journal,
2017). In particular, low effective tax rates, especially from large multinationals, have
drawn public attention to the topics of tax evasion and tax avoidance. Taxes are a major
source of governments’ income and, therefore, tax evasion and tax avoidance deprive
governments of tax revenues. Consequently, tax evasion and tax avoidance are high on
political agendas. Supranational organizations like the OECD and national policymakers
collaborate to develop legislation which is dedicated to tackling strategic tax planning
and especially profit shifting such as the recent Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project.
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One of the most common tax minimization channels used by multinational firms is
transfer pricing. In particular, firms evidently use transfer pricing schemes to shift prof-
its from high-tax to low-tax countries (e.g. De Simone et al., 2017; Klassen et al., 2017;
Blouin et al., 2018). Estimates regarding the magnitude of internal trade range from 33 %
up to 60 %. For example, the OECD states that one-third of the worldwide trade occurs
within the boundaries of multinational companies (Lanz and Miroudot, 2011). There-
fore, transfer pricing is mandatory to allocate the taxable income to the participating tax
jurisdictions. However, it also creates a huge potential for multinationals to realize tax
savings. Transfer pricing of intangibles seems especially prone to generate tax savings due
to the unique characteristics of intangibles that allow for a large discretion in the location
choice and corresponding transfer pricing decisions. For example, intangibles are typically
non-exclusive in its consumption, comparables are often rarely available, the using divi-
sions incur no or negligible marginal costs once the intangible is developed, and spillovers
and network effects regularly occur (Lev, 2001). Therefore, multinationals are typically
suspected to locate their intangibles in divisions in low tax countries, thereby, generating
tax savings by subsequent royalty flows. However, locating an intangible offshore can also
have detrimental effects.
Besides the tax function, transfer prices are used for managerial purposes. Conse-
quently, transfer pricing related conflicts between the different objectives of a multina-
tional company can arise (e.g. Baldenius et al., 2004; Hyde and Choe, 2005; Labro, 2019).
On the one hand, taxes should be minimized. On the other hand, divisions need to be
coordinated correctly. Basically, the use of two sets of books, i.e., the use of two differ-
ent transfer prices (see, for example, Baldenius et al., 2004) can mitigate those conflicts.
In particular, one reported transfer price can be used to achieve tax minimization and
another internal transfer price can induce efficient managerial decisions. Alternatively,
firms can operate a one set of books accounting system, i.e., a single transfer price is
used for both tax reporting and internal purposes (Göx and Schiller, 2007). Empirical
research shows that both accounting systems are used (Klassen et al., 2017; Springsteel,
1999). Nevertheless, the majority of firms keep one set of books (Klassen et al., 2017;
Baersch et al., 2018). Firms argue that finding two sets of books in a tax audit indicates
tax-aggressive behavior that might lead to long-lasting and expensive disputes with the
tax authority. Mills (1998) shows that large discrepancies between the financial statement
and the taxable income create red flags for tax authorities. Finding two different transfer
prices during a tax audit is similar and entails increased scrutiny of the tax auditor.
To prevent disputes between firms and tax authorities, regulators try to curtail strate-
gic tax minimization possibilities. Therefore, they implement tight transfer pricing regu-
lation to deter multinationals from shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Less report-
ing scope combined with the threat of potential tax audits curtail firms’ possibilities to
engage in beneficial tax minimization by managing their reported income downwards.
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Another promising means for regulators to tackle firms’ tax minimization within the na-
tional boundaries is the reduction of book-tax differences. Increasing mandatory book-tax
conformity reduces firms’ possibilities to bias their taxable income downwards without af-
fecting the financial statement.
Reducing firms discretion regarding tax reporting consequently affects firms’ behav-
ior. First, the reporting behavior is influenced due to less reporting scope. Second, firms
might alter their real economic decision because the remaining scope might induce firms
to optimize their after-tax income by means of operational decisions rather than by under-
stated tax reports. Prior theoretical and empirical research indicates that curtailing tax
minimization possibilities may lead to decreasing investments (Desai et al., 2006; Hong
and Smart, 2010; Schwab and Todtenhaupt, 2017; Juranek et al., 2018). Therefore, tax
regulation can cause inefficiencies like decreasing investments or organizational slack in
the form of excessive production capacity. This highlights the complexity that legislators,
tax authorities, and supranational organizations like the European Union need to consider
when designing anti-avoidance legislation.
1.2 Contribution and Main Findings
This thesis consists of four articles. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the articles, the
coauthors, the presentations at international conferences, and the status of publication.
Title Coauthors Conferences Status of publication
When Do Firms Use One
Set of Books in an Inter-
national Tax Compliance
Game?
Stefan Wielenberg
Katrin Weiskirchner-
Merten
ARFA 2017
ARW 2017
EAA 2017
VHB 2017
Revise and Re-
submit: Review
of Accounting
Studies
Transfer Pricing and Lo-
cation Choice of Intangi-
bles – Spillover and Tax
Avoidance through Profit
Shifting
Katrin Weiskirchner-
Merten
ARFA 2018
EAA 2018
EIASM 2018
GEABA 2018
VHB 2018
Working Paper
The Impact of Book-Tax
Conformity on Reporting
and Investment Behavior
Alexandra Lilge
Michelle Muraz
EAA 2019
ARW 2019
VHB 2019
Working Paper
International
Transfer Pricing and
Capacity Planning
Katrin Weiskirchner-
Merten
ARFA 2019
ARW 2019
Working Paper
Table 1.1: Article Overview
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Prior theoretical research highlights the dominance of two sets of books compared
to the use of a single transfer price for internal decisions and tax reporting. However,
empirical results indicate that the majority of firms keep one set of books. The first article
entitledWhen Do Firms Use One Set of Books in an International Tax Compliance Game?
presented in chapter 2 addresses the question of whether firms keep one set of books in
equilibrium when a strategic tax auditor is considered. While former work typically starts
when the accounting system is already in place, we endogenize the choice of one set of
books or two sets of books in a two-stage game theoretic model. We show that keeping
one set of books is part of an equilibrium strategy when tax audits are considered and
the choice of two sets of books is seen as an indication for purely tax-induced decisions.
Thus, the article contributes to prior research illustrating that a one set of books strategy
might be the outcome of strategic interaction with the tax auditor instead of a practical
simplification. Interestingly, firms’ tax-aggressiveness decreases with an increasing tax rate
differential because high profit shifting motives are anticipated by the strategically acting
tax auditor and are therefore incorporated in the tax decision.
The the second article entitled Transfer Pricing and Location Choice of Intangibles –
Spillover and Tax Avoidance through Profit Shifting, the third study The Impact of Book-
Tax Conformity on Reporting and Investment Behavior, and the fourth article Interna-
tional Transfer Pricing and Capacity Planning address calls for more research to better
understand how tax incentives affect firms’ real investment decisions (Hanlon and Heitz-
man, 2010). The articles show that tax regulation influences firms’ behavior in a non-trivial
way. Consequently, the studies reveal that investigating solely reporting behavior in the
context of profit shifting and related countermeasures seems myopic because unintended
and detrimental effects can occur.
Since multinationals are often assumed to use transfer pricing of intangibles to shift
profits to low-tax countries, the second article presented in chapter 3 investigates whether
an intangible should be located in the division of the low-tax country or in the division
of the high-tax jurisdiction. Locating intangibles in offshore divisions and corresponding
royalty flows can generate tax savings. Nevertheless, empirical evidence reveals that in-
tangibles exhibit a large ’home bias’, i.e., intangibles are often located in the headquarters
home country even though it is a high-tax jurisdiction. Whereas the empirical literature
imputes this ’home bias’ to legal requirements and enforcement, the second study identifies
economic conditions for which an intangible should be optimally located in the high-tax
country. In particular, for a high spillover and restrictions on tax avoidance, the intangible
is optimally located in the high-tax country. This provides a theoretical explanation for
the empirically documented ’home bias’. Moreover, the article shows that curtailing profit
shifting possibilities can lead to increasing or decreasing investments in the intangible.
Furthermore, the model predicts that a ’home bias’ which occurs in response to economic
4
circumstances and not because of particularities of the tax regulation, is most likely larger
for trademarks than for patents.
The third article presented in chapter 4 analyzes the effect of increasing book-tax
conformity on firms’ investment behavior and related reporting. An investment decision
is incorporated in a standard tax inspection game. Increasing book-tax conformity dete-
riorates investment incentives. Nevertheless, depending on the level of baseline book-tax
conformity increasing book-tax conformity can be either beneficial or detrimental for the
tax authority’s tax revenue depending on whether more or less understated tax reports
occur in response to increasing book-tax conformity. Thus, the article shows that the effect
of regulation regarding book-tax conformity is ambiguous and therefore highlights chal-
lenges governments and regulators face while designing regulations regarding mandatory
book-tax conformity.
The research questions of the fourth article presented in chapter 5 are similar. The
study investigates how multinationals adapt their investment decisions when tight transfer
pricing regulation curbs the reporting discretion. When market uncertainty is prevalent,
firms tend to hold an excessive capacity to fulfill the ex ante unknown demand. The
arm’s length principle and a tax rate differential increase this tendency because excessive
capacity becomes less costly due to a tax-saving effect. Therefore, the fourth article iden-
tifies tax regulation as a potential antecedent for organizational slack and highlights that
focusing on reporting aspects might be myopic in the light of tax regulation.
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Chapter 2
When Do Firms Use One Set of Books in an
International Tax Compliance Game?∗
Abstract
We study how a strategic tax auditor affects a multinational company’s choice of a transfer
pricing regime. In the first stage, a firm with a production division in a low-tax country and
a sales division in a high-tax country implements its transfer pricing regime. In a regime
with one set of books, the unique transfer price coordinates the quantity decision and
determines the tax payments. In a regime with two sets of books, different transfer prices
are used. After observing its cost type in the second stage, the firm can report a compliant
or a non-compliant transfer price. In the third stage, the tax auditor decides whether to
conduct an audit. The penalty differences between the two transfer pricing regimes drive
the first-stage implementation decision. The tax auditor’s personal audit costs critically
influence the firm’s compliance decision in the second stage. In equilibrium, an increase
in the tax rate difference induces less tax-aggressive behavior because it also increases the
tax auditor’s incentives. This is anticipated by the firm.
∗ This chapter is joint work with Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten (Vienna University of Economics and
Business) and Stefan Wielenberg (Leibniz University Hanover)
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2.1 Introduction
Transfer prices serve two purposes in a divisionalized multinational company (MNC).
On the one hand, they are necessary to compute divisional profits to provide incentives for
internal decisions. On the other hand, they also determine the tax profits of the divisions
in the different countries. Previous research illustrates that MNCs may either keep one
set of books (OSB) or two sets of books (TSB). A transfer pricing regime with OSB
uses the same transfer price for both internal and tax purposes (Göx and Schiller, 2007;
Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller, 2012). Under a regime with TSB, the MNC uses two
separate transfer prices, one for each purpose. Springsteel (1999), for example, finds that
77 percent of a best-practice group of large companies choose TSB. In a recent survey
study among U.S.-based MNCs, Klassen et al. (2017) report that 16.3% of firms calculate
different transfer prices for different purposes.
This paper scrutinizes the transfer pricing decisions of an MNC. We concentrate on
two important aspects. First, the choice between a regime with OSB or TSB is a long-
term decision because of implementation, user training, and other organizational issues.
The decision will not depend on or be revised due to changes in short-term operating
conditions. Therefore, we model the transfer pricing decision as a two-stage process: In the
first stage, the MNC decides between OSB and TSB. Then, after experiencing operating
conditions, such as production cost, the concrete transfer prices are determined in the
second stage.
An MNC’s decision of whether to keep OSB or TSB is not only long term but also
strategic. This is the second aspect addressed in our paper. Transfer prices are frequently
used as a profit shifting device and as such are subject to rigorous surveillance by tax
authorities, especially in high-tax countries. According to EY’s Global Transfer Pricing
Survey 2013, transfer pricing remains a central disagreement between MNCs and tax
authorities. A tax audit of a transfer pricing regime is a costly task, and tax authorities
are resource constrained. Therefore, we model the tax auditor (TA) as a strategic player
who makes her audit decision after observing the reported transfer price used for tax
purposes. During the investigation, the firm’s transfer pricing regime becomes observable
to the TA.
It is a widely reported fact that OSB and TSB have different consequences in the
event of a non-compliant transfer price. Companies argue that implementing TSB will
invite increased scrutiny by tax authorities (EY, 2003). Mills (1998) notes that book-
tax differences create red flags for the IRS. She finds empirical evidence that the audit
adjustments proposed by the IRS increase when the book-tax difference increases. The
discovery of two different transfer prices during a tax audit can be interpreted in the
same way. Two different prices lead to the suspicion that tax transfer prices are out of
compliance with the arm’s length principle. Finding TSB in a tax audit indicates that
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the reported transfer price is solely caused by tax optimization. On the other hand, OSB
creates evidence for a transfer price that is also driven by economic considerations (EY,
2003). Therefore, the penalty payment faced by an MNC in the event of detected non-
compliance in a tax audit increases in the case of TSB.1
In summary, the MNC has to consider the following trade-off in the decision between
OSB or TSB: OSB induces inefficient internal decisions and higher tax payments than
TSB, because TSB allows for an appropriate internal transfer price and a tax transfer price
(Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller, 2012). TSB, however, induces more serious consequences
in the event of detected non-compliance and subsequent intervention by the TA (see, for
example, Narayanan and Smith (2000, p. 507), Smith (2002, p. 224), and Martini (2015,
p. 873)).
We examine the MNC’s transfer pricing decisions in an incomplete information tax
compliance game between the MNC and the TA. The MNC consists of a foreign production
division in a low-tax jurisdiction and a domestic sales division in a high-tax country. On the
one hand, the transfer price affects the quantity decision of the sales division’s manager by
internalizing the costs of the intermediate product obtained from the production division.
In a world without taxes, the optimal transfer price is set equal to the marginal costs of
the production division (Hirshleifer, 1956). On the other hand, in a world with taxes, a
higher transfer price reduces the MNC’s tax payments. In line with prior literature, we
assume that a compliance range limits the tax transfer price accepted by tax authorities.
In the first stage of the game, the MNC decides between OSB and TSB. After observing
the unit cost in the production division, the firm sets the internal transfer price and the
tax transfer price in the second stage. Firms with low unit costs may have an incentive
to use a non-compliant high transfer price to compute tax profits. Then, the tax transfer
price is reported for both divisions and communicated to the tax authorities in the second
stage. In the third stage, the tax authority may conduct a tax audit. We only consider the
audit decision in the domestic high-tax country. In the event of detected non-compliance,
the firm faces a penalty that depends on the transfer pricing regime. Having TSB is
seen as an indication of pure tax optimization motives for non-compliance, and thus,
penalties are larger than under OSB. We find that these penalties determine the first-
stage decision between OSB and TSB. If the penalties for OSB and TSB are similar,
an equilibrium exists in which the MNC will always implement a TSB regime. In this
1 For example, Australia levies a penalty of 25%. This rate is reduced to 10% when the MNC can demon-
strate that it has a reasonably arguable position and increased to 50% when the TA can demonstrate
that the dominant purpose is tax avoidance (EY, 2012). In New Zealand, the penalties vary between
20% and 150% (EY, 2012). The applied rate depends on the degree of intent to avoid tax payments in
the MNC’s gross negligence. In Hong Kong, the scale of penalty imposed on a taxpayer is determined
based on the nature of the omission, amount of understatement of income or profits, the scale of the
business, the degree of the taxpayer’s cooperation or disclosure, and the length of the offence period.
Penalties can be scaled upwards or downwards based on such facts (EY, 2012). In Spain, the TA can
reduce or eliminate the penalty when the MNC can demonstrate conformity (KPMG, 2012, p. 202).
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case, the advantage of OSB compared to TSB diminishes, and the firm implements TSB
because of the greater flexibility in internal coordination. The firm randomizes between
OSB and TSB as the difference between the two penalties increases. However, there is no
difference in the penalties for finding OSB or TSB such that the MNC always implements
OSB in the first stage; this is because the OSB advantage in the event of non-compliance
is irrelevant for the high-cost type in the second stage because the high-cost type always
acts compliantly. Therefore, TSB will always be part of an equilibrium.
The transfer pricing decision in the second stage is essentially a choice between compli-
ance and non-compliance for the low-cost MNC. We find that a low-cost MNC will always
choose non-compliance if an OSB transfer pricing regime was previously implemented.
Compliance under a TSB transfer pricing regime depends on the level of audit costs faced
by the TA. At a low level of audit costs, the TA wants to conduct audits more frequently.
Thus, the probability of detecting non-compliance increases, and the MNC will more often
choose a compliant transfer price in equilibrium.
In addition, our findings show that a higher tax rate difference between the two coun-
tries decreases the probability of using TSB in a non-compliant way. This result initially
appears counterintuitive because profit shifting should be especially important in a situ-
ation where the tax rate difference is high. The finding, however, is due to the strategic
TA. High tax-saving possibilities caused by a large tax rate difference induce increased
scrutiny incentives for the TA. The MNC anticipates this when making its transfer pricing
decisions.
Transfer pricing is a well-investigated topic in the literature. However, prior research
typically begins with the transfer pricing regime already having been chosen, i.e., after
the decision of whether OSB or TSB are kept. This appears myopic because the MNC’s
transfer pricing regime is crucial to various decisions. For instance, the resulting pro-
duction decisions, managerial compensation, investment decisions or tax planning might
differ substantially. Rather than assuming the dominance of a specific transfer pricing
regime, we endogenize this decision. We extend prior research (see, for example, Balde-
nius et al., 2004; Martini et al., 2012) by addressing the question of whether tax regulation
and strategic TAs can affect the choice of keeping OSB or TSB. Our results support the
empirical evidence that OSB and TSB coexist among MNCs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related literature.
Then, the model is described, followed by a presentation and discussion of the equilibrium
analysis in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
A comprehensive overview of international transfer prices and their functions is pro-
vided by Sansing (2014). We focus on the literature that incorporates the trade-off between
internal coordination and tax minimization. MNCs regularly incorporate differences in tax
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and tariff rates as additional aspect of their transfer pricing decisions (see, for example,
Schjelderup and Sorgard, 1997; Smith, 2002)).
Prior research has already shown that MNCs may use transfer prices as a device to
shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions (see, for example, Jacob, 1996; Clausing,
2003). In a recent empirical study Klassen et al. (2017) note that decoupled transfer
prices are especially used by MNCs that pursue a tax minimization objective (instead of
a tax compliance objective). The intuition for this result is straightforward. Keeping OSB
necessarily entails a trade-off between the conflicting objectives of tax minimization and
quantity distortion. Narayanan and Smith (2000) find that tax-adjusted marginal costs
balance these conflicting objectives when using OSB. In a TSB setting, Baldenius et al.
(2004) obtain a similar result. They show that tax-adjusted marginal costs should be used
for internal purposes, while the external transfer price is straightforwardly the maximum
of the compliance range accepted by the TA. However, these results ignore the potential
case of non-compliance with the arm’s length principle. Kant (1988), Smith (2002), Hyde
and Choe (2005), and Choe and Hyde (2007) show that a corner solution is no longer
straightforward when adjustments by the TA are taken into account. Furthermore, Eden
et al. (2005) show that even the threat of transfer pricing penalties may have extensive
impacts on the targeted firms. In addition, fiscal authorities have modernized to ensure the
government a fair share of corporate taxes (Elliott and Emmanuel, 2000, p. 216). Despite
numerous governments’ efforts to secure higher tax payments, previous research has not
regarded the TA as a strategic party. However, Cools and Emmanuel (2006) highlight the
necessity of taking into account fiscal regulations as an endogenous variable.
Capuzzi (2010) notes that the TA and MNCs can use the arm’s length principle to
increase their incomes by interpreting it in their favor. Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013)
have shown that MNCs’ decisions are systematically distorted due to the application of
the arm’s length principle. However, they do not consider that detrimental distortions
might be alleviated by keeping TSB. In addition, Samuelson (1982) finds that MNCs are
able to manipulate the arm’s length limits. Nevertheless, the arm’s length principle is
applied in nearly all countries with transfer pricing restrictions. Picciotto (1992) provides
a detailed overview of arm’s length implementation and its historical development. All
of these papers take the decision of whether to keep OSB or TSB as given. By contrast,
Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller (2012) do not. They investigate whether there might exist
situations in which keeping OSB is preferable. However, their main research area is the
field of interdependencies between the different transfer prices. By applying the formula
apportionment approach, it is possible to obtain independence among different transfer
prices (Hyde and Choe, 2005). However, Martini et al. (2012) demonstrate that under a
formula apportionment approach, MNCs have incentives to shift the tax base by adjust-
ing investment levels. In contrast, when not applying formula apportionment and thereby
avoiding effects on investment levels, Martini et al. (2012) find that, MNCs use ex post
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income shifting with separate entities and transfer prices. They conclude that neither the
formula apportionment approach nor the separate entity approach is always preferable.
Despite these advantages and disadvantages regarding the tax system, in almost all coun-
tries, the single entity approach is applied. Therefore, we restrict our attention to taxation
in terms of the separate entity approach.
There is a strand of literature on the question of whether keeping OSB or TSB is
optimal. In particular, only the strategic coordination literature examines the optimality
of the different transfer pricing regimes. Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997), Arya and Mit-
tendorf (2008), and Dürr and Göx (2011) investigate whether OSB or TSB is preferable
under imperfect competition. In their studies, a single transfer price additionally serves
as a commitment device to soften competition in external markets. The results depend
substantially on whether competitors are able to observe the use of a single transfer price.
The transfer pricing regime cannot be used to influence competitors when the number of
books is unobservable. In contrast to this literature, we assume that the TA is not able
to observe whether OSB or TSB has been chosen. None of these studies include a strate-
gic TA in their considerations. Moreover, most of the existing research does not consider
the possibility of tax audits. One exception is Diller and Lorenz (2016). They extend the
work of Baldenius et al. (2004) by examining a strategic TA. In line with prior research,
they take an MNC’s decision of whether to keep OSB or TSB as given. They assume the
superiority of keeping TSB because of the greater flexibility this approach offers.
2.3 Model Description
We consider an MNC operating in a low-tax jurisdiction and a high-tax jurisdiction. In
contrast to prior research, we endogenize the MNC’s choice of the transfer pricing regime
while considering a strategic TA. In particular, we consider three stages. In the first stage,
the MNC has to decide whether to keep OSB or TSB. Next, after observing the operating
conditions, corresponding transfer prices are determined in the second stage. In the third
stage, a TA in the high-tax country may detect the possibly non-compliant transfer price
used by the MNC.
The MNC consists of a foreign production division and a domestic sales division.
Specifically, the foreign division produces an intermediate product that is transformed
into the final product by the domestic division. Without loss of generality, the domestic
division’s production costs are set equal to zero. There exists no external market for
the intermediate product. The foreign division is located in a low-tax jurisdiction, where
its income is taxed at rate t. Furthermore, the domestic division operates in a high-tax
jurisdiction with income tax rate t+h, where 0≤ t, h≤ 1 and t+h≤ 1. The parameter
h captures the tax rate difference between the low-tax and high-tax jurisdictions.
We assume taxation in terms of the source principle. Thus, the tax liability of each
division is determined by the division’s income. Hence, the MNC is interested in a high
11
reported transfer price for tax purposes to shift as much income as possible into the
low-tax jurisdiction. We assume that each division has additional income such that the
divisional after-tax income is always positive. However, the contribution of the internal
trade to the after-tax income of the foreign division might be negative.
In the first stage of the game, the MNC has to decide whether to keep OSB or TSB.
If OSB is chosen, the MNC uses a single transfer price for internal coordination and for
tax purposes, i.e., the internal transfer price pi equals the reported transfer price pr. In
the case of TSB, the MNC decouples its transfer pricing decisions and uses two different
prices, i.e., pi 6= pr. The decision in the first stage is a long-term decision and takes place
before cost uncertainty is resolved. We consider two possible states. The producing foreign
division can face either high constant marginal costs cH with probability β or low constant
marginal costs cL with probability 1−β, where 0< β < 1 and 0≤ cL < cH . Both players
know the ex ante probability β, but only the MNC observes the realization. The TA only
observes the realized marginal cost in the event of an audit. The decision in the first
stage is irreversible, i.e., cannot be changed upon observing the marginal costs. Thus, in
the second stage of the game, the transfer pricing decision is based on the prior transfer
pricing regime choice.
We consider a monopolistic setting with a revenue function R(q) =
(
a− 12q
)
q, where q
denotes the demanded quantity. The manager of the domestic division is evaluated on the
basis of pre-tax divisional profit.2 Considering the internal transfer price, the domestic
sales division determines demand according to
qD = argmax
q
{
ΠD =
(
a− 12q
)
q−piq
}
= a−pi. (2.1)
In line with the OECD guidelines and the monopolistic setting, the transfer price is
set using a cost-plus method. Under this transfer pricing method, marginal costs plus
an appropriate markup fulfill the needs of the arm’s length principle. Hence, the upper
bound for the reported transfer price of a low-cost MNC is given by pr = cL+mL, where
mL ≥ 0 captures the accepted markup. The appropriate markup for the high-cost type is
mH , yielding an upper bound pr. We assume mH and mL such that pr > pr. For the sake
of convenient notation, we assume that the lower bound of the compliance rage is prL for
both types, where 0≤ prL < pr < pr holds. Thus, the arm’s length compliance ranges are
given by
[
prL,pr
]
and [prL,pr].
2 Other authors assume that the divisions maximize their after-tax profits. This assumption is also ad
hoc in the transfer pricing setting. Baldenius et al. (2004) explicitly highlight this fact and refer to the
circumstance in which some firms evaluate their divisional managers on a pre-tax basis. For further
discussion of the advantages of pre-tax vs. after-tax profit maximization for divisional performance
measurement, see Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller (2012).
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In the third stage, the TA has to decide whether to conduct an audit. The TA is
located in the high-tax jurisdiction, i.e., in the home country of the domestic division.3
We do not explicitly model the incentive problem between the tax authority and the TA.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the incentive scheme is designed such that
the TA is interested in maximizing the additional income that she generates for the tax
authority. The TA faces personal audit costs Ka if she conducts an audit. Throughout
the analysis, we assume that the audit costs are not prohibitively high.
We capture the TA’s decision of whether to conduct an audit using a binary variable:
xa =

1 if an audit takes place,
0 if no audit is conducted.
(2.2)
In line with the extensive documentation requirements imposed on MNCs, we assume
that in the event of a tax audit, the TA observes the realized marginal costs, the transfer
pricing regime (OSB or TSB), and in the case of TSB, the internally used transfer price.
In the event of detected non-compliance, the MNC will be forced to pay the previously
saved tax liability plus a penalty. The saved tax liability is the difference between the tax
payment based on the compliant transfer price enforced by the auditor (pa) and the
originally reported transfer price pr. We assume that for a low-cost (high-cost) MNC,
the enforced transfer price is pr (pr). Moreover, the tax authority will levy an additional
penalty, which is captured by a linear penalty factor δ ∈ {δOSB, δTSB}, that is applied to
the evaded tax (Yitzhaki, 1974).4 In line with anecdotal findings and empirical evidence
regarding book-tax conformity (Mills, 1998; EY, 2003, 2012; KPMG, 2012), we assume
1≤ δOSB < δTSB.
Hence, in the event of detected non-compliance, the MNC faces the following payment,
depending on its transfer pricing regime:
S = (t+h)qδ ·max{pr−pa,0}, (2.3)
which comprises the intended tax evasion amount and the penalty. In the remainder of
the paper, we refer to S as the penalty. Thus, the TA’s decision problem can be written
as
max
xa∈{0,1}
{xA[E(S)−Ka]} . (2.4)
3 We do not consider the TA in the low-tax jurisdiction. The foreign TA anticipates that profits will be
shifted into her jurisdiction. In the event of a transfer pricing adjustment, double taxation occurs.
4 In some jurisdictions, for example in the U.S., the enforced transfer price is the median of the arm’s
length compliance range. By assuming that the upper bound of the compliance range is enforced, we do
not take into consideration the additional punishment from enforcing the median instead of the upper
bound. We capture the whole penalty by the penalty factor δ.
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The headquarters is interested in the global after-tax profit. Hence, the headquarters
incorporates both tax savings due to tax rate differences and possibly resulting penalties.
Thus, the headquarters maximizes
ΠMNC = q
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 12q
)
− (1− t)c+hpr
]
−S. (2.5)
The timing of the game is depicted in figure 2.1.
t=0 MNC selects a transfer pricingregime, i.e., OSB or TSB
t=1 Nature assigns operatingconditions, i.e., cH or cL
First Stage: Implementation
t=2 MNC determines pi and pr
t=3 Domestic division chooses q
Second Stage: Compliance
t=4 TA observes pr and decides onaudit
t=5
With detected non-compliance,
TA adjusts reported transfer
price
Third Stage: Audit
t=6 Payoffs are realized
Figure 2.1: Timeline
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The TA’s auditing decision takes place after the MNC has sent its transfer pricing re-
port. Nevertheless, the decisions in both stages may be seen as strategically ‘simultaneous’
in the sense that the TA only observes the outcome of the chosen reporting strategy. The
strategy itself remains concealed (Crawford and Sobel, 1982, p. 1433), but the reported
transfer price pr is a signal to the auditor. Thus, we apply the weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) concept. Generally, the MNC’s transfer pricing decision is a continu-
ous decision, as the firm may choose an arbitrary pr,pi > 0. In the following, we argue
14
that the MNC will have to consider a very restricted set of potential transfer prices. We
discuss the tax transfer price first.
A transfer price pr > pr is unambiguous evidence of non-compliance for the TA even
without any tax audit. We assume that the TA punishes obvious non-compliance without
facing substantial audit costs because such obvious tax evasion is beyond dispute. Hence,
pr > pr will never be reported. Therefore, type cH will always use a compliant transfer
price pr. Moreover, in the case of TSB, pr will be set equal to pr to minimize tax payments.
This is not necessarily true for OSB because the trade-off between quantity distortion and
tax savings has to be considered. However, we show that for a large prohibitive price a,
the high reported transfer price pr is also optimal under OSB. To see this, suppose that
an MNC of type cH has installed an OSB transfer pricing regime. Then, headquarters
maximizes its expected profits by determining a transfer price:
∂ΠMNC
∂pr
= (1− t−h)(−pr) + (1− t)cH +ah−2hpr = 0
⇐⇒ pr = 11− t+h [(1− t)cH +ah]≥ pr
for sufficiently large a. Thus, to remain compliant, the high-cost type chooses pr. The low-
cost type may choose a non-compliant transfer price. As the TA anticipates that a high-
cost MNC always reports pr, reporting a transfer price in the range [pr,pr) immediately
identifies the MNC as a low-cost type. Therefore, the non-compliant MNC will choose
pr = pr in the cases of OSB and TSB. If the MNC decides to be compliant and not to
mimic the high-cost type, it chooses to report the highest possible arm’s length price pr.
Analogously, as shown for the high-cost type, a large enough prohibitive price ensures
that pr is also optimal under OSB. Lemma 2.1 summarizes.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose a large prohibitive price a.
1. An MNC of type cH sets the compliant transfer price pr = pr in the cases of TSB
and OSB.
2. A non-compliant MNC of type cL sets pr = pr in the cases of TSB and OSB.
3. A compliant MNC of type cL sets pr = pr in the cases of TSB and OSB.
Proof. See appendix.
Essentially, lemma 2.1 states that the tax transfer pricing decision for the MNC reduces
to the set {pr,pr}.
With TSB, the internal transfer price includes an adjustment of marginal costs. In
particular, the MNC uses tax-adjusted marginal costs as the internal transfer price in the
compliance case. This price induces the domestic sales division to make the optimal quan-
tity decision. This matches the findings of Baldenius et al. (2004). In the non-compliance
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case, the MNC additionally considers the potential costs following a transfer pricing audit.
Hence, by considering a strategic TA, tax- and audit-adjusted marginal costs are used for
internal optimization. This finding is summarized in lemma 2.2. Note that η denotes the
TA’s audit probability.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that the MNC has installed a TSB regime in the first stage.
1. In the case of a non-compliant transfer price being reported by the low-cost type, the
possible penalty due to detection is incorporated for internal coordination:
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
. (2.6)
2. In the case of a compliant tax transfer price, tax-adjusted marginal costs cj, j =H,L
are adopted for internal coordination:
piH =
1
1− t−h [(1− t)cH −hpr] (2.7)
and
pi2 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
Proof. See appendix.
Finally, we consider the TA. She will never audit a tax transfer price pr ≤ pr, because
the MNC will always be compliant.
The game tree depicted in figure 2.2 displays those strategies for the MNC and TA
that are not dominated.
The game described above is an extended inspection game in which inspection decisions
depend on the reported transfer price. Pure strategy equilibria will exist for extremely
high or low audit costs in combination with low or high penalty payments for detected
non-compliance. In such cases, the MNC will select TSB or OSB in stage 1 and then
always or never choose a compliant transfer price in stage 2, and the TA never or always
chooses to audit the MNC. We are not interested in such equilibria, because they cannot
explain why compliance and non-compliance as well as non-trivial tax audit strategies
can simultaneously be observed in reality. Therefore, we concentrate on mixed strategy
equilibria. In our game, randomization may appear at three stages of the game tree: (1)
The MNC may randomize between TSB and OSB in the implementation stage. We denote
the corresponding probability by τ . (2) After observing its cost type in the compliance
stage, the low-cost MNC may choose the non-compliant transfer price pr with probability
λ and the compliant price pr with probability 1−λ. (3) In the audit stage, the TA decides
whether to conduct an audit (probability η) or not (probability 1−η).
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the players have to be indifferent among all the
strategies that are played with a non-zero probability in equilibrium. That implies an equal
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Figure 2.2: Game tree without dominated strategies
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payoff for all these strategies. In our two-player game, payoff equality between the MNC’s
equilibrium actions is achieved by the TA’s audit probability following a reported transfer
price pr. Note that the MNC encounters two decisions in two stages. Randomization
in both stages requires indifference both between the two implementation options and
between compliance and non-compliance. However, the TA has only one decision variable
to induce indifference. Therefore, randomization by the MNC will appear in only one of
the two stages in equilibrium. In the following, we separately discuss equilibria with (1)
deterministic implementation and random compliance and (2) random implementation
and deterministic compliance decisions.
The first proposition considers equilibria in which the low-cost MNC randomizes be-
tween compliance and non-compliance. In equilibrium, TSB will be implemented in the
first stage of the game.
Proposition 2.1 (Deterministic implementation and random compliance). Suppose that
δOSB ≥ δOSB and Ka <Ka2(η1). Then, the only equilibrium with deterministic implemen-
tation and random compliance is given by the following actions:
• The MNC always implements TSB. The low-cost type randomizes between compli-
ance and non-compliance. The non-compliant reported transfer price, i.e., pr, is
chosen with probability λTSB,I . The high-cost type always chooses the compliant
transfer price pr.
• The TA audits the high reported transfer price pr with audit probability ηI .
Proof. All proofs, equilibrium probabilities, and thresholds are stated in the appendix.
The deterministic implementation of TSB is an equilibrium strategy for an OSB
penalty factor close to the TSB penalty factor. In this case, the net benefit of reporting
a non-compliant transfer price in an OSB transfer pricing regime compared to a non-
compliant transfer price in a TSB transfer pricing regime is small because of the quantity
distortion under OSB. In this situation, the MNC randomizes between compliance and
non-compliance. The equilibrium will not occur for an OSB penalty factor that is rela-
tively low compared to the TSB penalty factor because then the MNC prefers to deviate
to OSB.
However, we will not observe an equilibrium with deterministic implementation of
OSB and randomization in the compliance stage. The argument is as follows: Suppose
that the MNC has implemented OSB and experiences cH . In this case, compliance is the
dominant action, and the MNC realizes the payoff under OSB and compliance (ΠMNC6 ).
This payoff is smaller than the payoff under TSB and compliance (ΠMNC1 ) because of the
quantity distortion. When observing cL, the MNC would randomize between compliance
and non-compliance. Payoff equality requires an equilibrium audit probability such that
the expected payoff to the low-cost type is equal to the payoff under OSB and compliant
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reporting (ΠMNC10 ). Again, this payoff is lower than the payoff under TSB and compli-
ant reporting. Thus, deterministic implementation of TSB and deterministic compliance
dominates deterministic implementation of OSB and random compliance.
As a result, we will only observe equilibria with OSB as part of a randomized imple-
mentation decision in the first stage of the game. The second proposition regards the case
of random implementation and deterministic compliance and shows that two equilibria
can occur.
Proposition 2.2 (Random implementation and deterministic compliance). Suppose that
Ka <Ka1(δOSB). Then, the following actions constitute an equilibrium:
• The MNC implements TSB with probability τII and OSB with probability 1− τII .
The low-cost MNC reports the compliant transfer price pr under TSB and the non-
compliant transfer price pr under OSB. The high-cost MNC reports the compliant
transfer price pr.
• The TA conducts an audit upon observing the high reported transfer price pr with
probability ηII .
Suppose that Ka1(δOSB)<Ka <Ka2 (ηIII). Now, the equilibrium actions are as follows:
• The MNC chooses TSB with probability τIII and OSB with probability 1−τIII . The
low-cost MNC chooses the non-compliant transfer price pr under TSB and under
OSB. The high-cost MNC reports the compliant transfer price pr.
• The TA audits the high reported transfer price pr with probability ηIII .
Proof. All proofs, equilibrium probabilities, and thresholds are stated in the appendix.
Note that the two equilibria described above are the only equilibria with deterministic
compliance or non-compliance. The low-cost MNC always chooses to be non-compliant
under OSB because the combination of a compliant transfer price and OSB will imply a
lower payoff than a compliant transfer price and TSB. Therefore, payoff equality between
OSB and TSB as required in the implementation stage will never be achieved with OSB
and deterministic compliance. Moreover, an equilibrium with compliance under OSB and
non-compliance under TSB will not exist because the MNC would deviate to a compliant
transfer price under TSB.
Furthermore, the proposition shows that the audit costs critically influence the deci-
sion between compliance and non-compliance. In the case of low audit costs, the MNC
chooses OSB with the non-compliant transfer price and TSB with the compliant trans-
fer price. Due to the low audit costs, the MNC expects frequent tax audits. Hence, it
balances the conflicting objectives while considering possible transfer pricing adjustments
and penalties. The non-compliant use of OSB realizes tax savings. The compliant use
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δOSB δTSB δOSB
Ka
Ka1(δOSB)
Ka2(ηI)
Ka2(ηIII)
OSB with pr and TSB with pr
OSB with pr and TSB with pr
TSB with pr and pr
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium areas depending on Ka and δOSB. The strategies are depicted for
the low-cost MNC. (plotted for a = 10.000, cH = 100, cL = 60, t = 0.2, h = 0.1, β = 0.8,
pr = 70, pr = 120, δTSB = 1.2.
of TSB yields the optimal quantity decision given the reported transfer price, while tax
payments are minimized within the legal boundaries. In the case of high audit costs, tax
audits are infrequent, and reporting the non-compliant transfer price dominates in the
second stage even in the case of TSB. Although the low-cost type always prefers non-
compliant reporting in the second stage, neither OSB nor TSB will be dominated in the
first stage. OSB implies lower penalties in the event of detection for the low-cost type,
and both types benefit from separating internal and external transfer prices under TSB.
Figure 2.3 summarizes the equilibria discussed above.
The figure shows that the equilibrium in our game is unique if the penalty parameter
δOSB is low. In this case, the MNC randomizes between TSB and OSB, and the audit
costs determine the compliance decision of the low-cost type under TSB. We observe that
the critical value Ka1(δOSB) increases in δOSB. This means that the most tax-aggressive
equilibrium with non-compliant reporting under OSB and TSB especially appears if δOSB
is low. This is also intuitive: A lower penalty factor under OSB decreases the TA’s incen-
tives. To keep the TA indifferent between auditing and not auditing, the audit costs Ka
also have to decrease. For higher penalty factors, the random implementation equilibria
coexist with the deterministic implementation equilibrium.
We now analyze the influence of the tax rate difference between the two countries.
This question is especially interesting in the case of TSB because the tax rate difference
directly and indirectly affects (1) the internal transfer price, (2) the audit probability, (3)
the implementation probability, and (4) the compliance probability.
At first glance, a higher tax rate difference should make TSB with non-compliant
reporting more attractive, because the possible gains from tax aggressiveness become
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larger. However, we show that the opposite is true. The MNC tends to refrain from the
non-compliant use of TSB given an increase in the tax rate difference. To understand
this counterintuitive finding, we provide the intuition in two steps. First, we consider
the impact of an increasing tax rate difference on the internal transfer prices and the
audit probability. Second, we illustrate the effect on the implementation and compliance
probabilities.
We begin with the discussion of the internal transfer prices in the case of compliant
reporting. As stated in lemma 2.2, the internal transfer price for an MNC with marginal
costs cj , j =H,L, and compliant reporting is:
pi =
1
1− t−h [(1− t−h)cj−hmj ] .
An increase in the tax rate difference makes profit shifting to the low-tax country more
attractive. With TSB, the MNC’s reported transfer price is set solely to optimize the
tax payments. Thus, the higher profit-shifting incentives are incorporated by lowering the
internal transfer price, which induces the MNC of type cj with j = H,L to increase the
quantity. That is, a higher tax rate difference results in lower tax-adjusted marginal costs
for internal coordination:
∂pi
∂h
= (−1) 1(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)mj ]< 0.
This has an indirect effect on the MNC’s expected profit. The price per unit sold externally
decreases as the contribution margin per unit sold decreases. However, for a larger tax
rate difference, the decrease in the contribution margin is outweighed by the positive
effect of a higher quantity because the benefit from separating internal coordination and
external reporting increases. In other words, inflating the external market reduces the
revenue gained. Nevertheless, the net income of the MNC increases due to reduced tax
liability.
Next, we consider the internal transfer price in the case of non-compliant reporting
behavior (see lemma 2.2):
pi1 =
1
1− t−h [(1− t)cL−hpr]︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax-adjustment
+ 11− t−h
[
ηδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
audit-adjustment
.
Comparing the internal transfer price for compliant reporting behavior with the inter-
nal transfer price in the case of non-compliant reporting behavior reveals that lowering
the tax adjustment of marginal costs due to an increasing tax rate difference occurs in-
dependent of the MNC’s compliance.
In addition, an MNC non-compliantly using TSB considers the impact of a higher
tax rate difference on the audit adjustment part because this is incorporated into the
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internal transfer price. The effect is twofold. First, a higher tax rate difference directly
increases the audit-adjustment part. However, as stated in the appendix, the reduced
tax adjustment outweighs the increase in the audit adjustment. In sum, the direct effect
of an increasing tax rate difference on the internal transfer price under non-compliant
reporting is negative. Second, an increase in the tax rate difference affects the TA’s audit
probability η, which then influences the audit adjustment in the internal transfer price
in the case of non-compliant reporting. Specifically, consider the direct and the indirect
effect of an increasing tax rate difference on the penalty S. An increase in the tax rate
difference directly increases the penalty S. Moreover, as described above, a higher tax
rate difference directly decreases the internal transfer prices and, thus, leads to a higher
produced and sold quantity q. This also leads to a higher penalty S.
In the deterministic implementation equilibrium with random compliance, a higher
penalty affects only non-compliant reporting. However, the increasing quantity also af-
fects the MNC’s profit in the case of compliance. In sum, the quantity effect exceeds the
increasing penalty such that profit shifting becomes especially attractive. This is antici-
pated by the TA and leads to more frequent audits. That is, ηI is increasing in the tax
rate difference h, dηI/dh > 0.
In the random implementation equilibrium with deterministic non-compliance, the
threat of an increasing penalty harms both equilibrium strategies because the low-cost
type always reports non-compliantly. However, the benefits of an increasing quantity can
only be realized by keeping TSB, so that in total, a higher penalty decreases profit shifting
incentives. Thus, a decreasing audit probability ensures the MNC’s indifference condition,
i.e., dηIII/dh < 0.
In both the deterministic implementation equilibrium with random compliance and
the random implementation equilibrium with deterministic non-compliance, the sum of
the direct and the indirect effect of an increasing tax rate difference on the non-compliant
internal transfer price is negative. That is, for both compliant and non-compliant MNCs
using TSB, a higher tax rate difference results in a lower internal transfer price and a
higher quantity q. The findings described above are summarized in proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3. In the deterministic implementation equilibrium with random com-
pliance, an increase in the tax rate difference h increases the TA’s audit probability, i.e.,
dηI/dh> 0. In the random implementation equilibrium with deterministic non-compliance,
an increase in the tax rate difference h decreases the TA’s audit probability, i.e., dηIII/dh<
0. With TSB, an increase in the tax rate difference h decreases the internal transfer prices
and, thus, increases the quantity q produced and sold by the MNC.
Proof. See appendix.
Next, we consider the MNC’s willingness to keep TSB with non-compliant reporting.
Reconsider the impact of a higher tax rate difference on the penalty S. A higher penalty
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implies higher scrutiny incentives for the TA. In equilibrium, the MNC anticipates this
and reduces the probability of tax-aggressive behavior to keep the expected penalty at
the same level. This is true for all equilibria in which the non-compliant use of TSB is
part of an equilibrium strategy. Hence, both the probability of reporting non-compliantly
in the case of the deterministic implementation of TSB (λTSB,I) and the probability of
implementing TSB in the equilibrium with stochastic implementation and deterministic
non-compliant reporting (τIII) are decreasing in the tax rate difference. That is,
dλTSB,I
dh
= ∂λTSB,I
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂λTSB,I
∂pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· dpi1
dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0
and
dτIII
dh
= ∂τIII
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂τIII
∂pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· dpi1
dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0
depending on the prevailing equilibrium. The findings are summarized in proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4. Given a positive probability of tax-aggressive behavior, the probability
of keeping TSB with the non-compliant transfer price pr decreases following an increase
in the tax rate difference h.
Proof. See appendix.
This result is in line with the empirical finding of Chan and Chow (1997) that high
tax rate differences are not crucial for the inducement of transfer pricing manipulations.
Nevertheless, their work demonstrates that the TA is aware of an MNC’s profit shifting
incentives. She assesses how likely an MNC is to engage in transfer pricing manipulations.
This assessment depends on the profit shifting incentives for the MNC. Thus, accounting
for the strategic interaction between the TA and the MNC leads to less manipulation in
the case of an increasing tax rate difference.
2.5 Conclusion
Prior research has demonstrated that keeping OSB in markets with imperfect com-
petition might become optimal despite the MNC’s reduced flexibility in optimizing both
internal decision making and tax payments (see, for example, Arya and Mittendorf, 2008;
Dürr and Göx, 2011). However, these results depend crucially on whether competitors
are able to observe when one transfer price is used to align conflicting objectives. We
argue that strategic considerations in a tax compliance game are another explanation for
the implementation of OSB. In our setting, the MNC faces a trade-off between flexibility
and expected penalty payments. By keeping TSB, an MNC can separately induce the
optimal quantity decision and minimize tax payments. However, a unique transfer price
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used for internal and tax purposes will reduce penalty payments in the event that non-
compliance is detected by the tax auditor. We show that the implementation of OSB
together with non-compliant reporting is part of the equilibrium whenever the penalty
difference between TSB and OSB is large.
Based on our equilibrium analysis, we investigate the consequences of the tax rate
difference between the foreign and the domestic country. The findings show that when
this parameter increases, an MNC’s tax aggressiveness decreases. Specifically, we find that
the probability of keeping non-compliant TSB decreases given an increase in the tax rate
difference between the high-tax and the low-tax jurisdiction. This result is directly induced
by the strategic TA: On the one hand, as expected, a high tax rate difference yields a
high tax-savings potential for the MNC. By keeping TSB with a non-compliant transfer
price, the MNC can exploit the high tax rate difference by shifting profits to the low-tax
country. However, the TA is aware of the MNC’s incentive to shift profits. Thus, the
high tax-savings potential increases the TA’s audit incentives. As a consequence, with an
increasing tax rate difference, profit shifting becomes riskier, more expensive, and thus less
attractive for the MNC. Then, the MNC increasingly refrains from keeping non-compliant
TSB and deviates to compliant reporting or implementing OSB in the first stage.
These results highlight that tax regulation and tax enforcement affect taxpayer be-
havior in a non-trivial way. In particular, an MNC’s choice of keeping OSB versus TSB
and the related potential tax-saving behavior can be influenced by tax legislation and
enforcement. This paper illustrates that the level of audit costs of the TA and the penalty
factors applied in the event of detected non-compliance determine the MNC’s tax-related
equilibrium behavior. As a consequence, in addition to MNCs, the findings are highly
relevant for a number of institutional players, for example, legislators, tax authorities,
and supranational units such as the EU and the OECD.
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2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1
The possible strategies are depicted in figure 2.4.
MNC
cL
cH
cL
cH
OSB
TSB
1−β
β
1−β
β
pr ∈ [prL ,pr ]
pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)pr = pr
pr ∈ [prL ,pr ]
pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)pr = pr
pi ,pr ∈ [prL ,pr ]
pi,pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)pi,pr = pr
pi ,pr ∈ [prL ,pr ]
pi,pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)pi,pr = pr
Figure 2.4: Possible strategy choices for an MNC with marginal costs cj , where j =H,L
The following strategies are dominated:
• When the MNC reports pr = pr, the MNC incurs the highest possible tax payments.
Thus, a tax audit cannot result in additional tax revenues. Consequently, the TA
never audits the reported transfer price pr.
• For pr >pr, is an unambiguous signal of tax evasion which is punished without costs.
Thus, setting pr > pr is never chosen by the MNC.
• The TA cannot generate any additional tax revenues in a tax audit when the MNC
is of type c = cH and chooses a pr ≤ pr. The high-cost MNC minimizes the tax
payments by setting pr = pr in case of TSB.
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• For a high prohibitive price a, the MNC of type c = cH keeping OSB prefers the
transfer price pr = pr. Suppose an MNC of type cH has installed a OSB transfer
pricing regime. Then, headquarters maximizes its expected profit determining a
transfer price:
∂ΠMNC
∂pr
= (1− t−h)(−pr) + (1− t)cH +ah−2hpr = 0
⇐⇒ pr = 11− t+h [(1− t)cH +ah]≥ pr
for sufficiently large a. Thus, in order to stay compliant the high-cost type chooses
pr. We assume throughout the paper, that a is sufficiently large.
• For TSB with a pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)
, the MNC of type c= cL prefers one of the not included
corner solutions. Thus, using pr = pr (pr = pr) strictly dominates the use of a pr
close to pr = pr (pr = pr).
• For a high prohibitive price a, the MNC of type c = cL keeping OSB prefers the
transfer price pr = pr or pr = pr to any pr ∈
(
pr,pr
)
.
Suppose an MNC of type cL has installed a OSB transfer pricing regime and wants
to choose a compliant reported transfer price pr ≤ pr. Then, headquarters maximizes
its expected profit determining a transfer price:
∂ΠMNC
∂pr
= (1− t+h)(−pr) + (1− t)cL+ah= 0
⇐⇒ pr = 11− t+h [(1− t)cL+ah]≥ pr
for sufficiently large a. Thus, in order to stay compliant the low-cost type chooses
pr.
Suppose an MNC of type cL has installed a OSB transfer pricing regime and im-
plements a reported transfer price pr ≤ pr ≤ pr. Then, headquarters maximizes its
expected profit determining a transfer price:
∂ΠMNC
∂pr
= (1−t+h−2η(t+h)δOSB)(−pr)+(1−t)cL+ah−η(t+h)δOSB(a+pr) = 0
⇐⇒ pr = 11− t+h−2η(t+h)δOSB
[
(1− t)cL+ah−η(t+h)δOSB(a+pr)
]
∂2ΠMNC
∂p2r
= (1− t+h−2η(t+h)δOSB)(−1)
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∂2ΠMNC
∂p2r
is negative for δOSB < 1−t+h2η(t+h) . That is, for a δOSB >
1−t+h
2η(t+h) the first order
condition determines a local minimum and the MNC prefers a corner solution. Sup-
pose δOSB < 1−t+h2η(t+h) so that the first order condition determines a local maximum.
For a sufficiently large a, the MNC’s FOC does not determine a pr in the interval
[pr,pr]. Therefore, the MNC prefers a corner solution.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
This proof is organized in two steps. First, the case is considered in which the MNC
reports a compliant transfer price under TSB. Second, the case is considered in which a
low-cost MNC mimics a high-cost MNC.
Step 1: For an MNC of type cj with j = H,L, the TA does not contest a reported
transfer price that belongs to the range [prL,pr] or
[
prL,pr
]
, respectively. Thus, the MNC’s
profit with marginal costs cj is determined by
ΠMNC(pi,pr) = (a−pi)
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 12(a−pi)
)
− (1− t)cj +hpr
]
. (2.8)
The FOC of equation 2.8 with respect to pr is (a− pi)h > 0. The Hessian matrix of
equation 2.8 is not strictly definite. Hence, the MNC prefers to set pr as large as possible,
i.e., pr (pr) for cj = cH (cj = cL).
FOCpi :−(1− t−h)pi+ (1− t)cj−hpr = 0
SOCpi :−(1− t−h)< 0
Thus, the FOC for pi determines a local maximum:
pi =
1
1− t−h [(1− t)cj−hpr] .
Step 2: For an MNC of type cL, the TA might want to contest a reported transfer
price that belongs to the range
(
pr,pr
]
. Then, the MNC’s profit is determined by
ΠMNC(pi,pr) = (a−pi)
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 12(a−pi)
)
− (1− t)cL+hpr
]
(2.9)
−ηδTSB(t+h)(a−pi)(pr−pr).
The FOC of equation 2.9 with respect to pr is (a− pi) [h−ηδTSB(t+h)]. The Hessian
matrix of equation 2.9 is not strictly definite. Hence, the MNC prefers to either set pr as
large or as small as possible. The case in which the MNC wants to set a small transfer price
is already described in step 1. Thus, we next consider the case in which pr is preferred.
FOCpi :−(1− t−h)pi+ (1− t)cL−hpr +ηδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr) = 0
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SOCpi :−(1− t−h)< 0
Thus, the FOC for pi determines a local maximum:
pi =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 and 2.2
Let ρ be the TA’s belief that an MNC reporting a high transfer price, pr = pr, has high
marginal costs, c = cH . In addition, τ is the randomized strategy of the MNC regarding
the transfer pricing regime. τ (1− τ) denotes the MNC’s chosen probability to keep TSB
(OSB). λTSB (1− λTSB) is the low-cost MNC’s chosen probability to report the non-
compliant (compliant) transfer price pr (pr) when TSB are kept. λOSB (1−λOSB) is the
low-cost MNC’s chosen probability to report the non-compliant (compliant) transfer price
pr (pr) when OSB is kept. When observing a high reported transfer price pr = pr, the TA
chooses to (not) conduct an audit with probability η (1− η). Note that an MNC with
c = cH always reports the transfer price pr = pr and the TA never audits a low reported
transfer price pr = pr.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
We focus on mixed strategy equilibria. In a mixed strategy equilibrium the players
have to be indifferent among all the strategies that are played with a non-zero probability
in equilibrium. That implies an equal payoff for all these strategies. In our two player
game, payoff equality between the MNC’s equilibrium actions is achieved by the TA’s
audit probability following a reported transfer price pr. Note that the MNC makes two
decisions at two stages. Randomization at both stages requires indifference between the
two implementation options and between compliance and non-compliance at the same
time. However, the TA has only one decision variable to induce indifference. Therefore,
randomization by the MNC will appear at only one of the two stages in equilibrium.
First, consider randomization between compliance and non-compliance for the low-
cost type when the MNC keeps OSB. The low-cost MNC randomizes between compliance
and non-compliance if and only if, the expected profit of these two strategies are the same:
E [Π | c= cL,OSB,pr = pr] = ηΠMNC8 + (1−η)ΠMNC9 ,
E
[
Π | c= cL,OSB,pr = pr
]
= ΠMNC10 ,
ηΠMNC8 + (1−η)ΠMNC9 = ΠMNC10
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That is, the MNC’s expected profit at the implementation stage is:
βΠMNC6 + (1−β)ΠMNC10
The MNC’s expected profit for TSB and compliant reporting at the implementation stage
is:
βΠMNC1 + (1−β)ΠMNC5
Note that ΠMNC6 <ΠMNC1 and ΠMNC10 <ΠMNC5 . Therefore, the MNC always deviates to
keeping TSB so that OSB with randomization at the compliance stage is not an equi-
librium. As a consequence, keeping TSB and random compliance is the only equilibrium
with deterministic implementation and random compliance.
Under which conditions does the MNC always keep TSB where the low-cost MNC
randomizes between compliance and non-compliance? With TSB in place, the low-cost
MNC randomizes between compliance and non-compliance if and only if, the expected
profit of these two strategies are the same:
E [Π | c= cL,TSB,pr = pr] = ηΠMNC3 + (1−η)ΠMNC4 ,
E
[
Π | c= cL,TSB,pr = pr
]
= ΠMNC5 ,
ηΠMNC3 + (1−η)ΠMNC4 = ΠMNC5
⇐⇒ η ∈
{
h
δ(t+h) ,
h
δ(t+h) +
2[a(1− t−h)− cL(1− t)]
δ(pr−pr)(t+h)
}
.
Conducting an audit is associated with costs for the TA. Thus, the TA audits with prob-
ability
ηI =
h
δ(t+h) > 0.
ηI is smaller than 1.
The MNC wants to deviate to keeping OSB with pr in t= 0 when δOSB ≤ δOSB. δOSB
is determined by the following equation:
βΠMNC1 + (1−β)ΠMNC5 = βΠMNC6 + (1−β)
[
ηIΠMNC8 + (1−ηI)ΠMNC9
]
⇐⇒ δOSB = 1(β−1)h(a−pr)(pr−pr) · δTSB·[
(1−β)
[
pi2
(
2cL(1− t)−2hpr−pi2(1− t−h)
)]
+βpiH (2cH(1− t)−piH(1− t−h)−2hpr)
+pr (1− t−h−2cH(1− t) + 2hpr)−2a(1−β)
[
(cL− cH)(1− t) +h(pr−pr)
]]
29
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between con-
ducting and not conducting an audit if and only if, the expected profit of these strategies
are the same:
βΠTA1 + (1−β)λTSBΠTA3 = 0
⇐⇒ λTSB = Ka(1−β)(t+h)δTSB(pr−pr)(a−pi1) := λTSB,I .
λTSB,I is positive. In addition, it is smaller than 1 if and only if Ka <Ka2(ηI), where
Ka2(ηI) := δTSB(a−pi1)(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr). (2.10)
In sum, always keeping TSB and the low-cost MNC randomizing between pr = pr and
pr = pr can occur for Ka <Ka2(ηI) and δOSB ≥ δOSB. In this case, τ = 1, λTSB = λTSB,I ,
η = ηI , and ρ= ββ+(1−β)λTSB,I constitute a weak PBE.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Step 1: Under which conditions does the MNC randomize between OSB and TSB
and the low-cost MNC reports compliantly under TSB and non-compliantly under OSB?
The MNC randomizes the strategies OSB and TSB if and only if, the expected profit of
these two strategies are the same:
E [Π | TSB] = βΠMNC1 + (1−β)ΠMNC5 ,
E [Π |OSB] = βΠMNC6 + (1−β)
[
ηΠMNC8 + (1−η)ΠMNC9
]
,
E [Π | TSB] = E [Π |OSB]
⇐⇒ η = 1(1−β)(a−pr)δOSB(t+h)(pr−pr)[
1− t−h
2
[
a2−pr2−β(a−piH)2− (1−β)(a−pi2)2
]
−β(a−pr)(1− t)cH − cL(1− t)(1−β)(a−pr) +hpr(a−pr)
]
:= ηII .
For sufficiently large a is ηII > 0.
ηII is always smaller than 1 because:
ΠMNC5 −ΠMNC8 =
1− t−h
2 (pr−pi2)
2 + (a−pr)(pr−pr)
δOSB(t+h)−h︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for δOSB>1
> 0.
Moreover, for a large prohibitive price a, ΠMNC9 > ΠMNC5 > 0 holds true. Thus, ηII < 1.
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The MNC might have an incentive to deviate keeping TSB and then choosing the
non-compliant transfer price pr in the case of low cost. This is the case if and only if
βΠMNC1 + (1−β)
[
ηIIΠMNC3 + (1−ηII)ΠMNC4
]
> βΠMNC1 + (1−β)ΠMNC5
⇐⇒ ηIIΠMNC3 + (1−ηII)ΠMNC4 > ΠMNC5 .
⇐⇒ 1− t−h2
(
p2i2−p2i1
)
< a(pr−pr) [h−ηIIδTSB(t+h)] .
For a large a the term [h−ηIIδTSB(t+h)] becomes negative so that a [h−ηIIδTSB(t+h)]
is negative. The inequality is violated for sufficiently large a. Therefore, the MNC does
not want to deviate to non-compliant TSB.
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between con-
ducting and not conducting an audit if and only if the expected profits of both strategies
are the same:
τβΠTA1 + (1− τ)
[
βΠTA6 + (1−β)ΠTA8
]
= 0
⇐⇒ τ = 1− Ka
δOSB(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr)(a−pr) := τII .
τII is smaller than 1. In addition, it is positive if and only if Ka ≤Ka1(δOSB) of (2.12).
In sum, randomizing between OSB and TSB where the low-cost MNC reports com-
pliantly under TSB and non-compliantly under OSB can occur for Ka <Ka1(δOSB) . In
this case, τ = τII , λTSB = 0, λOSB = 1, η = ηII , and ρ= ββ+(1−τII)(1−β) constitute a weak
PBE.
Step 2: Under which conditions does the MNC randomize between OSB and TSB
and the low-cost MNC always reports the non-compliant transfer price pr? The MNC
randomizes the strategies OSB and TSB if and only if, the expected profit of these two
strategies are the same:
E [Π | TSB] = βΠMNC1 + (1−β)
[
ηΠMNC3 + (1−η)ΠMNC4
]
,
E [Π |OSB] = βΠMNC6 + (1−β)
[
ηΠMNC8 + (1−η)ΠMNC9
]
,
E [Π | TSB] = E [Π |OSB]
⇐⇒ η2 + 2Bη+C = 0, (2.11)
where
B= 1
δ2TSB(pr−pr)(t+h)
[cLδTSB(1−t)+a(δOSB−δTSB)(1−t−h)−pr(δOSB(1−t−h)+δTSBh)],
C = (1− t)
2
(1−β)δ2TSB(pr−pr)2(t+h)2
[β(cH − cL)(cH + cL−2pr) + (cL−pr)2].
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For β ∈ [0,1], C is positive. We assume throughout the paper that a is sufficiently
large so that B < 0 and B2−C > 0. Thus, the MNC is indifferent between OSB and TSB
for
ηIII :=−B−
√
B2−C > 0.
For a large a, ηIII is smaller than 1.
The MNC might have an incentive to deviate keeping TSB and then choosing the
compliant transfer price pr in the case of low costs. This is the case if and only if
βΠMNC1 + (1−β)ΠMNC5 > βΠMNC6 + (1−β)
[
ηIIIΠMNC8 + (1−ηIII)ΠMNC9
]
⇐⇒ β 1− t−h2
(
(pr−pi2)2− (piH −pr)2
)
<
1− t−h
2 (pr−pi2)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1−β)(a−pr)(pr−pr) [ηIIIδOSB(t+h)−h] .
For a large a the term [ηIIIδOSB(t+h)−h] becomes negative so that a [ηIIIδOSB(t+h)−h]
is negative. Hence, for large a the inequality is violated. Therefore, the MNC never devi-
ates to TSB with compliant reporting.
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between con-
ducting and not conducting an audit if and only if the expected profits of both strategies
are the same:
τ
[
βΠTA1 + (1−β)ΠTA3
]
+ (1− τ)
[
βΠTA6 + (1−β)ΠTA8
]
= 0
⇐⇒ τ = Ka− (1−β)(t+h)(a−pr)(pr−pr)δOSB(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr)[(a−pi1)δTSB− (a−pr)δOSB] := τIII .
τIII is positive and smaller than 1 if and only if Ka1(δOSB)<Ka <Ka2(ηIII), where
Ka1(δOSB) := δOSB(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr)(a−pr) (2.12)
and
Ka2(ηIII) := δTSB(a−pi1)(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr). (2.13)
In sum, randomizing between OSB and TSB where the low-cost MNC is always non-
compliant can occur for Ka1(δOSB) < Ka < Ka2(ηIII). In this case, τ = τIII , λTSB = 1,
λOSB = 1, η = ηIII , and ρ= β constitute a weak PBE.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
A high-cost MNC uses the internal transfer price
piH =
1
1− t−h [(1− t)cH −hpr] .
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dpiH
dh
= (−1) 1(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)mH ]< 0.
A low-cost MNC keeping TSB with pr uses the internal transfer price
pi2 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
dpi2
dh
= (−1) 1(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)mL]< 0.
In the equilibrium where the MNC always keeps TSB, a low-cost MNC reporting pr
uses the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
= 11− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
dpi1
dh
= (−1) 1(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)(−mL)]< 0.
In the equilibrium where the MNC randomizes between TSB and OSB and the low-cost
MNC always reports the non-compliant transfer price pr, a low-cost MNC keeping TSB
with pr uses the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIIIδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
.
∂pi1
∂h
= 1(1− t−h)2
(1− t)(cL−pr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ηIIIδTSB(pr−pr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 .
For a high prohibitive price a, ∂pi1∂h is negative.
∂pi1
∂ηIII
= t+h1− t−hδTSB(pr−pr)> 0.
The probability to keep TSB ηIII is implicitly defined by F = η2 +Bη+C = 0 (see equation
(2.11)).
∂F
∂ηIII
= 2ηIII +B > 0.
∂F
∂h
= ∂B
∂h
η+ ∂C
∂h
,
which is positive for a large prohibitive price a. According to the implicit function theorem,
dηIII
dh
=−
∂F
∂h
∂F
∂ηIII
< 0.
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In sum,
dpi1
dh
= ∂pi1
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂pi1
∂ηIII︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· dηIII
dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
According to equation 2.1, a smaller internal transfer price results in a higher quantity
produced and sold.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
In the equilibrium where the MNC always keeps TSB, the low-cost MNC reports the
non-compliant transfer price pr with probability λTSB,I and uses the internal transfer
price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
= 11− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
,
where dpi1dh is negative according to section 2.6.
∂λTSB,I
∂h
= (−1)(t+h)2
Ka
(1−β)δTSB(a−pi1)(pr−pr) < 0.
∂λTSB,I
∂pi1
= Ka(a−pi1)
2
(1−β)(t+h)δTSB(pr−pr) > 0.
Therefore,
dλTSB,I
dh
= ∂λTSB,I
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂λTSB,I
∂pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dpi1
dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
In the equilibrium where the MNC randomizes between TSB and OSB and the low-
cost MNC always reports the non-compliant transfer price pr, the MNC keeps TSB with
probability τIII and uses the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIIIδTSB(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
,
where dpi1dh is negative according to section 2.6.
∂τIII
∂h
= (−1) Ka(1−β)(t+h)2(pr−pr) [δTSB(a−pi1)− δOSB(a−pr)] < 0.
∂τIII
∂pi1
= δTSB [δTSB(a−pi1)− δOSB(a−pr)]−2
[
(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr)
]−1 ·
[
Ka− δOSB(a−pr)(1−β)(t+h)(pr−pr)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for Ka>Ka1
> 0.
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In sum,
dτIII
dh
= ∂τIII
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂τIII
∂pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dpi1
dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
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Chapter 3
Transfer Pricing and Location Choice of Intangibles –
Spillover and Tax Avoidance through Profit Shifting†
Abstract
Large multinational companies are regularly suspected of using transfer pricing of intan-
gibles to shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the optimal transfer
prices while endogenizing the location choice of intangibles and considering spillovers. In
line with the initial intuition, we find that multinationals locate their intangibles in low-tax
jurisdictions and deploy royalty flows to minimize tax payments. However, if multination-
als face a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient spillover internalization, the
so-called ’home bias’ might occur. Then, for a large spillover, the intangible is optimally
located in the high-tax domestic country. This leads to less severe investment distortions
because the spillover is internalized. In addition, the model predicts that curtailing profit
shifting possibilities can either harm or facilitate multinationals’ overall investments. This
depends heavily on unobservable factors such as the underlying accounting system. There-
fore, our analysis highlights challenges for the anti-avoidance legislation of governments.
† This chapter is joint work with Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten (Vienna University of Economics and
Business)
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3.1 Introduction
The low effective tax rates enjoyed by large multinational companies (MNCs) and
the underlying profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions have drawn public attention. The
European Union and its member states are particularly concerned about collecting the
taxes they are owed (Drozdiak, 2017; Wall Street Journal, 2017). Transfer pricing is often
used to shift profits. In particular, locating intangibles in low-tax jurisdictions and the
subsequent royalty flows are effective means of avoiding tax payments. Empirical evidence
reveals that intangibles display a ‘home bias’. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) show that
the average European MNC files 57.1 percent of its annual patent applications from the
parent location. For trademarks, Heckemeyer et al. (2018) find an even stronger ‘home
bias’. They document that 95.3 percent of the U.S. trademarks registered at the USPTO
between 2003 and 2012 are owned by U.S. constituents of the S&P 500. This seems to be
counterintuitive at first glance.
The unique nature and especially the public good character of intangibles allow for
considerable discretion in their location choice and respective transfer pricing. Moreover,
the use of existing intangibles entails no or negligible marginal costs. Additionally, an
intangible is typically non-exclusive in its consumption, and spillovers or network effects
typically occur (Lev, 2001). These network effects may appear as spillovers from one
division’s investments in intangibles to other divisions’ profits. The internalization of
these spillovers is crucial for the success of decentralized MNCs (Roberts, 2005). The
prior literature demonstrates that transfer pricing might help to induce the internalization
of spillovers (Bouwens et al., 2017). However, most of the existing research regarding
transfer pricing neglects these aspects and investigates only tax optimization. We extend
this strand of literature by incorporating both spillovers and tax optimization. Tax-saving
incentives may interfere with the internalization incentives of spillovers, therefore affecting
the location choice and the respective transfer pricing. The objective of this paper is to
shed light on the impact of an intangible’s specific characteristics on its location choice
and corresponding transfer pricing decisions.
Regarding the unique characteristics of intangibles, we focus on missing marginal costs
for using an existing intangible, spillovers, non-rivalry in its consumption, and the ease
of the location choice. In particular, we examine the following research questions: Is the
intangible optimally located in the high- or in the low-tax jurisdiction? That is, do MNCs
exhibit a ‘home bias’ for their location choice of intangibles? How does a spillover influence
the MNCs’ location choice, respective royalty payments, and corresponding investment
decisions related to intangibles?
We consider a decentralized MNC comprising a headquarters and a domestic and a
foreign division. The MNC’s headquarters and the domestic division are located in a high-
tax jurisdiction. The foreign division operates in a low-tax country. Each division seeks to
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maximize its after-tax divisional profits. The MNC has a ready-to-use intangible (for ex-
ample, a brand, a patent, a database, or a quality concept) and headquarters determines
this intangible’s location, i.e., which part of the MNC owns the intangible. This intangible
is separately used by the MNC’s divisions. The use of the intangible by one division is
not detrimental to the consumption possibilities of the other division, and marginal costs
do not arise from its use. In order to sustain or even increase the expected benefits re-
sulting from the intangible, the divisions using it need to invest in maintenance (Roberts,
2005; Sandner and Block, 2011). For example, creating a brand, a patent, or a database
is usually the first step. Failure to maintain the brand in each market might result in its
deterioration. Similarly, an unmaintained database might soon become out-of-date and
thus useless. Failing to maintain or even establish the MNC’s operations according to the
patent’s technology means that the patent’s profit potential cannot be realized. These
maintenance investments may create spillovers for other divisions, i.e., one division might
benefit from the maintenance investment of another division. For example, advertising
investments in the domestic country may also increase the awareness of a brand in a for-
eign country through word-of-mouth, internet presence, or product placement in movies,
sitcoms, and talk shows. In the considered setting, transfer pricing has two functions: first,
paying for the use of the existing intangible and, second, providing the divisions with in-
centives for making maintenance investments. This results in two potentially conflicting
objectives of transfer pricing.
The MNC can either implement a one set of books (OSB) or two sets of books (TSB)
transfer pricing system. Empirical findings indicate that both accounting systems are used
(Klassen et al., 2017; Springsteel, 1999), so we consider each system. First, a OSB setting
is investigated where a single transfer price is determined to induce optimal maintenance
investments and report the taxable income. Second, we consider a TSB setting that allows
the MNC to decouple its internal decision making from external reporting.5
When an MNC faces no restrictions on internal transfer pricing, the foreign division
operating in the low-tax jurisdiction owns the intangible. The external royalty rate6 is
straightforwardly the highest acceptable rate. Thus, profit is shifted to the low-tax juris-
diction. In general, the optimal internal royalty rate does not equal zero despite the lack
of costs incurred from using the intangible. The reason is that adequate maintenance in-
vestments are induced by non-zero internal royalty rates. Specifically, the optimal internal
royalty rate is positive (negative) for a small (high) spillover. Thus, with a high spillover,
the domestic division receives a maintenance investment subsidy. This is beneficial for
the foreign division because the domestic division internalizes its spillover on the foreign
division’s contribution margin.
5 We are not interested in the question of whether OSB or TSB is preferable or used in equilibrium.
There is literature investigating this question (see, for example, Haak et al., 2017).
6 The MNC uses royalty-based transfer pricing, so we use the terms royalty rate and transfer price
interchangeably throughout the paper.
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Despite the huge tax-saving potential of intangibles’ transfer pricing, companies aim
at complying with tax law (The Economist, 2004; Cools and Emmanuel, 2006; Cools
and Slagmulder, 2009). Moreover, Klassen et al. (2017) have shown in a survey regarding
transfer pricing strategies for large multinationals that the majority of MNCs priori-
tized preventing disputes with tax authorities above the tax minimization objective. Mills
(1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) have highlighted that large book-tax differences cre-
ate red flags for tax authorities. The identification of large discrepancies between internal
and external transfer prices has similar consequences. Thus, an MNC using TSB with
large differences between internal and taxable income induces increased scrutiny by tax
authorities (EY, 2003). Although, tax avoidance is perfectly legal, higher scrutiny by tax
authorities is undesirable since participation in the audit process is costly. On the one
hand, time needs to be spent preparing for the audit. On the other hand, tax profes-
sionals charge fees for representation. Beck et al. (2000) term this the audit participation
penalty. Thus, MNCs aim at avoiding long-lasting audits and disputes. Therefore, MNCs
refrain from creating large discrepancies. This creates restrictions on an MNC’s transfer
pricing. In particular, we consider a restriction on an MNC’s internal transfer price. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that MNCs refrain from using negative internal roy-
alty rates, while the arm’s length principle requires positive external royalty rates. This
non-negativity assumption is a surrogate for a restriction on transfer pricing when MNCs
focus on preventing disputes triggered by large discrepancies between internal and ex-
ternal transfer prices. In our model, other restrictions regarding excessive discrepancies
between the internal and external transfer price will yield qualitatively identical effects.
When restrictions on the internal royalty rate are present, i.e., either TSB with restric-
tions or OSB, locating the intangible in the low-tax foreign jurisdiction is discouraged.
Then, assigning ownership to the high-tax country can be optimal. Specifically, for small
(large) spillovers, the intangible is optimally located in the low-tax (high-tax) jurisdic-
tion. The MNC faces the following trade-off. On the one hand, tax-saving behavior is
most effective when the foreign division owns the intangible. On the other hand, better
internalization of the spillover is obtained when the intangible is located in the high-tax
domestic jurisdiction. For a large spillover, internalization becomes more important. That
is, the threat of inconclusive but long-lasting and expensive disputes with the tax author-
ity caused by large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices can induce
MNCs to locate the intangible in the domestic, high-tax jurisdiction. Thus, our findings
illustrate that a trade-off between tax minimization and efficient spillover internalization
may explain the empirical evidence on MNCs’ tendency to hold intangibles in the par-
ent’s high-tax jurisdiction, the so-called ‘home bias’ (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith
et al., 2014; Dischinger et al., 2014; Heckemeyer et al., 2018).
Tax authorities and governments determine the MNCs’ abilities to engage in prof-
itable profit shifting by defining the legal environment. Our results show that the effect
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of curtailing profit shifting possibilities is intricate. Indeed, restricting profit shifting can
harm domestic investment. This is in line with prior research (Desai et al., 2006; Hong and
Smart, 2010; Juranek et al., 2018). However, we extend this strand of literature by showing
that whether lower profit shifting possibilities are detrimental for investment incentives
depends on the underlying accounting system and the spillover’s magnitude. If TSB with
restrictions are in place, transfer pricing is already used to optimally tackle tax minimiza-
tion and induce investment decisions. Thus, decreasing profit shifting possibilities leads
to decreased investment. However, under an OSB accounting system, the transfer pric-
ing decision simultaneously targets tax optimization and providing investment incentives.
Hence, reducing profit shifting possibilities mitigates the trade-off because the tax-saving
possibilities decrease. This, in turn, may either increase or decrease investment incentives
depending on which objective dominates the decision.
This highlights the problem regulators face when designing anti-avoidance legislation.
On the one hand, governments are interested in collecting the taxes they are owed and
therefore introduce countermeasures to circumvent profit shifting and tax avoidance, such
as the recent BEPS project. However, our results show that the outcome of restricting
profit shifting depends on the accounting system in place and the spillover’s magnitude.
The coexistence of different accounting systems and spillovers are only two of a vari-
ety of factors that could lead to unintended consequences. Thus, our results show that
implementing anti-avoidance regulations is a very complex task.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, the related
literature and the model are presented. Then, section 3.4 presents two benchmark cases.
The first-best solution and a no-tax world are considered. Section 3.5 depicts the optimal
location choice under OSB. Section 3.6 discusses the location choice when the MNC keeps
TSB and restrictions on internal royalty rates are either absent or present. Section 3.7
concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) illustrate that taxes affect the attraction of additional
capital investment. Our findings show that curtailing profit shifting possibilities can either
reduce or increase MNCs’ incentives to invest in intangible maintenance.
The literature on transfer pricing for intangibles (with tax considerations) is scarce.
Johnson (2006) examines different transfer pricing methods for intangibles. In the stud-
ied setting, two divisions consecutively create the intangible. Her results highlight that
royalty-based transfer pricing with renegotiation can achieve the first-best investment
incentives when the investments are either quasi-independent or substitutes. As we con-
centrate on compliant tax avoidance and negotiated transfer prices are perceived as po-
tentially harming tax compliance (Cools and Slagmulder, 2009), our analysis is restricted
to royalty-based transfer pricing. We add to the findings of Johnson (2006) by showing
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that spillovers affect internal transfer prices and that an MNC facing a trade-off between
tax minimization and efficient spillover internalization may exhibit a ‘home bias’.
De Simone and Sansing (2014) investigate whether cost sharing arrangements serve
to shift intellectual property offshore to low-tax jurisdictions in the presence of spillovers
from marketing intangibles. They show that a cost sharing arrangement can be useful
to shift profits if the spillover of the domestic division exceeds the foreign spillover on
domestic profits. This result occurs because the Internal Revenue Service assumes that
marketing intangibles increase only the profits of the division that owns them. Hence,
spillovers are neglected in IRS considerations. We show that it is crucial to consider
spillovers to estimate the consequences of regulatory activities. Bornemann (2018) addi-
tionally investigates different consequences of cost sharing versus licensing agreements.
He finds that investment-specific characteristics affect the decision to design a contract
as a licensing or cost sharing agreement. In contrast to De Simone and Sansing (2014)
and Bornemann (2018), we investigate the location choice of an existing intangible rather
than its development because empirical findings show that an intangible’s development
and subsequent location choice can easily be disentangled (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).
De Waegenaere et al. (2012) model a patent race among MNCs making research and
development investments and the subsequent production of tangible assets. During the
production of tangible assets, the intangible is exploited. The production can take place
either domestically or in the foreign country. DeWaegenaere et al. (2012) show that weaker
enforcement of the arm’s length principle may improve social welfare. We find related
results by showing that narrowing the arm’s length range can harm the investments of an
MNC. We extend their findings by showing that investment incentives can also increase
depending on spillovers and the accounting system in place.
Recently, Juranek et al. (2018) investigate how different methods employed in deter-
mining an arm’s length price influence MNCs’ investment decisions when the intangible is
located in a low-tax jurisdiction. Moreover, they are interested in the appropriateness of a
source tax for reducing profit shifting via royalties. We add to their findings by considering
different accounting systems and a spillover. We show that a spillover combined with de-
creasing profit shifting possibilities can also induce increasing investment incentives. For a
high spillover, in line with the empirically documented ‘home bias’, we find that locating
the intangible in the high-tax country can become optimal. Then, it becomes possible
to internalize the spillover in the MNC’s investment decisions. Moreover, we respond to
the call by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for more theoretical research regarding the
development of theories allowing for the development of testable hypotheses.
In addition, we contribute to the empirical literature on the location choice for intangi-
bles (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014; Dischinger et al., 2014; Heckemeyer
et al., 2018). This literature offers several potential explanations for a ‘home bias’. These
are that headquarters often finances the development of the intangible and bears the risk,
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making it the legal owner of the intangible (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). Moreover, the
headquarters exhibits economies of scale in the administration and management process
of intangibles (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Heckemeyer et al., 2018), and headquarters’
managers value their influence over valuable assets and, thus, seek to keep them at the
headquarters (Dischinger et al., 2014). Furthermore, MNCs want to avoid taxes upon the
repatriation of profits from the foreign division to the headquarters (Dischinger et al.,
2014) and to minimize payments regarding withholding taxes (Heckemeyer et al., 2018).
Additionally, particularities in tax transfer pricing regulation and the law regulating and
protecting the intangible can make transferring the intangible to the low-tax jurisdiction
unattractive (Heckemeyer et al., 2018).
Whereas these antecedents of the ‘home bias’ are mostly related to particularities
of tax regulations and law, we illustrate the impact of spillovers on the location choice
for intangibles. Thus, we provide an additional economic explanation for the ‘home bias’
documented in the empirical literature. In addition, our model predicts that the ‘home
bias’ of trademarks is most likely larger than the ‘home bias’ of patents. This implication is
supported by empirical evidence reported by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Heckemeyer
et al. (2018).
3.3 Model Description
We investigate whether an intangible should be located in the low-tax country when
restrictions on transfer pricing exist. We are interested in the implications of the location
choice and an MNC’s maintenance investments. Therefore, in line with prior work of
Juranek et al. (2018), we neglect the initial invention and innovation of the intangible.
According to the findings of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Schwab and Todtenhaupt
(2017), neglecting the development of an intangible is not restrictive. They show that
the development of an intangible and its actual location are independent. This becomes
even more relevant if exit taxes are considered. Obviously, exit taxes make a relocation less
attractive. Thus, MNCs will attempt to avoid costly relocations by anticipating subsequent
consequences and determine the intangible’s location ex ante. This is in line with empirical
findings that the location choice of an intangible typically takes place at an early stage
of the development process when the intangible’s prospects are highly uncertain. Thus,
we assume that MNCs anticipate the consequences of their location choice, so that the
location choice takes place ex ante and no relocation occurs.
We consider a divisionalized MNC operating in a low- and a high-tax country. The
MNC has a ready-to-use intangible and comprises a headquarters HQ, a domestic division
D, and a foreign division F . The foreign division operates in the low-tax jurisdiction. Its
income is taxed at tax rate t. The headquarters and the domestic division are located
in the high-tax jurisdiction, where their income is taxed at rate t+h, where 0 < t,h < 1
and t+h < 1. Both divisions generate profits using the existing intangible. These profits
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can be increased by maintenance investments of each division j, with j = F,D. The
maintenance investments are costly cj = k2θ
2
j , with j = F,D, where k > 0 denotes the unit
cost of the investment, and θj ∈ [0,1] is division j’s investment. We assume that k is
sufficiently large in order to ensure that 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1 holds true. Maintenance investments
are expensed. Division j decides on the investment θj to maximize the division’s after-tax
profit Πj . The headquarters cannot verify the total investment.7 Thus, it is not possible
for the headquarters to administer the maintenance investments.8 These costs reduce the
investing division’s taxable income. Division j generates direct contribution margin xj ,
which is either high or low, where division j’s investment θj determines the probability of
obtaining the high direct contribution margin. That is, xj = 1 is realized with probability
θj . Otherwise, the investing division faces the baseline contribution margin, which we
normalize without loss of generality to xj = 0.
We assume that the investment of the high-tax division has a spillover β, with 0 ≤
β ≤ 1, on the contribution margin of the foreign division (the indirect effect on the con-
tribution margin). All results hold true if we consider bilateral spillovers as long as the
domestic spillover exceeds the foreign spillover. Thus, we normalize the spillover from the
foreign division’s investment on the domestic division’s contribution margin to zero. Of
course, negative spillovers might also occur. However, if a sufficiently detrimental spillover
is expected, it would be reasonable to deny the non-owning division access to the intan-
gible imposing negative externalities on the other division. A typical example of negative
spillovers are luxury brands. The allowance to use the brand name in other divisions can
be detrimental by inflating the market and thereby destroying the exclusiveness of the
brand. For example, Burberry recently attracted adverse media attention by burning tons
of clothes rather than discounting them and thereby possibly inflating the market.9 This
shows that MNCs attempt to prevent negative expected spillovers. Thus, in expectation,
the spillover should be positive. Therefore, we assume a positive spillover. In line with
Bouwens et al. (2017), we model a linear spillover. That is, the total contribution mar-
gin of the low-tax division is MF = xF + βxD, whereas the contribution margin of the
domestic division is determined solely by its own investments, i.e., MD = xD.
Due to the specific features of intangibles, the boundaries of ownership are blurred.
In particular, the non-rivalry in consumption allows both divisions to use the intangible
without facing scarcity. However, the owning division has the right to decide whether
other parties are allowed to use the intangible or not. In particular, the legal owner of
the intangible is determined by the right to enjoy, sell, rent, or even destroy an item of
property. In line with prior research (Grossman and Hart, 1986), we define the owner of an
intangible as the residual claimant. However, in contrast to Grossman and Hart (1986),
7 This is a standard assumption in the literature (Johnson, 2006).
8 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each division has additional operations generating revenues
and costs, so that the investment expenditures cj cannot be inferred.
9 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44885983.
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the right to determine corresponding quantities or investments does not belong to the
residual rights in our setting.
The headquarters locates the ready-to-use intangible in order to maximize its overall
after-tax profit ΠHQ.10 The headquarters has various strategic choices. On the one hand,
it can decide that one of its two divisions legally owns the intangible. On the other hand,
the headquarters can own the intangible or decide that both divisions jointly hold the
intangible. That is, we consider four possibilities for the intangible’s location. Either, the
domestic division, the foreign division, both divisions jointly, or the headquarters can own
the intangible.
We consider an administered transfer pricing environment, i.e., the price setting power
remains under the headquarters’ control for all ownership possibilities. Based on prior re-
search, we tie the royalty rate γ ∈ R to the non-owning division’s contribution margin
(see, for example, Johnson, 2006; Bornemann, 2018). The headquarters chooses the trans-
fer prices, i.e., the internal and the external royalty rate, in order to maximize the overall
after-tax profit. To ensure that our results do not depend on the underlying but unob-
servable accounting system, we conduct the analysis twice. First, we consider an OSB
setting. Afterward, we investigate the TSB case. In the TSB case, the MNC disentangles
the royalty rates for internal and external purposes. In particular, investment decisions
might be affected by an internal royalty rate γi ∈ R, whereas the external royalty rate
γr ∈
[
γr,γr
]
with 0< γr < γr < 1 serves for tax reporting. This range reflects the accept-
able arm’s length royalty rates. In line with the transfer pricing literature, we assume
exogenous boundaries for the arm’s length range (see, for example, Baldenius et al., 2004;
Johnson, 2006)). Since we are interested in tax avoidance rather than illegal tax evasion,
the MNC always chooses a price from this exogenous arm’s length range. 11 The timing
of the game is depicted in figure 3.1.
Location
choice for
exisiting
intangible
t=0
HQ
determines
the royalty
rate(s)
t=1
Division F
and D decide
on θD and
θF ,
respectively
t=2
Payoffs are
realized
t=3
Figure 3.1: Timeline
10The divisions’ after-tax profits ΠD and ΠF and the headquarters’ after-tax profit ΠHQ depend on the
location choice, the determined royalty rates, and the accounting system in place. Whenever necessary,
we present the expected profit functions in the main text or the appendix.
11Juranek et al. (2018) investigate how different transfer pricing methods and the possibly differing arm’s
length ranges influence profit shifting with intangibles.
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3.4 Benchmark Cases
We now turn to the analysis of the location choice. This section provides two bench-
marks to demonstrate that the ‘home bias’ does not occur in the first-best solution or
in a no-tax world. In particular, in the first benchmark, we examine the location choice
when the headquarters observes and dictates the investment decisions, i.e., the first-best
solution. The second benchmark considers a no-tax world.
3.4.1 Benchmark 1: First-Best Solution
In the first-best solution, the headquarters observes the divisions’ investment decisions.
If the divisions implement investment levels different from the headquarters’ preferred
ones, the headquarters can punish the division managers. Therefore, investment decisions
according to the headquarters’ preferences are induced.
Locating the intangible in the foreign division allows the MNC to legally shift profits
from the high- to the low-tax jurisdiction. This reduces the MNC’s tax liability, so that
locating the intangible in the foreign division is preferred to ownership by the domestic
division, headquarters, or joint ownership.
If the headquarters assigns ownership to the foreign division, the domestic division
makes a royalty payment to the low-tax jurisdiction. The maximum profit is shifted to
the low-tax jurisdiction by setting the external royalty rate as high as possible, i.e., γr = γr.
The first-best investment decisions of the headquarters are
θD,fb =
1
k
+ β(1− t) +hγr
k(1− t−h) ,
θF,fb =
1
k
.
Obviously, the domestic investment level is increasing in the spillover β, and the foreign
investment is unaffected.
Lemma 3.1. In the first-best solution, the MNC locates the intangible in the low-tax
foreign division.
Proof. See appendix.
3.4.2 Benchmark 2: No-Tax World
As a second benchmark, we investigate which location is preferable in a no-tax world.
This enables us to isolate tax effects in the next section. This is especially interesting
because MNCs are often suspected to locate their intangibles solely to reduce their tax
liability. Without tax regulation, the MNC is free to design its royalty scheme in order
to maximize the overall profit. We acknowledge that taxes induce different first-best in-
vestments than in a no-tax world. Therefore, the first-best investments of the domestic
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division are affected by taxes, so that we consider an adapted level of the first-best do-
mestic investment in a no-tax world. First-best investments cannot be achieved if the
domestic division owns the intangible. Basically, the royalty payment from the foreign
division leads to a partial internalization of the indirect effect on the foreign contribution
margin. However, a royalty payment reduces the investment incentives of the foreign di-
vision in a no-tax world. Hence, a trade-off is inherent in designing the transfer pricing
scheme even without taxes.12 This negative effect can easily be avoided as the following
analysis shows. Legal ownership can be assigned to the foreign division. Then, transfer
pricing is used to affect the divisions’ decisions regarding maintenance investments. The
domestic division expects the following profit:13
E
[
ΠFD,NT
]
= (1−γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and the foreign division’s profit comprises its own revenues and the royalty income. Hence,
its expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠFF,NT
]
= θF + θD (β+γ)− k2θ
2
F .
Hence, the division’s investment decisions are as follows:
θFD,NT =
1−γ
k
and
θFF,NT =
1
k
.
Thus, the investment incentives of the foreign division are not affected by the royalty
payment. Nevertheless, the foreign division is also interested in providing investment in-
centives to the domestic division due to the indirect effect on its own contribution margin.
Obviously, a royalty rate γFNT =−β induces the first-best domestic investment. For eco-
nomic reasons, this royalty rate is negative and can be interpreted as an investment
subsidy. Although the foreign division owns the intangible, it pays an investment subsidy
to the domestic division to ensure that the spillover is internalized correctly.
The same result is achieved if the headquarters owns the intangible. Then, both divi-
sions have to pay royalties in order to secure access to the intangible. First-best invest-
ments can be achieved if the foreign division uses the intangible free of charge. Thus, the
headquarters asks for a zero royalty γHQF,NT = 0. Furthermore, the headquarters pays an
investment subsidy, i.e., γHQD,NT = −β to the domestic division to induce the spillover’s
internalization. Hence, first-best investments in both divisions require a redistribution
12The proofs for all four considered ownership settings are in the appendix.
13The subscript NT highlights the no-tax cases, whereas the absence of the NT subscript signals tax
world considerations. The superscript indicates the owner of the intangible.
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of profits. In a no-tax world without any restrictions concerning the royalty rate, profit
shifting is necessary to induce optimal maintenance investments.
With joint ownership, an investment subsidy might be profit enhancing. However,
no subsidy can be found that the foreign division is willing to accept. Both divisions
own the intangible, so that no royalties are paid, and first-best investments cannot be
induced. Hence, foreign ownership or ownership by the domestic headquarters dominates
joint ownership.
Proposition 3.1. Without taxes, the MNC is indifferent between locating the intangible
in the domestic headquarters or abroad. For either location choice, first-best investments
can be induced. Despite the absence of marginal costs, optimal transfer pricing includes
non-zero royalty rates.
Proof. See appendix.
3.5 Location Choice of Intangibles under OSB
Before examining the TSB case in section 3.6, we investigate the OSB setting in this
section. That is, we restrict the MNC’s transfer pricing flexibility by requiring the internal
and the external royalty rate to coincide.
3.5.1 Royalty Rates and Location Choices under OSB
If the foreign division owns the intangible, the overall after-tax profit contains a tax-
saving position. Thus, the headquarters’ expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ (1− t)
[
βθD + θF − k2θ
2
F
]
+hγrθD. (3.1)
Under an OSB setting, a single royalty rate has to be determined that balances the
conflicting objectives and therefore maximizes the headquarters’ overall after-tax profit.
The entire transfer pricing decision is restricted to the interval
[
γr,γr
]
because we focus
on legal tax avoidance. Thus, a trade-off is inherent in the MNC’s decision. The resulting
transfer pricing decision if the intangible is located in the foreign division is given by:14
γF,OSBr =

γr for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
h−(1−t)β
1−t+h for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
γr for β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,1
]
.
(3.2)
The divisions’ investment choices with foreign ownership are:
θF,OSBD =
1
k
(
1−γF,OSBr
)
, (3.3)
14All threshold values and findings in this section are presented in the appendix.
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θF,OSBF =
1
k
. (3.4)
If the domestic division owns the intangible, the overall after-tax profit contains a
term indicating that incoming royalties have to be taxed at the higher tax rate. Thus, the
headquarters’ expected profit is given by:
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ (1− t)
[
βθD + θF − k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (βθD + θF ) . (3.5)
The resulting transfer pricing decision if the intangible is located in the domestic division
is given by:
γD,OSBr =

γr for β ∈
[
0,βD,OSB1
]
(1−t)β2−h(1+β)
β2(1−t+h)+1−t−2h for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
γr for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
(3.6)
The divisions’ investment choices with domestic ownership are:
θD,OSBD =
1
k
(
1 +βγD,OSBr
)
, (3.7)
θD,OSBF =
1
k
(
1−γD,OSBr
)
. (3.8)
With joint ownership, the effect of the spillover is never internalized. That is, both divi-
sions invest 1/k.
For a low spillover, i.e., β < βFJ ,15 it is optimal to locate the intangible abroad. The
ownership of the intangible is assigned to the foreign division, and profits are shifted
effectively. While the foreign division implements the first-best investment decision, the
domestic division underinvests relative to the first-best solution. This investment distor-
tion is small for a low spillover, so that the tax-saving motive drives the location choice.
That is, even for the most restrictive internal pricing policy, i.e., forcing MNCs to use
OSB, the tax-saving motive dominates the location choice for a small spillover.
The MNC only uses the most tax-effective transfer price γr for a very low spillover,
i.e., for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
.16 Otherwise, a transfer price smaller than γr, i.e., either h−(1−t)β1−t+h
or γr, is used (see equation (3.2)). That is, the MNC mitigates the investment distortion
by partially forgoing the profit shifting benefits.
If the spillover is high, the investment distortion is detrimental. Therefore, investment
decisions drive the location choice. In case of joint ownership, profit shifting does not
15The superscript F and the subscript J indicate that the threshold βFJ is the level of the spillover at
which the headquarters is indifferent between locating the intangible in the foreign division or using
joint ownership.
16As outlined in the appendix: 0< βF,OSB1 < β
F,OSB
2 < β
F
J .
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occur at all. Additionally, while the foreign division still invests according to the first-best
solution, the domestic division underinvests less relative to the foreign ownership case.
Hence, for a medium spillover, joint ownership becomes optimal in the OSB setting.
The intangible is optimally held in the high-tax jurisdiction for a high spillover. The
domestic division owns the intangible under OSB for a high spillover to mitigate the
investment distortion. In particular, compared to foreign and joint ownership, the domestic
division underinvests less in this case. Paying a royalty induces the foreign division to
underinvest. The spillover is so important that profit shifting to the high-tax country is
accepted as a consequence. In sum, we can show that the intangible is located in the
high-tax jurisdiction for a high spillover, i.e., β ≥ βDJ , where βDJ < βD,OSB1 .17
For β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
, profits are shifted to the high-tax country using the least harm-
ful transfer price γr. When the spillover is very high, i.e., β > βD,OSB1 , the investment
distortions are the most severe. Then, the MNC is willing to shift more profits to the
high-tax country by setting a transfer price larger than γr (see equation (3.6)). Our find-
ings are summarized in proposition 3.2 and illustrated in figure 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. For h < 3−
√
5
2 (1− t) and γr < 1−t1−t+h ,18 under an OSB accounting sys-
tem, and
• a low spillover, i.e., β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in the low-tax foreign division,
• a medium spillover, i.e, βFJ < β < βDJ , joint ownership is optimal,
• a high spillover, i.e., β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the high-tax domestic
division.
Proof. See appendix.
3.5.2 Profit Shifting Effects on Investments under OSB
Next, we examine the effect of various exogenous factors on our OSB findings. For
β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
, an increase in the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr reduces
the domestic investment when the intangible is located abroad. Thus, greater investment
distortion results from an increasing γr, while the investment with joint ownership is
unaffected. As a consequence, the higher the lower bound of the arm’s length range is,
the lower the spillover needs to be for the headquarters to favor foreign ownership. For
17The superscript D and the subscript J indicate that the threshold βDJ is the level of the spillover at
which the headquarters is indifferent between locating the intangible in the domestic division or using
joint ownership.
18The first threshold is decreasing in the tax rate t. For t = 0.1 or t = 0.3, the first threshold allows a
maximal tax rate differential of 0.344 or 0.267, respectively. The second threshold is decreasing in t
and h. For t= 0.3 and h= 0.25, the maximal upper bound of the arm’s length range γr is 0.737. That
is, numerous tax jurisdictions fulfill these two criteria regarding h and γr.
49
Figure 3.2: Expected Firm Profits with Foreign (F), Joint (J) and Domestic (D) Ownership
under OSB (plotted for γr = 0.1,γr = 0.5, t= 0.2,h= 0.15, and k = 3)
β ∈
[
βFJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
and domestic ownership, a higher arm’s length price γr reduces the do-
mestic investment distortion by increasing domestic investment. However, the investment
distortion of the foreign division increases. A higher γr induces more profits being shifted
from the low- to the high-tax jurisdiction. This unfavorable effect dominates the invest-
ment effects, so that a higher spillover is needed to induce the headquarters to locate the
intangible in the domestic division.
For β ∈
[
βF,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
]
, an increase in the upper bound of the arm’s length range
γr does not affect the divisions’ investment decisions because the used transfer price is
smaller than γr. That is, the attractiveness of domestic, foreign, or joint ownership is
unaffected by a rise in γr.
Furthermore, an increasing tax rate differential h makes profit shifting to the low-tax
jurisdiction more attractive and profit shifting to the high-tax jurisdiction more costly.
Therefore, a higher spillover is required to make it optimal for the headquarters to use
joint and domestic ownership.
Corollary 3.1. The threshold levels of the spillover βFJ and βDJ are
• decreasing and increasing in the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr, respec-
tively,
• unaffected by a rise in the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr, and
• increasing in the tax rate differential h.
Proof. See appendix.
When the headquarters uses a transfer price that is an interior value from the arm’s
length range, i.e., β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
or β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
, the spillover β affects
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the royalty rate. A higher spillover increases the importance of domestic investment. Thus,
lowering the royalty rate under foreign ownership provides higher investment incentives
to the domestic division. Under domestic ownership, a higher royalty rate provides the
domestic division with a larger share of the spillover effect. Therefore, the domestic divi-
sion’s investment incentives increase. However, an increasing spillover does not affect the
royalty rate when the headquarters has already applied a corner value of the arm’s length
range.
Proposition 3.3. For foreign ownership and OSB, an increasing spillover either de-
creases the royalty rate or the royalty rate is unaffected.
For domestic ownership and OSB, an increasing spillover either increases the royalty
rate or the royalty rate is unaffected.
Proof. See appendix.
We are also interested in the effect of reducing the MNC’s profit shifting possibilities
by narrowing the arm’s length range. Whenever the headquarters applies a corner value of
the arm’s length range as the transfer price, the divisions’ investments are affected by an
increasing lower bound or a decreasing upper bound. Specifically, a higher lower bound is
detrimental to the MNC’s investment incentives, while a lower upper bound fosters these
incentives. This is summarized in proposition 3.4 and depicted in figure 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. For β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
or β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
, curtailing profit shifting pos-
sibilities by narrowing the arm’s length range leads to increased investment incentives for
the MNC under OSB.
For β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
or β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
, curtailing profit shifting possibilities by
narrowing the arm’s length range leads to decreased investment incentives for the MNC
under OSB.
For any other spillover β, curtailing profit shifting possibilities by narrowing the arm’s
length range does not affect the investment incentives for the MNC under OSB.
Proof. See appendix.
The tax rate differential h affects the divisions’ investment choices only when the
headquarters does not use a corner value of the arm’s length range. A higher tax rate
differential increases the benefits from shifting profits from the high- to the low-tax juris-
diction but does not affect the benefits from the spillover. The MNC reacts to the higher
tax-saving potential by increasing (decreasing) the royalty rate under foreign (domestic)
ownership. This results in lower domestic investment. In the case of domestic ownership,
due to the lower royalty rate, the foreign division retains a higher share of its contri-
bution margin. That is, the marginal benefits from foreign investment on foreign profits
increase, while the marginal investment costs are unaffected. Thus, the foreign division
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Figure 3.3: The Effect of Narrowing the Arm’s Length Range on the Investment Incentives for the
MNC under OSB (γr is the transfer price; β is the spillover from domestic investment to the foreign
contribution margin)
invests more. When the headquarters uses a corner value of the arm’s length range as the
transfer price, a rise in the tax rate differential does not affect the royalty rate. Therefore,
domestic and foreign investment are unaffected.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that the MNC keeps OSB. An increasing tax rate differential
• decreases or does not affect domestic investment and
• increases or does not affect foreign investment.
Proof. See appendix.
3.6 Location Choice of Intangibles under TSB
The conflict between the different objectives is mitigated by keeping TSB because the
headquarters faces a higher degree of freedom in using different royalty rates for different
purposes. Hence, relaxing the requirement that the internal and external royalty rates
have to coincide makes the trade-off less severe.
3.6.1 No Restriction on Transfer Pricing
In a TSB setting without any restrictions on the internal royalty rate, foreign ownership
dominates.19 Specifically, the expected profits are given by:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
−γiθD +γrθD (t+h)
19All proofs are in the appendix.
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and
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+γiθD− tγrθD.
The headquarters’ expected profit is given by equation (3.1), which was introduced in
section 3.5. The internal royalty rate is only implicitly considered in the headquarters’
expected profit because it affects the investment decisions of divisional managers. Since the
internal incentive provision and external reporting objectives are decoupled, it is obvious
that the MNC is interested in the highest possible external transfer price under foreign
ownership, i.e., γr, to maximize its tax savings. The divisions choose their investment levels
to maximize their own after-tax profits.The divisions’ investment decisions are given by:
θFD =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)−γi] (3.9)
and
θFF =
1
k
. (3.10)
Stipulating the following internal royalty rate induces first-best investments:
γFi = γrt− (1− t)β. (3.11)
In this subsection, we do not consider restrictions on transfer prices, so that this internal
royalty rate becomes negative for a high spillover β. Then, the foreign division subsidizes
the investment of the domestic division. Therefore, the spillover is optimally exploited.
Hence, the underinvestment problem present under OSB is alleviated. In addition to the
internalization problem, maximal tax savings can be generated by legally shifting profits
from the high-tax to the low-tax jurisdiction.
3.6.2 Restriction on Transfer Pricing and Resulting Home Bias
Recently, Mescall and Klassen (2018) demonstrate that MNCs incorporate the transfer
pricing risk due to potential future tax audits into their considerations. Moreover, extant
evidence has shown that large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices
entail increased scrutiny in a potential tax audit (Badertscher et al., 2009; Mills, 1998;
Mills and Sansing, 2000; Chen and Gavious, 2017). That is, MNCs focusing on preventing
long-lasting and costly disputes with the tax authority consider restrictions on transfer
pricing to avoid large discrepancies. We assume that internal royalty rates have to be
non-negative in cross-border transactions. We use this non-negativity requirement for the
internal royalty rate to display restrictions on internal transfer pricing. However, this
surrogate is chosen for the sake of simplicity and convenient presentation. Non-negativity
is not necessary to obtain our results. Merely the existence of restrictions on internal
transfer pricing decisions is needed, which are decidedly prevalent in MNCs’ decision
making (Graham et al., 2014).
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If restrictions on transfer pricing are present, an investment subsidy is not possible
because large discrepancies should be avoided. Then, it is no longer straightforward that
the foreign division owns the intangible.
For a low spillover, namely β <βF , optimal investments can be achieved. If the spillover
is high, i.e., β > βF , first-best investments cannot be induced. Refraining from large dis-
crepancies in cross-border transactions curtails the MNC’s internal pricing possibilities.
Thus, the MNC has to trade off the conflicting objectives of tax minimization and invest-
ment incentives even when decoupling internal and external decision making.
For a large spillover, ownership by the headquarters can be used to induce less dis-
torted investment incentives for the domestic division by setting appropriate internal
transfer prices. The domestic division and the headquarters are located in the same tax
jurisdiction. Hence, tax avoidance via profit shifting between the headquarters and the
domestic division is not an issue.20 Tax authorities are resource constrained and there-
fore need to strategically choose which transactions will be considered in greater detail
(OECD, 2015). Therefore, it is most likely that cross-border transactions are scrutinized
because of the absence of a profit shifting motive in purely domestic transactions. Thus,
the headquarters can differentiate the royalty rates so that the restriction on internal
transfer pricing is only a concern in cross-border transactions.
If the headquarters owns the intangible, it charges royalty fees to both divisions. Hence,
the expected profits of the divisions are as follows:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ θD [γr (t+h)−γiD]
and
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+ (θF +βθD) [γrt−γiF ] .
The headquarters receives the royalty payments. Because the headquarters is located
in the high-tax jurisdiction, all royalty income is taxed within the high-tax country. Thus,
the expected overall after-tax profit of the MNC is given by:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (θF +βθD) .
Obviously, the headquarters chooses γr in order to minimize its tax liability while com-
plying with the arm’s length principle. The internal trade is perfectly legal because the
arm’s length principle is not violated. Thus, the domestic division has to pay an internal
royalty rate of:
γHQiD = γr (t+h)−β
(
1− t−hγr
)
.
20This holds true if there is no reduced tax rate for passive income, i.e., no IP-Box. Furthermore, we
suppress the possibility of loss carryforwards and hidden distributions.
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The domestic division faces a royalty agreement that can be either positive or negative.
However, the domestic tax authorities’ income is not affected. Thus, the MNC cannot be
accused of tax avoidance. The foreign division is incentivized with the following internal
royalty rate when the headquarters owns the intangible:
γHQiF = γr (t+h) .
In line with prior research, we show that the internal royalty rates depend on the externally
accepted royalty rate (Hyde and Choe, 2005; Haak et al., 2017).
If the indirect effect of the domestic division’s investment on the contribution margin
of the foreign division is high, i.e., β > βHQ, ownership by the headquarters becomes
preferable. The intuition is as follows. If the foreign division holds the intangible, tax
savings might be generated because profits are shifted to the low-tax jurisdiction. However,
a high spillover leads to a severe domestic investment distortion if the domestic division is
not forced to internalize this spillover. Hence, appropriate investment incentives become
more important as the spillover increases. Ownership by the headquarters leads to a
less severe domestic investment distortion because it allows for the subsidization of the
domestic division’s investment and thus leads to an internalization of the spillover.
Our findings are summarized in proposition 3.6 and illustrated in figure 3.4.
Proposition 3.6. In a TSB setting without restrictions on internal transfer pricing, the
intangible is located in the foreign division. With restrictions on internal transfer pricing
and
• a low spillover, i.e., β < βHQ, the intangible is located in the low-tax foreign division
• a large spillover, i.e., β >βHQ, the intangible is located in the domestic headquarters
even though it is in the high-tax jurisdiction.
Despite the absence of marginal costs, optimal transfer pricing schemes include non-zero
internal royalty rates for a very low and a large spillover.
Proof. See appendix.
In contrast to the OSB setting, joint ownership is always dominated by foreign own-
ership for an MNC keeping TSB. Similar to the OSB setting, the intangible is optimally
held in the high-tax jurisdiction under a high spillover, i.e., the ’home bias’ occurs. In
particular, the spillover is so important that profit shifting to the high-tax country is
accepted. With OSB, a single transfer price is used to provide investment incentives to
both divisions. That is, higher domestic investment incentives can only be achieved by
reducing foreign investment incentives. While decoupling under TSB allows better tax-
saving behavior, the link between the domestic and foreign investment incentives persists.
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Figure 3.4: Expected Firm Profits with Foreign (F) and Headquarters (HQ) Ownership
under Restrictions on Transfer Pricing (plotted for γr = 0.1,γr = 0.5, t= 0.2,h= 0.15, and
k = 3)
However, by using headquarters ownership under TSB, the investment incentives for the
domestic and the foreign division can be separated. Therefore, the headquarters can pro-
vide higher domestic investment incentives without harming foreign investment incentives.
Rather than locating the intangible in the domestic division as under OSB, headquarters
ownership is preferred under TSB.
Empirical findings suggest that intangibles are often located in the high-tax jurisdic-
tion of an MNC’s headquarters despite the presence of tax rate differentials and that profit
shifting might reduce the MNC’s tax liability (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Dischinger
et al., 2014; Heckemeyer et al., 2018). Empirical studies conclude that the so-called ‘home
bias’ is difficult to explain. Potentially, part of this bias stems from spillovers and transfer
pricing considerations. We have shown that locating the intangible in the high-tax juris-
diction is preferable for a high spillover under TSB with restrictions on internal transfer
pricing and OSB. That is, a ‘home bias’ might occur whenever the MNC faces a trade-off
between tax minimization and efficient investment incentives.
The findings of proposition 3.6 imply that a high (low) spillover is associated with lo-
cating the intangible in the high-tax domestic (low-tax foreign) jurisdiction. Patents relate
to a specific technology, product, or process, whereas trademarks likely affect the entire
business of an MNC. That is, trademarks seems to have larger spillovers than patents.
Thus, our model predicts that trademarks exhibit a larger ‘home bias’ than patents. This
empirical implication is supported. Whereas Heckemeyer et al. (2018) document that 95.3
percent of US trademarks are located in the US, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) depict that
only 57.1 percent of patent applications occur in the parent location. This finding seems
to be especially surprising because the results of Pfeiffer and Voget (2017) indicate that
MNCs use trademarks more frequently for tax planning than they do patents. According
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to our model, this difference might stem from spillovers and considerations regarding the
prevention of inconclusive but costly disputes with the tax authority.
Of course, there is a large body of additional explanations of the ‘home bias’. Typical
examples are litigation costs, legal certainty in the home country, and exit taxes. We do
not negate all these potential explanations for the ‘home bias’. Our aim is to show that
there might be economic reasons in addition to all the other factors that might lead to
a ‘home bias’. Hence, the location choice of intangibles might be much more complex
than it appears at first sight. That is, although tax-saving potentials are considered in
the location choice of the intangible, the MNC also considers spillover effects. Our results
might help to better understand reasons for intangible location choice beyond pure tax
and legal considerations.
3.6.3 Profit Shifting Effects on Investments
In the following, we investigate how our results are affected by varying exogenous
factors. The threshold βHQ determines the minimum spillover that is needed to optimally
locate the intangible in the high-tax jurisdiction under TSB with restrictions on internal
transfer pricing. This threshold is increasing in the lower bound of the arm’s length range
γr. An increase in γr forces the MNC with headquarters ownership to shift more profit from
the low-tax to the high-tax jurisdiction, whereas the MNC’s profit under foreign ownership
is unaffected. Thus, to induce the MNC to locate the intangible at the headquarters, which
is in the high-tax jurisdiction, the investment incentives need to become more important.
Therefore, the threshold βHQ increases with a rise in γr. This is similar to the result under
OSB in corollary 3.1. When the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr increases, the
MNC’s profit shifting possibilities under foreign ownership increase. The arm’s length
price γr does not affect the MNC’s profit under headquarters ownership. This means that
solely foreign ownership becomes more attractive. Thus, a higher spillover is required to
make it optimal to assign ownership to the headquarters.
This finding is contrary to the OSB finding in corollary 3.1, where an increase in the
upper bound of the arm’s length range does not affect the location choice. The reason is
that in the OSB setting, the royalty rate for a medium spillover is smaller than the upper
bound of the arm’s length range. Therefore, the expected profits are unaffected.
A higher tax rate differential implies higher incentives for shifting profits to the low-
tax jurisdiction. With foreign ownership, the MNC can optimally exploit legal tax-saving
possibilities. This is not possible with ownership by the headquarters because profits are
shifted to the high-tax country and then have to be taxed at the higher tax rate. Hence,
foreign ownership becomes more attractive. However, whereas foreign ownership results
in a greater distortion of the domestic investment decision, headquarters ownership allows
better domestic investment. In order to still outweigh the increasing benefits of foreign
ownership due to an increase in the tax rate differential, the minimum spillover βHQ has
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to increase to make headquarters ownership optimal. This is similar to the OSB finding
in corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. The threshold level of the spillover βHQ is increasing in
• the lower bound of the arm’s length range γr,
• the upper bound of the arm’s length range γr, and
• the tax differential h for h < (1− t)/2.
Proof. See appendix.
When the spillover is high, its internalization becomes important. The internal royalty
rate becomes negative when preventing disputes with the tax authority is not an issue,
i.e., no restriction on the internal transfer price is imposed. This can be interpreted as an
investment subsidy. Nevertheless, an increasing spillover leads to decreased internal roy-
alty rates under foreign ownership. Two effects on the headquarters’ expected profit occur.
First, an increasing spillover leads to a higher foreign contribution margin. Second, the
domestic investment affects both the domestic and the foreign divisions’ contribution mar-
gins. Hence, with an increasing spillover, the investment incentives of the domestic division
become more important from the headquarters’ perspective. If the MNC is interested in
preventing long-lasting and expensive disputes, ownership by the headquarters allows the
implementation of less distorted domestic investment. The headquarters faces a higher
degree of freedom in the transfer pricing design if the intangible is located in the high-tax
jurisdiction. The internal royalty rate for cross-border transactions does not depend on
the spillover. However, the internal royalty rate for domestic transactions decreases with
an increasing spillover. In particular, the investment subsidy increases because a higher
spillover makes domestic investment incentives more important.
Proposition 3.7. An increasing spillover either decreases the internal royalty rate, or
the internal royalty rate is unaffected.
Proof. See appendix.
The finding of proposition 3.7 is similar to the result regarding foreign ownership under
OSB (proposition 3.3). However, proposition 3.3 states a contrary finding for domestic
ownership under OSB. With domestic ownership, the foreign division makes a royalty
payment to the domestic division. For a higher spillover and thus higher benefits from
less distorted domestic investment, the MNC induces the domestic division to invest more
by using a higher royalty rate. When the MNC already uses a corner value of the arm’s
length range, a marginal increase in the spillover benefits cannot be exploited by increasing
the royalty rate.
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Furthermore, we are interested in the effect of reducing the profit shifting possibili-
ties. The arm’s length range determines the MNC’s possibilities to engage in legal tax
avoidance and corresponding profit shifting. In line with prior theoretical research (Desai
et al., 2006; Hong and Smart, 2010; Juranek et al., 2018) and empirical findings (Schwab
and Todtenhaupt, 2017), we can show that narrowing the arm’s length range and cor-
responding reduction in profit shifting possibilities harms the investment incentives in
the TSB setting. If the intangible is located in the low-tax jurisdiction, the investment
incentives provided to the domestic division decreases if less profit shifting is possible.
The investment incentives of the foreign division remain the same because its investment
affects only its own profits. In the case of headquarters ownership, reducing profit shifting
possibilities harms the investment incentives for both divisions.
Our result also contributes to prior findings of De Waegenaere et al. (2012), who show
that a weaker enforcement of the arm’s length principle may improve social welfare. Under
TSB, the deterioration of the overall investment incentives due to reduced profit shifting
possibilities is not sensitive to the ownership location of the intangible. That is, tight
transfer pricing regulations may have negative impacts on real investment decisions. This
finding is summarized in Proposition 3.8.
Proposition 3.8. Curtailing profit shifting possibilities by narrowing the arm’s length
range leads to decreased investment incentives for the MNC under TSB.
Proof. See appendix.
Parts of related OSB findings in proposition 3.4 are contrary to proposition 3.8. The
difference occurs because an MNC keeping OSB has to use a transfer price belonging to
the arm’s length range for both tax and internal objectives. Whenever a corner value of
the arm’s length range is applied, one of the purposes dominates. For example, the tax-
saving objective dominates for a very low spillover, so that the MNC locates the intangible
in the low-tax foreign jurisdiction and uses the upper bound of the arm’s length range as
the transfer price. This allows maximal legal profit shifting while providing little invest-
ment incentives for the domestic division. By curtailing the profit shifting possibilities,
the internal objective receives more emphasis. That is, the MNC’s investment incentives
increase. Propositions 3.4 and 3.8 illustrate that the effect of curtailing profit shifting
possibilities depends on the underlying accounting system and with OSB additionally
on the spillover’s magnitude. Both the accounting system and the spillover are usually
unobservable. As a consequence, regulators that curtail profit shifting possibilities have
difficulty estimating the consequences of their actions for MNCs’ investments. This makes
anti-avoidance regulation a complex task.
Next, we consider the impact of the tax rate differential h on the divisions’ investment
incentives. An increase in the tax rate differential decreases the domestic division’s after-
tax investment costs because the investment costs are tax deductible. A higher tax rate
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differential does not affect the benefits from the domestic division’s maintenance invest-
ment, so that in sum, the domestic investment increases. This is true for both foreign and
headquarters ownership.
The impact on the foreign division’s investment incentives depends on the location
choice. First, an increase in the tax rate differential does not affect the foreign division’s
investment decision at all in the case of foreign ownership. Second, under ownership by
the headquarters, the foreign division pays a positive external royalty rate for using the
intangible. The headquarters in turn enjoys royalty income. An increase in the tax rate
differential decreases the after-tax benefit from this royalty income. However, the foreign
division’s investment costs are unaffected. As a consequence, headquarters provides less
investment incentives through a higher internal royalty rate. In sum, the location choice
does not affect the impact of an increasing tax rate differential on the domestic investment
decision. The impact on the foreign investment decision depends on the location choice.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose that the MNC keeps TSB. An increase in the tax rate differ-
ential
• increases the domestic investment,
• decreases (does not affect) foreign investment when the intangible is located in the
high-tax headquarters (low-tax foreign division).
Proof. See appendix.
Most parts of proposition 3.9 are contrary to the related OSB findings in proposition
3.5. Again, using a single transfer price for both tax optimization and to provide in-
vestment incentives under OSB is responsible for the difference. The tax rate differential
affects the investments under OSB only when neither of the inherent objectives domi-
nates. This is the case when the transfer price employed is not a corner value of the arm’s
length range. A higher tax rate differential increases the benefits from profit shifting to
the low-tax jurisdiction so that the tax optimization objective gains importance. With
foreign ownership, the MNC increases the royalty rate to shift more profits from the do-
mestic to the foreign division. This curbs the domestic investment benefits. As with TSB,
the foreign investment benefits are unaffected. With domestic ownership under OSB, the
MNC decreases the royalty rate payable by the foreign to the domestic division. Thus,
the domestic division obtains a smaller part of the spillover. Therefore, the marginal in-
vestment benefits decrease, while the marginal investment costs are unaffected. A smaller
royalty rate increases the foreign division’s marginal investment benefits, so that foreign
investment rises. As with curtailing profit shifting possibilities, the MNC’s accounting
system affects how changes in the tax rate differential influence the investments.
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3.7 Conclusion
Intangibles are critical for an MNC’s success and are often unique but not exclusive in
their consumption. Furthermore, the use of an intangible is typically associated with no or
negligible marginal costs, and spillovers regularly occur. Nevertheless, when an intangible
is used by several divisions, internal royalty payments are necessary to induce adequate
maintenance investments. In addition to this internal role of royalty payments, an external
transfer price is mandatory to report taxable income. Cross-border transactions are likely
to entail tax audits. Therefore, MNCs that are especially concerned with the prevention
of disputes with the tax authority refrain from large discrepancies between the internal
and external transfer price.
We study the optimal royalty rates while endogenizing the location choice of an intan-
gible. Non-zero royalty rates are necessary to induce adequate maintenance investments
because of a spillover from the domestic to the foreign division’s contribution margin.
Our model highlights that without restrictions on the internal transfer price, the in-
tangible is located in the low-tax jurisdiction. This allows the MNC to optimally shift
profits to minimize its tax liability. This result is in line with initial intuition. However, it
is well known that large discrepancies between internal and external transfer prices trigger
increased scrutiny and mistrust. MNCs that are interested in preventing disputes with the
tax authority while keeping TSB therefore consider restrictions on internal transfer prices.
If restrictions on the internal transfer price are present and spillovers are low, locating
the intangible in the low-tax jurisdiction is still optimal. However, for a high spillover, the
MNC needs to trade-off effective legal profit shifting and investment distortions. Beneficial
profit shifting is obtained when the intangible is held by the foreign division operating
in the low-tax jurisdiction. A higher spillover results in higher benefits from adequate
maintenance investments. As a consequence, for a large spillover, the benefits from less
severe domestic investment distortions exceed the costs arising from ineffective profit
shifting. Thus, the intangible is located in the high-tax domestic jurisdiction. A similar
finding occurs when the MNC keeps OSB. This provides a potential explanation for the
‘home bias’ found in the empirical literature.
Recently, governments and tax authorities have sought to curtail MNCs’ profit shift-
ing possibilities. In particular, the BEPS project is intended to reduce profit shifting. Our
analysis illustrates that the consequences of restricting profit shifting possibilities depend
on several parameters. Our work has identified the unobservable accounting system and
spillovers as two factors influencing the outcome of such regulations. Thus, curtailing
profit shifting possibilities can either increase or decrease the MNC’s investment incen-
tives. This highlights the complexity that legislators, tax authorities, and supranational
organizations such as the OECD and the EU face when designing anti-avoidance legisla-
tion while preventing unintended outcomes.
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1
When the foreign division owns the intangible headquarters’ expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQ,fb
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ (1− t)
[
βθD + θF − k2θ
2
F
]
+hγrθD
The MNC is interested in the highest possible external transfer price, i.e., γr, in order to
maximize its tax savings. Headquarters is interested in investment decisions maximizing
overall after-tax profits:
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1−kθ1) +β (1− t) +hγr (t+h) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1−kθ2) = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum: θD,fb and θF,fb.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We first consider all possible location choices in a no-tax world.
The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profits are given by:
E [ΠD] = θD− k2θ
2
D +γ (θF +βθD)
and
E [ΠF ] = (1−γ)(θF +βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
The divisions choose their investments in order to maximize the divisional profit:
FOCθD : 1−kθD +γβ = 0
SOCθD :−k < 0
FOCθF : 1−kθF −γ = 0
SOCθF :−k < 0.
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Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum:
θDD =
1 +γβ
k
and
θDF =
1−γ
k
.
The headquarters’ profit is equal to:
E
[
ΠHQ
]
= θD + θF +βθD− k2
(
θ2D + θ2F
)
. (3.12)
First-best investments cannot be achieved. The headquarters chooses the transfer price
in order to maximize the overall profit given the division’s investments:
FOCγ : 1
k
[
β−1 +β2− 12
(
2β+ 2β2γ−2 + 2γ
)]
SOCγ : 1
k
((
2β2 + 2
)
·−12
)
< 0.
Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum. The optimal transfer price is:
γD = β
2
1 +β2 . (3.13)
The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division, incorporating royalty payments is:
E [ΠD] = (1−γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and the foreign division expects a profit of:
E [ΠF ] = θF + (γ+βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θFD =
1−γ
k
and
θFF =
1
k
.
The headquarters objective remains in all no-tax scenarios unchanged and are depicted in
(3.12). First-best investments can easily be achieved setting γ =−β. The foreign division
is willing to accept a negative royalty payment administered by the headquarters because
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its expected profit with the subsidy
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
+β 1 +β
k
− k2
1
k2
−β 1 +β
k
= 12k (3.14)
equals the expected profit of the foreign division if it denies access to the intangible for
the domestic division:
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
− k2
1
k2
= 12k .
First-best investments imply E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠDHQ
]
where the superscript denotes the
location choice of the intangible.
Joint Ownership of the Intangible
In case of a joint ownership no division faces royalty payments. The expected profits
are:
E [ΠD] = θD− k2θ
2
D
and
E [ΠF ] = θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θJD =
1
k
and
θJF =
1
k
.
Despite the absence of royalty payments an investment subsidy might be profit enhancing.
However, no subsidy can be found the foreign division is willing to accept. This result is
due to the joint ownership. No division is able to deny the other division access to the
intangible. Hence, both divisions use the intangible without permission of the other one.
Thus, the expected profit of the foreign division without subsidy:
E [ΠF ] =
1
k
+ β
k
− k2
1
k2
= 12k (1 + 2β) (3.15)
is higher than with subsidy because (3.15)>(3.14).
The investment incentives with foreign ownership can easily replicate the incentives
under consideration using γ = 0. This implies that E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠJHQ
]
holds true so that
joint ownership of the intangible is strictly dominated.
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The Headquarters owns the Intangible
Both divisions pay royalty fees for using the intangible. Expected profits are:
E [ΠD] = (1−γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
and
E [ΠF ] = (1−γ)(θF +βθD)− k2θ
2
F .
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θHQD =
1−γ
k
and
θHQF =
1−γ
k
First-best investments can be achieved using γHQD = −β and γHQF = 0. This implies
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= E
[
ΠFHQ
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We now provide an overview over possible location choices in a tax-world when OSB
is kept.
The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division is given by:
E
[
ΠDD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD +γ (βθD + θF )− k2θ
2
D
]
and the expected profit of the royalty paying foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠDF
]
= (1− t)
[
(1−γ)(βθD + θF )− k2θ
2
F
]
.
The divisions choose their investment levels in order to maximize their own after-tax
profits.
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1 +γβ−kθD) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1−γ−kθF ) = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
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Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum and the investments are:
θD,OSBD =
1
k
(1 +γβ) (3.16)
and
θD,OSBF =
1
k
(1−γ). (3.17)
Headquarters expects the following profit:
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD,OSBD −
k
2
(
θD,OSBD
)2]
+ (1− t)
[
βθD,OSBD + θ
D,OSB
F −
k
2
(
θD,OSBF
)2]−hγ (βθD,OSBD + θD,OSBF ) (3.18)
Differentiating headquarters’ expected profit with respect to γ yields:
FOCγ : 1
k
[
γ
(
2h−1 + t−β2(1− t+h)
)
+ (1− t)β2−h(1−β)
]
= 0
SOCγ : 1
k
[
2h−1 + t−β2(1− t+h)
]
,
which is negative for h < (1− t)/2. Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum. Hence,
the optimal royalty rate is:
γD,OSB1 =
(1− t)β2−h(1 +β)
β2(1− t+h) + (1− t−2h) . (3.19)
However, the royalty rate needs to belong to the arm’s length range. For γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and
h < 1−t2 , γ
D,OSB
1 ≥ γr if and only if
β≥ βD,OSB1 :=
1
2(1− t−γr(1− t+h))
[
h+
√
h2 + 4(1− t−γr(1− t+h))(h+ (1− t−2h)γr)
]
.
For γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and h < 1−t2 , γD,OSB1 ≤ γr if and only if
β≤ βD,OSB2 :=
1
2(1− t−γr(1− t+h))
[
h+
√
h2 + 4(1− t−γr(1− t+h))(h+ (1− t−2h)γr)
]
.
In sum, for γr ≤ 1−t1−t+h and h < 1−t2 the optimal royalty rate is as stated in equation (3.6).
The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the royalty paying domestic division is given by:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
(1−γ)θD− k2θ
2
D
]
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and the expected profit of the foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθ1 + θF +γθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θF,OSBD =
1
k
(1−γ) (3.20)
and
θF,OSBF =
1
k
. (3.21)
Headquarters expects the following profit:
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θF,OSBD −
k
2
(
θF,OSBD
)2]
+ (1− t)
[
βθF,OSBD + θ
F,OSB
F −
k
2
(
θF,OSBF
)2]
+hγθF,OSBD . (3.22)
Differentiating headquarters’ expected profit with respect to γ yields:
FOCγ : 1
k
[−γ (1− t+h) +h− (1− t)β] = 0
SOCγ :−1
k
(1− t+h)< 0.
Thus, the FOC determines a local maximum and the optimal royalty rate is:
γF,OSB1 =
h−β(1− t)
1− t+h . (3.23)
However, the royalty rate needs to belong to the arm’s length range. γF,OSB1 ≥ γr if and
only if
β ≤ βF,OSB2 :=
h−γr(1− t+h)
1− t .
γF,OSB1 ≤ γr if and only if
β ≥ βF,OSB1 :=
h−γr(1− t+h)
1− t .
In sum, the optimal royalty rate is as stated in equation 3.2.
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Joint Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠJD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and
E
[
ΠJF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θJ,OSBD =
1
k
(3.24)
and
θJ,OSBF =
1
k
. (3.25)
Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θJ,OSBD −
k
2
(
θJ,OSBD
)2]
+(1− t)
[
θJ,OSBF +βθ
J,OSB
D −
k
2
(
θJ,OSBF
)2]
.
Headquarters’ Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division is:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
(1−γD)θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and the expected profit of the foreign division is:
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
(1−γF )(βθD + θF )− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θHQ,OSBD =
1
k
(1−γD) (3.26)
and
θHQ,OSBF =
1
k
(1−γF ). (3.27)
Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θHQ,OSBD −
k
2
(
θHQ,OSBD
)2]
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+(1− t)
[
(1−γ2)(θHQ,OSBF +βθHQ,OSBD )−
k
2
(
θHQ,OSBF
)2]
+(1− t−h)γ2
(
θHQ,OSBF +βθ
HQ,OSB
D
)
.
∂2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ21
= 1
k
(1− t−h)(−1)< 0
∂2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ22
= 1
k
(2h+ t−1),
which is negative for h < (1− t)/2.
∂2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ1∂γ2
=
∂2E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
∂γ2∂γ1
= 1
k
βh.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is
1
k
[
(1− t−h)(1− t−2h)−β2h2
]
,
which is positive for h< (1−t)(3−√5)/2< (1−t)/2. Thus, the Hessian matrix is negative
definite and the headquarters’ expected profit is concave.
The headquarters maximizes this expected profit under the restriction that the transfer
prices belong to the arm’s length range. This restriction satisfies the constraint qualifica-
tion. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are necessary for an optimal solution.
The headquarters expected profit is differentiable and concave in the non-negative or-
thant. According to the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem, transfer prices satisfying the
Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions give a global maximum. In sum, the Kuhn-Tucker
maximum conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
For γD = γr and γF = γr, all Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are satisfied.
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
so that headquarters’ ownership is dominated by joint ownership.
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥ E
[
ΠDHQ
]
if and only if β < βDJ , where
βDJ :=
h+
√
h2 + (γr(1 +h− t) + 2(t−1))(γr(2h+ t−1)−2h)
2(1− t)−γr(1 +h− t) . (3.28)
E
[
ΠJHQ
]
≥ E
[
ΠFHQ
]
if and only if β > βFJ , where
βFJ :=
2h+γr(t−h−1)
2(1− t) and (3.29)
βD,OSB1 < β
F,OSB
2 < β
F
J < β
D
J < β
D,OSB
1 < β
D,OSB
2 .
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Therefore, the intangible is located in the foreign division for β ∈
[
0,βFJ
]
. Joint ownership
dominates for β ∈
(
βFJ ,β
D
J
)
. The intangible is located in the domestic division for β ∈[
βDJ ,1
]
.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
This directly follows from calculating the first derivatives of equations (3.28) and (3.29)
with respect to γr, γr, or h.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
For β ≤ βFJ , the intangible is located in the foreign division. For β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
and β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
, γr and γr are used, respectively. Then, ∂γF,OSBr /∂β = 0. For
β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
, ∂γF,OSBr /∂β < 0.
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division. For β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
and β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
, γr and γr are used, respectively. Then, ∂γD,OSBr /∂β = 0. For β ∈(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
, ∂γD,OSBr /∂β > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Consider the equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8). For β ≤ βFJ , the
intangible is located in the foreign division so that the MNC invests θF,OSBD + θ
F,OSB
F in
total. The first derivatives of total investment with regard to γr and γr are:
∂
(
θF,OSBD + θ
F,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

0 for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB2
]
−1
k for β ∈
(
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
,
∂
(
θF,OSBD + θ
F,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

−1
k for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
0 for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F
J
]
.
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division so that the MNC invests
θD,OSBD +θ
D,OSB
F in total. The first derivatives of total investment with regard to γr and
γr are:
∂
(
θD,OSBD + θ
D,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

β−1
k for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,1
]
,
∂
(
θD,OSBD + θ
D,OSB
F
)
∂γr
=

0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
2
]
β−1
k for β ∈
(
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
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Decreasing γr and increasing γr jointly present curtailing profit shifting possibilities.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Consider the equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8). For β ≤ βFJ , the
intangible is located in the foreign division. The first derivatives of domestic and foreign
investment with regard to h are:
∂θF,OSBD
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
0,βF,OSB1
]
−(1+β)(1−t)
k(1−t+h)2 < 0 for β ∈
(
βF,OSB1 ,β
F,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βF,OSB2 ,β
F
J
]
,
∂θF,OSBF
∂h
= 0,
For β ≥ βDJ , the intangible is located in the domestic division. The first derivatives of
domestic and foreign investment with regard to h are:
∂θD,OSBD
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
β(1+β−β2+β3+β4)(t−1)
k(−1+2h+t+β2(t−h−1))2 < 0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
,
∂θD,OSBF
∂h
=

0 for β ∈
[
βDJ ,β
D,OSB
1
]
(1+β−β2+β3+β4)(1−t)
k(−1+2h+t+β2(t−h−1))2 > 0 for β ∈
(
βD,OSB1 ,β
D,OSB
2
)
0 for β ∈
[
βD,OSB2 ,1
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
We now provide an overview over possible location choices in a tax-world keeping TSB.
The Domestic Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of division 1 is given by:
E
[
ΠDD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
−k2θ
2
1
]
+γi (βθD + θF )− (t+h)γr (βθD + θF )
and the expected profit of the royalty paying foreign division is given by:
E
[
ΠDF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθD + θF − k2θ
2
F
]
−γi (βθD + θF ) + tγr (βθD + θF ) .
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Due to the tax rate differential the transfer price is not canceled out. The transfer pricing
decision affects MNC’s overall after-tax profit. Similar to the no-tax world the divisions
choose their investment levels in order to maximize their own after-tax profits. They have
to take into account the internal as well as the tax royalty rate.
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1−kθD) +γiβ−βγr (t+h) = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1−kθF )−γi+ tγr = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum and the investments are:
θDD =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t−h)
[
β
(
γi−γr(t+h)
)]
(3.30)
and
θDF =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t)
[
tγr−γi
]
. (3.31)
The internal royalty rate γi affects both divisions’ investment decision so that first-best
investments cannot be achieved. Hence, the headquarters maximizes its overall after-tax
profit choosing the internal royalty rate taking into account the divisions’ investment
decisions.
FOCγi :
1
1− t−h
[
β2γr (t+h)−β2γi+β2 (1− t)−β2hγr
]
+ 11− t
[
γr (t+h)−γi
]
= 0
SOCγi :
1
1− t−h
(
−β2
)
− 11− t < 0.
Hence, the optimal internal royalty rate is:
γDi =
1
1− t−h+β2 (1− t)
[
β2 (1− t)
(
tγr + 1− t
)
+γr (t+h)(1− t−h)]
]
. (3.32)
The Foreign Division owns the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠFD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
−γiθD +γrθD (t+h)
and of the foreign:
E
[
ΠFF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
+γiθD− tγrθD.
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Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θFD =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)−γi] (3.33)
and
θFF =
1
k
. (3.34)
Stipulating the following internal royalty rate induces first-best investments:
γFi = γrt− (1− t)β (3.35)
Joint Ownership of the Intangible
Expected profit of the domestic division:
E
[
ΠJD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
and
E
[
ΠJF
]
= (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
.
Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θJD =
1
k
(3.36)
and
θJF =
1
k
. (3.37)
By setting γi = γr (t+h) in 3.8 the investment incentives in 3.8 can be replicated. But
θJD 6= θFD. Hence, E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠJHQ
]
.
Headquarters’ Ownership of the Intangible
The domestic (foreign) division pays a royalty rate γiD (γiF ). The expected profit of
the domestic division is:
E
[
ΠHQD
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
−γiDθD +γrθD (t+h)
and the expected profit of the foreign division is:
E
[
ΠHQF
]
= (1− t)
[
βθD + θF − k2θ
2
F
]
−γiF (βθD + θF ) + tγr (βθD + θF ) .
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Following the procedure used in section 3.8 yields:
θHQD =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t−h) [γr (t+h)−γiD] (3.38)
and
θHQF =
1
k
+ 1
k (1− t) [tγr−γiF ] . (3.39)
Headquarters expected profit is:
E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
= (1− t−h)
[
θD− k2θ
2
D
]
+ (1− t)
[
θF +βθD− k2θ
2
F
]
−hγr (θF +βθD) .
The MNC is interested in the lowest possible external transfer price, i.e., γr, in order to
minimize its tax liabilities. Headquarters is interested in investment decisions maximizing
overall after-tax profits:
FOCθD : (1− t−h)(1−kθD) +β (1− t)−hβγr = 0
SOCθD : (1− t−h)(−k)< 0
FOCθF : (1− t)(1−kθF )−hγr = 0
SOCθF : (1− t)(−k)< 0.
The Hessian matrix is negative definite. Thus, the FOCs determine a local maximum.
These second-best investments are induced by stipulating the following internal royalty
rates:
γHQiD = γr (t+h)−
(
1− t−hγr
)
β (3.40)
and
γHQiF = γr (t+h) . (3.41)
In a world without restrictions on transfer pricing the foreign division always owns the
intangible, i.e., E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠDHQ
]
>E
[
ΠJHQ
]
and E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
.
With restrictions on transfer pricing, we have E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠJHQ
]
and E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
>
E
[
ΠDHQ
]
. Thus, either foreign or headquarters’ ownership is optimal. For β ≤ βF , foreign
ownership is optimal as E
[
ΠFHQ
]
> E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
. For β > βF , foreign ownership dominates
headquarters’ ownership if and only if
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
≥ E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
⇐⇒ δ := E
[
ΠFHQ
]
−E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
≥ 0
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⇐⇒ 12k(1− t)(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
Aβ2 +Bβ+C
]
≥ 0,
where
A := (t−1)
(
t+γrh−1
)2
< 0,
B := 2(t−1)
[
γrh(t+h−1) +γr(t−1)(t+h)
]
> 0, and
C := 2γrh(t−1)(t+h−1) +γrh(t+h−1)(γrh+ 2t−2) +γr2(t−1)(t2−h2). (3.42)
Due to A< 0, δ is inversely U-shaped in β. Setting δ equal to zero yields two thresholds
β1 =
1
2A
[
−B+
√
B2−4AC
]
and
βHQ = 12A
[
−B−
√
B2−4AC
]
.
β1 is smaller than βHQ. Using E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠHQHQ
]
for β = βF and that δ is inversely U-
shaped in β yields that for β <βHQ (β >βHQ), E
[
ΠFHQ
]
>E
[
ΠHQHQ
] (
E
[
ΠFHQ
]
<E
[
ΠHQHQ
])
.
As the example in figure 3.4 demonstrates, βHQ can be smaller than 1. Thus, headquar-
ters’ ownership can become optimal.
Proof of Corollary 3.2
As stated in the proof of proposition 3.6, the threshold βHQ is determined by Aβ2 +
Bβ+C = 0 (see equations (3.42)). Define G := Aβ2 +Bβ+C.
∂G
∂βHQ
= 2AβHQ+B < 0.
∂G
∂γr
= 2h
β(1− t)(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+β2(1− t)(1−γrh− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(1− t−h)(1−γrh− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂γr
=− ∂G
∂γr
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
∂G
∂γr
= 2(1− t)
h(1− t−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+β(1− t)(h+ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+γr(h2− t2)
 ,
which is positive for β ≥ βF . Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂γr
=− ∂G
∂γr
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
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∂G
∂h
= 2γr2h(1− t) + 2γr(1− t)(1− t−2h+β(1− t))+
γr
[
γrh(3h−2(1− t)) + 2(1 +β)(1− t)(1− t−2h) + 2β2(1− t)(1−γrh− t)
]
,
which is positive for h < (1− t)/2. Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂βHQ
∂h
=−∂G
∂h
/
∂G
∂βHQ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
For β ≤ βHQ, the intangible is located in the foreign division. The internal transfer
price is given by: γFi = tγr− (1− t)β, where γFi is non-zero if there is no restriction on
tax-avoidance or if restrictions are present for β < βF and γFi = 0 for βF ≤ β ≤ βHQ. A
non-zero internal royalty rate decreases with an increasing spillover:
∂γFi
∂β
=−(1− t)< 0.
Otherwise, if γFi = 0 the internal royalty rate is unaffected.
For β > βHQ, the intangible is held in the headquarters. The internal royalty rate
for purely domestic transactions is given by: γHQiD = γr (t+h)−
(
1− t−hγr
)
β and the
internal royalty rate for cross-border transactions is γHQiF = γr (t+h) . Thus, the internal
royalty rate for purely domestic transactions decreases with an increasing spillover:
∂γHQiD
∂β
=−(1− t) +hγr < 0.
The internal royalty rate for cross-border transactions is unaffected.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
For β ≤ βHQ, the intangible is located in the foreign division. For β ≤ βF , first-best
investments are achievable and are given by θFD = 1k +
1
k(1−t−h) [(1− t)β+hγr]. If βF <β ≤
βHQ an investment distortion occurs; the distorted investment decisions of the domestic
division is given by (3.33). The derivative is
∂θFD
∂γr
=

h
k(1−t−h) > 0 for β ∈
[
0,βF
]
t+h
k(1−t−h) > 0 for β ∈
(
βF ,βHQ
]
.
Thus, curtailing profit shifting, i.e., decreasing γr, leads to decreasing investments in the
domestic division. The investment decision of the foreign country is shown in (3.34). The
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investment incentives are unaffected and remain the same so that the MNC’s overall
investment decreases.
For β > βHQ, the intangible is located in the headquarters. The investment decisions
are described in (3.38) and (3.39). The derivatives with respect to the external royalty
rate are:
∂θHQD
∂γr
= −hβ
k (1− t−h) < 0
and
∂θHQF
∂γr
= −h
k (1− t) < 0.
Thus, curtailing profit shifting possibilities, i.e., increasing γr, leads to less investments in
both divisions.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
With foreign ownership the derivative of the domestic division’s investment with re-
spect to the tax rate differential is:
∂θFD
∂h
=

γr
k(1−t−h)2 > 0 for β ∈
[
0,βF
]
(1−t)(γr+β)
k(1−t−h)2 > 0 for β ∈
(
βF ,βHQ
]
.
With foreign ownership the derivative of the foreign division’s investment with respect
to the tax rate differential is
∂θFF
∂h
= 0.
With headquarters’ ownership the derivatives of both divisions’ investments with respect
to the tax rate differential are
∂θHQD
∂h
=
β(1− t)(1−γr)
k (1− t−h)2 > 0
and
∂θHQF
∂h
=
−γr
k (1− t) < 0.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Book-Tax Conformity on
Tax-Reporting and Investment Behavior‡
Abstract
Book-tax differences affect firms’ behavior in various ways. On the one hand, high book-
tax conformity reduces the firms’ reporting flexibility. On the other hand, real effects
occur because taxes and corresponding tax regulation influence firms’ investment behav-
ior. In a game theoretic model, we study how investment decisions and related reporting
interfere with each other when the financial statement provides a noisy signal to the tax
authority. First, the firm decides on an investment amount considering subsequent report-
ing consequences. Subsequently, the tax authority may conduct an audit. High book-tax
conformity deteriorates investment incentives. However, increasing mandatory book-tax
conformity could lead to more or less tax-aggressive reporting in the form of understated
tax reports. Considering both investment behavior and corresponding tax reporting, in-
creasing mandatory book-tax conformity can either increase or decrease the firm’s and the
tax authority’s expected payoff. Thus, our results indicate that the effect of tighter reg-
ulation regarding book-tax conformity is ambiguous and, therefore, highlight challenges
governments face while designing book-tax conformity regulation.
‡ This chapter is joint work with Alexandra Lilge (Leibniz University Hanover) and Michelle Muraz
(Leibniz University Hanover)
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4.1 Introduction
In the wake of accounting scandals and misreporting cases regulators discuss the align-
ment of the financial statement and the tax report to curb accounting manipulation and
fraud. An alignment of the financial accounting rules and tax law leads to high mandatory
book-tax conformity.21 The reduced reporting discretion in simultaneously managing the
financial statement and the tax report is expected to decrease the probability of account-
ing scandals (Watts, 2003; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005). However, book-tax conformity is a
double-edged sword. Besides the advantage of preventing firms from engaging in upwards
earnings management while understating their taxable income at the same time, the gov-
ernments’ possibilities to induce specific firm behavior by providing tax incentives might
decrease with an increasing mandatory book-tax conformity. In contrast to financial ac-
counting rules settled in the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that are
typically based on conservatism and matching principles, a tax system is designed to raise
the government’s tax revenues, providing economic incentives or disincentives to engage
in certain activities, and rewarding particular constituencies (Atwood et al., 2010). Con-
sidering the different purposes of a tax system, increasing the book-tax conformity with
the aim to increase the tax revenue might be myopic. In particular, high book-tax confor-
mity can impair investment incentives. Since profitable investments build the foundation
of long-term economic growth and are therefore crucial for the welfare of an economy,
the deterioration of investment incentives can be particularly harmful. This highlights
the necessity to investigate the effects of regulation regarding book-tax conformity on
investment behavior and related reporting.
In this study, we examine the impact of mandatory book-tax conformity on a firm’s
investment and tax reporting decisions when the correct financial statement provides a
noisy signal to the tax authority. We investigate whether increasing book-tax conformity
leads to less understated tax reports and, accordingly, to higher tax revenues for the tax
authority. We are particularly interested in the following research questions: What are the
consequences of a high mandatory book-tax conformity on a firm’s investment decision
considering that tax reporting is the outcome of a strategic interaction between the firm
and the tax authority? Does high book-tax conformity lead to a higher tax revenue for
the tax authority?
We study the raised research questions in a game theoretic model. Specifically, we
consider a setting where a firm decides on an investment in an existing project and de-
termines corresponding tax reporting. The project outcome is depicted in a financial
statement and a tax report which are linked through an exogenous book-tax conformity.
Specifically, book-tax conformity reflects similarities between GAAP and tax law. There-
21Book-tax conformity is jointly determined by financial accounting setters and tax regulators. Compli-
ance with the financial accounting rules and tax law is mandatory. Therefore, we use the terms book-tax
conformity and mandatory book-tax conformity interchangeably throughout the paper.
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fore, the correct treatment of the project outcome for the financial statement and for tax
purposes are positively correlated. Hence, observing the financial statement is informative
about the correct tax treatment and, consequently, incorporated in the audit decision of
a strategic tax authority.
Initially, the firm has an existing project and decides on an investment amount to
increase the expected outcome of the project. The outcome of the project can be either
high due to the investment or remain low if the investment fails. The project outcome is
realized before the firm issues its reports. We consider public firms and assume that the
financial statement is correct and publicly observable. In contrast, the firm can bias the
tax report to reduce its tax liability. The tax authority observes both reports and decides
whether to conduct an audit or not.
Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work, we show that an increasing book-
tax conformity induces less understated non-conforming tax reports, i.e. an understated
tax report that creates a book-tax difference (Atwood et al., 2012; Blaufus et al., 2017;
Chen and Gavious, 2017; Niggemann, 2018). This supports the hypothesis of Chan et al.
(2013) that increasing book-tax conformity is likely to induce increasing tax payments
for firms with sufficiently high financial reporting incentives. However, the above argu-
ment ignores that increasing book-tax conformity facilitates conforming understated tax
reports, i.e. an understated tax report when the financial statement is low, and therefore
can also decrease the revenue of the tax authority.
An increasing book-tax conformity reduces the government’s possibility to provide par-
ticular investment incentives. Thus, this increase of the marginal investment costs due to
a less beneficial tax treatment of the investment induces a decreasing investment amount.
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the expected tax base. Therefore, increasing book-tax
conformity can either increase or decrease the expected income of the tax authority. The
outcome depends on the level of baseline book-tax conformity and the tax independent
investment incentives like the investment costs. For a low level of baseline book-tax con-
formity, the expected tax revenue increases with an increasing book-tax conformity by
inducing less understated tax reports. The deterioration of the investment incentives is
not severe so that the benefits of less understated tax reports outweigh the decreasing in-
vestment amount. However, if the level of baseline book-tax conformity is high, a further
increase of mandatory book-tax conformity leads to a decrease of the expected income of
the tax authority. In this case, the investment incentives are low because the investment
is expensive due to the unfavorable tax treatment. The marginal costs of the investment
increase with increasing book-tax conformity and, therefore, the firm forgoes expected
pre-tax profits because a high probability for a low project outcome and a concomitant
low financial statement leads to a high probability for a correct low tax report, thereby
reducing the expected tax liability. However, the probability for understated conforming
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tax reports also increases because a firm facing a low project outcome and a high correct
tax report can better mimic a low tax report type.
Taken together, our results indicate that the effect of tightening regulation regarding
book-tax conformity is ambiguous. This highlights problems regulators face while design-
ing book-tax legislation. Governments are interested in collecting their owing taxes. Thus,
countermeasures are introduced to prevent firms from tax-aggressive reporting behavior.
We show that the outcome of suchlike regulation is unclear and depends on various vari-
ables like the level of baseline book-tax conformity which is inherent to current tax law and
GAAP. Moreover, several potentially unobservable parameters like the firm’s preferences
or the investment costs influence the outcome. Hence, our results show that implementing
book-tax regulations is a complex task.
We address calls of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Graham et al. (2012) for re-
search that leads to a better understanding of how tax incentives influence a firm’s real
investments. Therefore, we contribute to findings of Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2017);
De Simone et al. (2018), and Reineke and Weiskirchner-Merten (2018) investigating the
impact of tax regulation on firm’s real decisions. Moreover, we add to the extant litera-
ture by endogenizing an investment decision in a tax inspection game. That is, instead of
considering only reporting behavior we investigate the impact of book-tax conformity on
the reporting and the investment decision of a firm simultaneously.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, the related literature is discussed in
section 4.2. Then, the model is presented in section 4.3. Afterwards, section 4.4 provides
the analysis and discussion of the equilibrium strategies of both players. This is followed
by comparative statics in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section, we provide an overview of theoretical and empirical work closely related
to our research. It is well known that book-tax differences may be a useful tool to convey
information to shareholders without incurring corresponding tax consequences. Mills and
Newberry (2001) have shown that firms with a positive income account for positive book-
tax differences while loss-making firms tend to have negative book-tax differences.
Prior research has shown that book-tax differences affect tax auditors’ behavior. Sans-
ing (1993) examines how different information influences taxpayers’ and tax auditors’
behavior whereas Mills (1998) shows a positive association between book-tax differences
and proposed IRS audit adjustments. The results indicate that book-tax differences serve
as red flags for tax auditors. This finding is in line with work of Badertscher et al. (2009);
Mills (1996); Mills and Sansing (2000) and Chen and Gavious (2017) who show that
positions with high book-tax differences are more likely to be scrutinized within a tax
audit.
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Niggemann (2018) finds that a departure from high book-tax conformity increases the
tax non-compliance. In line with empirical evidence of Ayers et al. (2010); Chan et al.
(2010), and Hanlon et al. (2008), this indicates that high book-tax conformity might mit-
igate understated tax reports. Nevertheless, Atwood et al. (2010) also document that this
can come at the cost of reduced accuracy of the financial statement. They state that in-
creasing book-tax conformity may reduce the earnings quality. In contrast, Desai (2005);
Evers et al. (2016), and Lev and Nissim (2004) argue that a one book system, i.e., a
financial statement and a tax report which coincide, would offer less discretion for oppor-
tunistic reporting behavior and, therefore, induces a higher earnings quality. However, the
information required by tax authorities differs substantially from the information needed
by investors who are the primary recipients of financial accounting information (Atwood
et al., 2010). Thus, increasing book-tax conformity necessarily exacerbates the trade-off
between the different information requirements. Ali and Hwang (2000) show that earnings
are less value relevant when book-tax conformity is high. This suggests that in such cases
less information is transmitted to the financial statement users.
Despite the potentially harmful effect on the earnings quality, the findings of Lang
et al. (2012); Tang (2015), and Watrin et al. (2014) indicate that managers will less often
engage in earnings management when book-tax conformity is low because the incentive
to smooth the taxable income carry over to smoother accounting earnings for high book-
tax conformity. Contrary, Blaylock et al. (2017) find that higher book-tax conformity
increases the cost of equity whereas the cost of debt does not change. They conclude that
high book-tax conformity is associated with more earnings management.
Although the effect of an increasing book-tax conformity on earnings management for
financial statement purposes appears equivoval, the results regarding tax evasion tend to
be less ambiguous. The findings of Atwood et al. (2012) and Chen and Gavious (2017)
suggest that an increasing book-tax conformity is associated with less tax evasion. Blau-
fus et al. (2017) have shown that an increasing book-tax conformity can lead to more
or less understated tax reports. We contribute to their findings showing that reduced re-
porting discretion results in lower investment amounts when real effects are considered.
Accordingly, increasing book-tax conformity may lead to decreasing expected tax revenues
for the tax authority. High book-tax conformity deteriorates investment incentives. Thus,
governments face a trade-off while designing regulation regarding the book-tax conformity.
Closely related to our work are the studies of Blaufus et al. (2017), Mills and Sansing
(2000) and Mills et al. (2010). These papers investigate different information environ-
ments and the resulting inferences from book-tax differences. Mills and Sansing (2000)
consider the use of financial statement information in a tax audit. Blaufus et al. (2017)
include a strategic statutory auditor in the aforementioned setting. Basically, our focus is
different. While these papers are particularly concerned with the signaling effect of book-
tax differences, we investigate the impact of book-tax conformity on a firm’s investment
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decision while acknowledging that the financial statement alters the tax authority’s beliefs
regarding the correct tax treatment of the project outcome.
4.3 Model Description
We consider two risk-neutral players, namely, a firm and a tax authority. Initially,
the firm has an existing project with a low project outcome. The firm decides on an
investment amount for this existing project to achieve a high project’s outcome. Then,
the firm releases a financial statement and a tax report. The project outcome is depicted in
both reports. Nevertheless, due to particularities in GAAP and tax law, the treatment of
the project outcome for the financial statement and the tax report can differ. For example,
corporate tax shelters may induce favorable tax treatment of investments. Alternatively,
the firm could decide whether an expenditure must be expensed or capitalized in the
financial statement and the tax report (see Mills and Sansing, 2000). Subsequently, the
tax authority decides whether to conduct a tax audit or not.
In particular, the firm decides on an investment amount a > 0 in the existing project
to maximize its expected after-tax income, considering potential tax audits. After the
investment takes place the project outcome b can either remain low (b) or a high project
outcome (b) is realized through the firm’s investment effort. The investment is costly za
2
2
where z > 0 denotes the unit costs of the investment. We assume that z is sufficiently large
to ensure that a ≤ 1 holds true. The investment amount a determines the probability of
obtaining a high project outcome, i.e., P (b) = a and P (b) = (1−a), respectively.22 That
is, an investment shifts probability mass from the low b to the high project outcome b.
After the project outcome is realized, the firm releases a financial statement and a tax
report. Since we are not interested in strategic interdependencies with a statutory auditor,
we assume that the project outcome and the corresponding financial statement coincide.
That is, we suppress the possibility that a high project outcome leads to a low financial
statement due to certain financial accounting rules. In addition, the firm has no incentive
to bias the financial statement because the financial statement of public firms is always
audited and publicly observable. Presuming a perfect audit technology, false reports are
always detected and corrected. Hence, the disclosed financial statement displays the cor-
rect financial accounting treatment of the project outcome. Correspondingly, the project
outcome and the concomitant financial statement are b ∈ {b,b}, with b > b > 0.
Considering the tax report, the correct treatment of the project outcome can also be
either high or low, i.e., t ∈ {t, t}, with t > t > 0. However, the correct tax treatment of
the project outcome is private information to the firm. Thus, the firm can either issue a
correct tax report of the project outcome or bias the tax report. When the tax report tˆ
and the financial statement differ a book-tax difference arise. On the one hand, differences
22For example, an investment in equipment could induce higher productivity. Consequently, the proba-
bility of high profits increases.
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between the financial accounting rules and tax law can induce book-tax differences. On
the other hand, a book-tax difference can occur because the firm biases the tax report.
In line with prior work of Blaufus et al. (2017), we refer to the true project outcome (b, t)
as the firm’s type. Hence, the firm can be of four types: {(b, t),(b, t),(b, t),(b, t)}.
Since both the tax report and the financial statement describe the same underlying
economics, similarities between the financial accounting rules and the tax law lead to a
positive but imperfect correlation between the tax report and the financial statement.
This correlation is captured by the level of mandatory book-tax conformity c, where c is
exogenously and jointly determined by tax regulators and financial statement standard
setters. To ensure a positive correlation between the financial statement and the tax
report, we assume 12 < c< 1. Therefore, the conditional probabilities are P (t|b) = P (t|b) =
c and P (t|b) = P (t|b) = (1− c). Thus, a high level of mandatory book-tax conformity
increases the probability of conforming reports, i.e., both the financial statement and
the tax report are either high or low at the same time whereas a low level of book-tax-
conformity increases the probability of non-conforming reports, i.e., a book-tax difference
arise when the financial statement is high and the tax report is low or vice versa.
The tax authority observes the firm’s tax report tˆ and the financial statement and
decides based on these reports whether to conduct an audit or not while facing audit
costs k. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the audit costs are not prohibitively
high to ensure the tax authority’s audit incentives. We capture the tax authority’s decision
whether to conduct an audit or not using a binary variable
xTA =

1 if an audit takes place,
0 if no audit takes place.
We assume a perfect audit technology. That is, if an audit is conducted the tax author-
ity always observes the correct tax treatment of the project outcome and detects biased
tax reports. Since the correct financial statement of the project outcome is publicly ob-
servable, the tax authority updates its beliefs regarding a true high or low tax report
depending on the level of book-tax conformity c and the observed financial statement.
When tax evasion is detected, the tax report is corrected and the firm is forced to pay an
additional penalty δ. The timing of the game is illustrated in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Timeline
The tax authority is interested in high tax revenues comprising the firm’s tax liability
and potential penalties due to detected tax evasion. Thus, the tax authority’s decision
problem can be written as
maxxTA∈{0,1}E[xTA] = tˆ+xTA
(
max
{
t− tˆ,0
} t− tˆ+ δ
t− tˆ −k
)
.
Considering potential penalties due to a detected understated tax report, the firm
maximizes
max
a,tˆ
E[ΠF (a)] = a(µb−ωTb) + (1−a)(µb−ωTb)−
za2
2 ,
with µ and ω as positive weighting factors indicating the firm’s preferences regarding the
financial statement and the tax report. These preferences are common knowledge to all
players. We consider the case of µ > ω, implying that the firm is more sensitive to the
financial statement. This is representative for large firms where investment and reporting
decisions are typically delegated to managers whose variable compensation is commonly
based on the financial statement (Blaufus et al., 2017). Tb and Tb denote the expected tax
liability including expected penalties with a high or low financial statement respectively.
Thereby, the expected tax liability depends on the firm’s tax reporting decision and the
tax authority’s auditing decision. That is, issuing a correct tax report leads to a tax
liability which is always equivalent to the report. However, in the case of an understated
tax report, the expected tax liability depends on the tax authority’s audit decision. The
tax liability in the case of a biased tax report are depicted in table 4.1.
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Reporting/ Audit Decision xTA = 1 xTA = 0
t, tˆ= t t+ δ t
t, tˆ= t t t
Table 4.1: Firm’s tax liability depending on the audit and reporting decisions
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The decision of the tax authority takes place after the firm has released its financial
statement and its tax report. However, the tax authority observes only the outcome of the
chosen tax reporting strategy. The firm’s strategy itself, i.e., whether a correct or biased
tax report was sent, remains concealed. Therefore, the reporting decision of the firm and
the audit decision of the tax authority can be seen as strategically simultaneous (Crawford
and Sobel, 1982). The model is solved using backward induction. First, the firm’s reporting
and the tax authority’s auditing strategy are determined. Then, anticipating subsequent
behavior the firm decides on an investment amount in an existing project to maximize its
expected after-tax income.
4.4.1 Dominated Strategies
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis. Recall that the firm is interested in a high
project outcome, a concomitant high financial statement and a low tax report to achieve
a low tax liability. Accordingly, the firm never benefits from biasing a low correct tax
report t of the project outcome. A true t will never be corrected upon audit. In contrast,
the tax authority is interested in maximizing the tax revenue comprising the firm’s tax
liability and the potential penalty due to a detected understated tax report. Therefore,
a high tax report, i.e., t, will never be audited because an audit is a costly task and no
additional tax revenue can be generated. This is summarized in lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. The following actions will not occur in equilibrium:
1. The firm will never bias a correct tax report tˆ= t.
2. The tax authority will never audit a tax report tˆ= t.
The game tree depicted in figure 4.2 displays those strategies which are not dominated.
4.4.2 Equilibrium Strategies
Considering extremely high or low tax audit costs would cause pure-strategy equilibria.
However, we focus on more realistic mixed-strategy equilibria where the firm and the tax
authority apply probabilistic tax reporting and auditing strategies. Therefore, we assume
throughout the analysis that k < t− t+ δ holds true. Then, the firm randomizes between
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Figure 4.2: Game tree without dominated strategies
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understating a correct tax treatment t and a truthful report. The tax authority, in turn,
audits a tax report tˆ= t with a positive probability.
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium strategies of the tax authority and the firm are as
follows:
1. The tax authority audits a tax report tˆ= t with probability γ = ω(t−t)
ω(t−t)+δ .
2. The firm of type (b, t) understates the tax report with probability φ= (1−c)k
c(t−t+δ−k) .
3. The firm of type (b, t) understates the tax report with probability η = ck(1−c)(t−t+δ−k) .
4. The misreporting probability is higher in terms of conforming reports, i.e., φ < η.
Proof. See appendix.
The tax authority’s audit probability and the firm’s tax reporting strategy are in line
with prior theoretical work. In particular, proposition 4.1 replicates equilibrium behav-
ior in a standard tax inspection game which is well known in the literature (e.g. Mills
and Sansing, 2000; Blaufus et al., 2017). Moreover, proposition 4.1 shows that the tax
authority’s audit incentives and the firm’s reporting incentives are reflected in the respec-
tive equilibrium strategy. In particular, for high preferences of the firm regarding the tax
report ω or high tax savings in the case of an understated tax report, i.e. high t− t, an
understated tax report seems especially worthwhile. However, higher incentives to under-
state the tax report, in turn, are incorporated in the tax authority’s audit probability.
Accordingly, high penalties in the case of a detected understated tax report lead to a
low probability of an understated tax report. Anticipating this, the tax authority audits
low tax reports less frequently when the penalty is high. Furthermore, proposition 4.1
shows that the equilibrium strategies also depend on the level of mandatory book-tax
conformity, i.e., on the correlation between GAAP and tax law. Basically, the firm’s tax
reporting strategy depends on the project outcome, i.e., whether the investment in the
existing project was a success or a failure. Moreover, the firm considers that the finan-
cial statement is informative regarding the correct tax treatment of the project outcome.
Therefore, the expected tax consequences depend on both the expected project outcome
and the book-tax conformity. Observing a low financial statement indicates that a tax
report tˆ= t might be correct with a high probability because the financial statement and
the tax report are strongly correlated. Therefore, a firm with negative book-tax differ-
ences, i.e., type (b, t), can better mimic a low-conforming type, i.e., (b, t) rather than a
high non-conforming type, i.e., type (b, t) can mimic a firm with positive book-tax differ-
ences, i.e., (b, t). Therefore, a conforming understated report occurs more frequently than
a non-conforming understated tax report, i.e., φ < η.
With a high level of mandatory book-tax conformity, the probability of an under-
stated tax report can either increase or decrease depending on the project outcome. The
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tax authority updates its beliefs regarding the true type of the firm dependent on the
observed financial statement. That is, observing a high financial statement b the tax au-
thority anticipates that a high tax report is more likely for a high book-tax conformity
c. Consequently, a report tˆ= t is understated with a high probability. Therefore, the firm
understates its tax report less frequently to ensure the tax authority’s indifference condi-
tion. For a financial statement b, the probability of a low correct tax report increases with
increasing mandatory book-tax conformity. Therefore, the tax audit incentives decrease
and the firm of type (b, t) can better mimic a low conforming type for a high level of
mandatory book-tax conformity.
Corollary 4.1. Increasing mandatory book-tax conformity leads to less understated non-
conforming tax reports, i.e., the probability of a report (b, tˆ= t) decreases, while the prob-
ability of conforming understated tax reports, i.e., (b, tˆ = t), increases with book-tax con-
formity.
Proof. See appendix.
4.4.3 The Effect of Book-Tax Conformity Neglecting Real Effects
Prior theoretical work has focused on the effects of book-tax conformity on firms’
reporting behavior. Disentangling the occurring effects is appealing because it allows in-
vestigating the impact of tighter book-tax regulation on a single aspect. Nevertheless,
empirical work draws conclusions regarding the impact of increasing book-tax conformity
on a firm’s tax payments (Chan et al., 2013). To provide a theoretical foundation for em-
pirical research regarding book-tax conformity we conduct an analysis considering both
reporting and real effects. First, we investigate the effect of book-tax-conformity neglect-
ing real effects to draw inferences regarding firms’ reporting behavior. In particular, we
investigate the effect of book-tax conformity on the expected tax revenue without en-
dogenizing the firm’s investment decision. In contrast to prior research, we consider the
possibility that the probability of a high project outcome and a concomitant high finan-
cial statement varies. That is, instead of assuming a high or a low financial statement are
equally likely, we acknowledge that the probability of a high financial statement depends
on the underlying project.
Empirical findings of Atwood et al. (2012) and Chen and Gavious (2017) indicate
that high book-tax conformity induces less tax evasion. With decreasing understated tax
reports the tax revenue is expected to increase. Therefore, prior research hypothesizes that
increasing book-tax conformity is beneficial for the tax authority because the expected
tax revenues increase. In terms of an inspection game and in line with prior work of
Blaufus et al. (2017), we interpret the ex ante probability of an understated tax report as
a measure for tax evasion:
Prob(tˆ= t|t= t) = a · c ·P{b, tˆ= t) | (b, t= t)}+ (1−a)(1− c) ·P{(b, tˆ= t) | (b, t)}.
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Whether the firm’s tax reporting strategy leads to more or less understated tax reports,
i.e., more or less tax evasion, depends on the project outcome. High book-tax conformity
induces more truthful tax reporting for a high conforming type of the firm, i.e., (b, t),
whereas the opposite is true for a low non-conforming type of the firm, i.e., (b, t). That is,
increasing book-tax conformity can lead to more tax evasion in terms of more understated
conforming reports. Therefore, the impact of increasing book-tax conformity on the ex
ante expected tax revenue for the tax authority is ambiguous and can lead to increas-
ing or decreasing ex ante expected tax revenues. Consequently, the effect of increasing
mandatory book-tax conformity depends on the probability of a high project outcome
and a concomitant high financial statement. This result is summarized in lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2. The probabilities for a correct high tax report and the expected tax revenue
are increasing (decreasing) with increasing book-tax conformity if a high project outcome
and a concomitant high financial statement occur with a high (low) probability, i.e., for
a > 12 (for a <
1
2).
Proof. See appendix.
In line with empirical findings of Atwood et al. (2012) and Chen and Gavious (2017),
this result suggests that high book-tax conformity can induce less tax evasion. Never-
theless, the effect of book-tax conformity is ambiguous and depends on the probability
of success or failure of the firm’s project. Thereby, increasing the mandatory book-tax
conformity can either have a beneficial or a detrimental effect on the tax authority’s ex-
pected tax revenue. On the one hand, firms can face projects which lead to a high outcome
and a concomitant high financial statement with a high probability. In the case of a high
financial statement, increasing book-tax conformity eliminates uncertainty regarding the
correct tax report. In particular, for a high financial statement and perfectly correlated
reports, the tax authority knows with certainty that the tax report must be also high.
Therefore, increasing mandatory book-tax conformity limits the firm’s reporting discre-
tion in case of a high financial statement. On the other hand, firms can face projects which
lead with a high probability to a low project outcome and a concomitant low financial
statement. In this case, an increasing mandatory book-tax conformity leads to decreasing
expected tax revenues of the tax authority. This result occurs because the probability of a
correct low tax report is increasing in book-tax conformity for a low financial statement.
The expected tax revenue and the probability of an understated tax report depending on
book-tax conformity are depicted in figure 4.3.
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In the next section, we endogenize the investment decision and analyze the correspond-
ing effects of increasing mandatory book-tax conformity.
4.4.4 Optimal Investment Decision
Basically, an investment in an existing project typically influences the project outcome
because additional capital or personally costly effort will generally increase the probability
of success. The probability of a high financial statement increases with increasing invest-
ment amount because we assume a perfect correlation between the financial statement
and the project outcome. The firm decides on the investment amount to achieve a high
project outcome and a concomitant high financial statement considering investment costs
and subsequent tax reporting consequences. In equilibrium, both the tax authority and
the firm are indifferent whether to conduct an audit or not and whether to report the
taxable income truthful or untruthful. Therefore, the firm’s expected payoff in the case
of a truthful tax report equals its expected payoff in the case of an untruthful tax report.
As a consequence, the expected tax liability depends on the probability of a low or a high
financial statement and the level of mandatory book-tax conformity. The firm’s ex ante
expected payoff incorporating equilibrium behavior is given by
E[ΠF (a)] = a
(
µb−ω(ct+ (1− c)t)
)
+ (1−a)(µb−ω(ct+ (1− c)t))− za
2
2 . (4.1)
Thus, the firm maximizes its expected payoff by investing
∂E[ΠF (a)]
∂a
= µ(b− b)− cωt− (1− c)ωt+ (1− c)ωt+ cωt− za != 0
⇐⇒ a∗ = µ(b− b) + (1−2c)ω(t− t)
z
≥ 0. (4.2)
The firm always invests a positive amount a if the firm is more sensitive to the financial
statement, i.e., µ(b− b)≥ ω(t− t).
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Proposition 4.2. The firm maximizes its after-tax profit choosing an investment amount
a∗.
Proof. See appendix.
The investment amount decreases if the investment becomes costlier. Therefore, high
mandatory book-tax conformity is detrimental for the investment incentives because a
high expected tax liability must be considered.
Corollary 4.2. Investment incentives are deteriorated by a high level of mandatory book-
tax conformity.
Proof. See appendix.
Firms let potential pre-tax profits forgo by accepting a high probability of a low
project outcome if the benefit gained by a high investment in the existing project is
devoured by a high tax liability. This occurs independently of the height of the firm’s
preferences regarding the financial statement. In summary, the firm achieves a low tax
liability due to two different effects. First, the firm can use tax reporting discretion and
minimize the tax liability issuing an understated tax report. Second, the firm can choose
a low investment amount because high mandatory book-tax conformity leads to a high
expected tax liability since tax-related investment incentives cannot be provided. Both
effects are crucial to evaluate the consequences of a varying level of mandatory book-tax
conformity.
4.5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the impact of a varying level of mandatory book-tax con-
formity on the firm’s and the tax authority’s expected payoff. First, we consider the firm’s
expected payoff. Maximizing the expected payoff the firm chooses an investment amount
a∗ and applies a tax reporting strategy depending on the project outcome to minimize the
expected tax liability. Inserting the optimal investment amount a∗ in the firm’s expected
payoff yields
E[ΠF (a∗)] =a∗µb+ (1−a∗)µb− za
∗2
2 −ω(a
∗(ct+ (1− c)t) + (1−a∗)(ct+ (1− c)t)
⇔ 12z
(
2zµbµ2(b− b)2− (1−2c)2ω2(t− t)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. Pre-tax Profit(Πpre−taxF )
− ω
z
(
z(ct+ (1− c)t)− (1−2c)(t− t)(µ(b− b)− (1−2c)ω(t− t))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. Tax Liability(ΠtaxF )
. (4.3)
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The effect of increasing mandatory book-tax conformity on the firm’s expected payoff,
therefore, depends on the effect on the firm’s expected pre-tax profits and on the expected
tax liability. Interestingly, increasing book-tax conformity leads to decreasing expected
pre-tax profits of the firm:
∂Πpre−taxF
∂c
= 12z
(
−(8c−4)ω2(t− t)2
)
< 0. (4.4)
This occurs because the investment decision is based on the after-tax profit of the in-
vestment. With high book-tax conformity, an investment becomes costlier due to a less
favorable tax treatment. Thus, the optimal investment amount decreases because the
marginal costs increase with increasing book-tax conformity. Therefore, the probability
of a high project outcome, i.e., a high pre-tax profit, is low.
While increasing book-tax conformity always leads to decreasing expected pre-tax
profits, the effect on the expected tax liability is ambiguous. Increasing book-tax confor-
mity can increase or decrease the probability of an understated tax report depending on
the probability of a high project outcome. Differentiating the expected tax liability with
respect to c yields
∂ΠtaxF
∂c
= ω
z
(
−z(t− t) + 2µ(b− b)(t− t)− (8c−4)ω(t− t)2
)
. (4.5)
Whether the expected tax liability is increasing or decreasing in the book-tax conformity
depends on the level of baseline mandatory book-tax conformity. That is,
∂ΠtaxF
∂c

> 0 if c < cTA = 2µ(b−b)+4ω(t−t)−z8ω(t−t) , and
< 0 otherwise.
(4.6)
1. For a low level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c < cTA, the tax-based in-
vestment incentives are high because, for a high project outcome, a preferential tax
treatment occurs with high probability. Consequently, the firm chooses a high invest-
ment amount and a correct high tax report is understated with positive probability.
For a marginal increase of book-tax conformity, the investment incentives are still
sufficient to induce an investment amount which leads with a high probability to
a high project outcome and a concomitant high financial statement. However, in-
creasing book-tax conformity increases the probability of a correct high tax report.
Thus, the tax authority’s audit incentives also increase. Anticipating higher audit
incentives, the firm understates the tax report less frequently. Thereby, the expected
tax liability is increasing in case of increasing book-tax conformity.
2. For a high level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c ≥ cTA, the tax-based in-
vestment incentives are low because, for a high project outcome, a preferential tax
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treatment occurs with low probability. Investment incentives are low and an increas-
ing mandatory book-tax conformity additionally harms the investment incentives.
Thereby, a low optimal investment amount results so that a low project outcome
and a concomitant low financial statement occur with high probability and make
a low correct tax report more likely. Therefore, the audit incentives decrease and
the firm understates the tax report more frequently. Therefore, the expected tax
liability is decreasing with increasing book-tax conformity.23
With an ambiguous effect on the expected tax liability, the overall effect of increas-
ing book-tax conformity on the firm’s expected payoff depends on the baseline level of
mandatory book-tax conformity
∂ΠF
∂c
> 0 for c > cF =
2µ(b− b) + 2ω(t− t)− z
4ω(t− t) . (4.7)
That is, the effect of a decreasing expected tax liability outweighs the effect of de-
creasing pre-tax profits when the baseline level of book-tax conformity exceeds cF . Thus,
for sufficiently low level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c < cF , the firm’s expected
payoff is decreasing. This can occur due to two different reasons. On the one hand, the
firm’s expected pre-tax profit is always decreasing in c independent of the level of the
baseline book-tax conformity. On the other hand, the expected tax liability can increase
in the book-tax conformity for a low level of baseline book-tax conformity. Both effects
lead to a decreasing expected payoff of the firm. Nevertheless, the expected tax liability
can also decrease with increasing book-tax conformity. However, the marginal benefit from
a decreasing expected tax liability cannot outweigh the marginal loss from a decreasing
expected pre-tax profit. In sum, the expected payoff of the firm decreases for a low level
of baseline book-tax conformity.
For a high level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c > cF , the firm’s expected payoff
is increasing with increasing book-tax conformity. The decreasing expected pre-tax profits
are outweighed by sufficiently high expected tax savings.
The effect on the tax authority’s expected payoff, however, depends on the threshold
cTA. An increasing expected tax liability is beneficial for the tax authority. When the
baseline level of book-tax conformity is sufficiently small, i.e., c < cTA, the firm’s expected
tax liability increases and, consequently, the tax authority’s expected payoff increases.
On the other hand, with a sufficiently high level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e.,
23Depending on the firm’s investment incentives like the investment costs z and the preferences about the
financial statement µ, it is feasible that the expected tax liability is always increasing or decreasing in
book-tax conformity. That is, for high investment costs or low preferences about the financial statement
investment incentives are so low that the firm always chooses a low investment amount and an increasing
book-tax conformity always decreases the expected tax liability (cTA < 0.5 < c). For low investment
costs or high preferences about the financial statement, investment incentives are high. Consequently,
deteriorated investment incentives due to increasing book-tax conformity can be neglected and the
expected tax liability always increases due to less understated tax reports (c < 1< cTA).
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c > cTA, the tax authority’s expected payoff is decreasing due to the decreasing expected
tax liability resulting from the forgoing of expected pre-tax profits of the firm. The effects
of increasing book-tax conformity on the firm’s and the tax authority’s expected payoff
are summarized in lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3. 1. For a low (high) level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c < cF
(c > cF ) the firm’s expected payoff is decreasing (increasing) with increasing book-
tax conformity.
2. For a low (high) level of baseline book-tax conformity, i.e., c < cTA (c > cTA) the
tax authority’s expected payoff is increasing (decreasing) with increasing book-tax
conformity.
Proof. See appendix.
The threshold values of the firm and the tax authority which determine whether the
firm’s and the tax authority’s expected payoff increase or decrease with increasing book-
tax conformity do not coincide. When the baseline level of book-tax conformity exceeds
cTA an increasing book-tax conformity always decreases the expected tax liability and,
therefore, decreases the tax authority’s expected payoff. However, a decreasing expected
tax liability is not necessarily associated with an increasing expected payoff of the firm
due to decreasing expected pre-tax profits. That is, an increasing tax authority’s expected
payoff is not always associated with a decreasing firm’s expected payoff and vice versa.
The difference between the threshold values is given by
cF − cTA = 2µ(b− b)− z8ω(t− t) . (4.8)
This shows that the threshold cTA is always greater than cF for high investment costs,
i.e., z > 2µ(b− b). Nevertheless, for high investment costs both thresholds are always
smaller than 0.5, i.e., cF <cTA< 0.5<c. Thus, the expected tax liability is decreasing with
increasing book-tax conformity. This effect outweighs the effect of decreasing expected
pre-tax profits. Consequently, the tax authority’s expected payoff is decreasing while the
firm’s expected payoff increases.
Contrary, with low investment costs, i.e., z < 2µ(b− b), the threshold cTA is smaller
than cF where 0.5 < cTA < cF < 1 results. The effect of varying book-tax conformity in
the case of low investment costs is depicted in figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Expected tax revenue and expected firm payoff depending on book-tax con-
formity c (plotted for µ= 2, ω = 1, (b− b) = (t− t) = (2−1), z = 2.5, δ = 1.25, k = 0.75).
With a sufficiently low (high) level of baseline book-tax conformity an increasing (de-
creasing) tax authority’s expected payoff is always associated with a decreasing (increas-
ing) firm’s expected payoff. Interestingly, for an intermediate level of baseline book-tax
conformity both the tax authority’s and the firm’s expected payoff decrease with increas-
ing book-tax conformity. Due to the less favorable tax treatment the firm chooses a low
investment amount, thereby, reducing the expected tax liability. However, the effect of de-
creasing expected pre-tax profits outweighs the effect of a decreasing expected tax liability
leading to a decreasing firm’s expected payoff. The results are summarized in Proposition
4.3.24
Proposition 4.3. Increasing mandatory book-tax conformity
1. increases (decreases) the tax authority’s (firm’s) expected payoff for z < zTA or z ∈
[zTA, z] and c < cTA,
2. decreases both the tax authority’s and the firm’s expected payoff for z ∈ [zTA, zF ] and
c > cTA or z ∈ [zF , z] and c ∈ [cTA, cF ], and
3. decreases (increases) the tax authority’s (firm’s) expected payoff for z ∈ [zF , z] and
c > cF or z > z.
Proof. See appendix.
24The threshold values for z are stated in the appendix.
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4.6 Conclusion
Allowing firms to reveal relevant information to investors without facing monetary
consequences like a higher tax liability is the primary benefit of book-tax differences
(Atwood et al., 2010). Moreover, tax authorities can influence firm behavior in their favor,
for instance by tax exemptions and tax deductibility. These measures necessarily lead to
book-tax differences because GAAP reporting aims at providing relevant information to
investors instead of inducing certain behavior. This highlights the comparative advantage
of book-tax differences relative to simply lowering the tax rate to increase firms’ after-tax
profits. At first sight, one might infer that lowering the tax rate provides higher investment
incentives due to the additional after tax-income.
Recently, the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 was intended to significantly in-
crease labor supply and business investments. The substantially decreased corporate tax
rate endows firms with higher funds which can be invested in profitable economic growth.
However, up to now, no considerable effect is recognized. Moreover, CEOs argue that
corporate tax cuts would not substantially increase investments (The New York Times,
2017). The additional after-tax income is used for other forms of spending. Thus, instead
of omnidirectional tax benefits, a design that could provide specific investment incentives
might do a better job. Book-tax differences might be an appropriate means. However,
governments and supranational organizations are concerned with large book-tax differ-
ences because book-tax differences also provide large reporting discretion. In particular,
low mandatory book-tax conformity can foster opportunistic reporting behavior of tax-
payers. Specifically, firms can bias their taxable income downwards while engaging in
upwards earnings manipulation. Accordingly, regulators consider opportunities to better
align financial statements and tax reports to curtail tax evasion by means of book-tax
differences. Nevertheless, reducing book-tax differences counteracts the possibility to in-
centivize specific firm behavior. In particular, high book-tax conformity does not allow
for regulation affecting only taxpayers’ behavior without considering the consequences re-
sulting from the investors’ reaction on altered information provided by GAAP reporting.
Moreover, whether a financial statement which is driven by accounting standards that are
intended to induce specific behavior provides information meeting the criteria of decision
usefulness and relevance is at least questionable and needs careful consideration. Due to
the aforementioned countervailing effects, a prosperous debate regarding the minimization
of book-tax differences is prevalent. However, the consequences of tightening regulation
regarding the allowance of book-tax differences are widely unexplored.
We argue that prior research regarding book-tax differences neglects effects on firms’
decision making beyond pure reporting decisions. In contrast, we study firms’ investment
behavior considering that both the tax report and the financial statement are affected.
Increasing book-tax conformity is detrimental for investment decisions by providing fewer
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incentives due to less preferential tax treatment. Prior work (Atwood et al., 2012; Chen
and Gavious, 2017) suggest that an increasing mandatory book-tax conformity induces
less tax-aggressive reporting. Therefore, they conclude that high book-tax conformity
might be beneficial. In line with prior research, we show that high book-tax conformity
leads to less understated non-conforming tax reports. Nevertheless, our results indicate
that investigating solely reporting behavior in the context of book-tax differences seems
to be myopic. In particular, the joint consideration of reporting and investment behavior
shows that increasing book-tax conformity can either increase or decrease tax author-
ity’s expected tax revenue depending on the level of baseline book-tax conformity be-
cause firms might be willing to forgo pre-tax profits. Therefore, the expected tax liability
might decrease. Thus, the effect of increasing book-tax conformity depends on the tax-
independent investment incentives and the level of baseline book-tax conformity because
increasing mandatory book-tax conformity affects both the firm’s investment decision and
the corresponding expected tax liability. Interestingly, for an intermediate level of baseline
book-tax conformity, an increasing book-tax conformity is detrimental for both the firm’s
and the tax authority’s expected payoff.
Recently, governments and tax authorities seek to curtail book-tax differences. Our
analysis demonstrates that the consequences of increasing book-tax conformity depend
on several, potentially unobservable parameters. This emphasizes the complexity that
legislators, tax authorities, and supranational organizations like the European Union need
to consider when designing regulation regarding book-tax conformity. Regulators should
bear in mind the trade-off between providing investment incentives and inducing less tax-
aggressive reporting. Thus, the real effects of increasing mandatory book-tax conformity
should be considered instead of solely focusing on reporting behavior.
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4.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Never auditing report tˆ= t and never overstating report tˆ= t simply follows from the
tax authority’s and firm’s preferences.
The tax authority’s equilibrium audit probability for report tˆ= t can be derived from
the indifference of the firm between truthful and untruthful reporting. The firm of type
(b, t) is indifferent between truthful and understated reports for
µb−γ(ωt+ δ)− (1−γ)ωt= µb+ωt
⇔γ = ω(t− t)
ω(t− t) + δ .
The firm’s equilibrium reporting probability can be derived from the indifference of
the tax authority between auditing and not auditing report tˆ= t. This is given for a high
financial statement (b) for
cφ(t+ δ−k) + c(1−φ)t+ (1− c)(t−k) = (cφ+ (1− c))t+ c(1−φ)t
⇔ φ= (1− c)k
c((t− t) + δ−k) .
The tax authority is indifferent between auditing and not auditing the report tˆ= t given
b for
c(t−k) + (1− c)η(t+ δ−k) + (1− c)(1−η)t= (1− c)(1−η)t+ (c+ (1− c)η)t
⇔ η = ck(1− c)((t− t) + δ−k) .
The firm of type b understates more often:
φ= (1− c)k
c((t− t) + δ−k) < η =
ck
(1− c)((t− t) + δ−k) ⇔ (1− c)< c.
Proof of Corollary 4.1
The firm of type b understates t with probability φ. Differentiating the probability φ
with respect to c shows that the probability of an understatement decreases with higher
book-tax-conformity:
∂φ
∂c
= −k
c2(t− t+ δ−k) < 0.
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The firm of type b, instead, understates t with probability η. Differentiating with
respect to c reveals that the probability of an understatement increases with higher book-
tax conformity:
∂η
∂c
= k(1− c)2(t− t+ δ−k) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
In mixed-strategies the expected tax revenue can be written as
ΠTA[a] =(acφ+ (1−a)(1− c)η+a(1− c) + (1−a)c) t
+ (ac(1−φ) + ((1−a)(1− c)(1−η)) t.
Inserting the equilibrium probabilities φ and η and differentiate with respect to c yields
∂ΠTA
∂c
= (a− (1−a))
(
1 + k(t− t+ δ−k)
)
(t− t)
with
∂ΠTA
∂c

< 0 if a < 0.5,
= 0 if a= 0.5 and
> 0 ifa > 0.5.
The expected probability of misreporting and the probability of low tax reports can
be written as
P (tˆ= t|t= t) = acφ+ (1−a)(1− c)η and
P (t) = acφ+ (1−a)(1− c)η+a(1− c) + (1−a)c
Given the equilibrium probabilities φ and η and differentiate with respect to c yields
∂P (tˆ= t|t= t)
∂c
= ((1−a)−a) k(t− t+ δ−k) and
∂P (t)
∂c
= ((1−a)−a) t− t+ δ(t− t+ δ−k)
with
∂P (tˆ= t|t= t)
∂c
,
∂P (t)
∂c

< 0 if a > 0.5,
= 0 if a= 0.5 and
> 0 ifa < 0.5.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
The firm maximizes the expected after-tax payoff:
E[ΠF (a)] = a
(
µb−ω(ct+ (1− c)t)
)
+ (1−a)(µb−ω(ct+ (1− c)t)− za
2
2 .
Firm chooses investment amount to maximize after-tax profit:
FOCa : µ(b− b)− cωt− (1− c)ωt+ (1− c)ωt+ cωt− za= 0.
The second order condition
SOCa= (−z)
is negative so that a determines a local maximum. Therefore, the optimal investment level
is
a∗ = µ(b− b) + (1−2c)ω(t− t)
z
.
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Differentiating the optimal investment level a∗ with respect to c yields
∂a∗
∂c
= −2ω(t− t)
z
< 0.
The tax valuation t always exceeds the valuation t so that higher book-tax-conformity
always leads to less investment expenditure.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
In equilibrium, inserting the optimal investment amount a∗ in the firm’s expected
payoff can be written as:
E[ΠF (a∗)] =
1
2z
(
2zµb+µ2(b− b)2− (1−2c)2ω2(t− t)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. Pre-tax Profit(Πpre−taxF )
− ω
z
(
z(ct+ (1− c)t)− (1−2c)(t− t)(µ(b− b)− (1−2c)ω(t− t))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. Tax Liability(ΠtaxF )
.
Differentiating the expected pre-tax profit with respect to c reveals:
∂Πpre−taxF
∂c
= 12z
(
−(8c−4)ω2(t− t)2
)
< 0.
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The expected tax liability is increasing or decreasing in the book-tax conformity de-
pending on the baseline level of book-tax conformity:
∂ΠtaxF
∂c
= ω
z
(
−z(t− t) + 2µ(b− b)(t− t)− (8c−4)ω(t− t2
)
with
∂ΠtaxF
∂c

> 0 if c < cTA = 2µ(b−b)+4ω(t−t)−z8ω(t−t) and
< 0 if c > cTA = 2µ(b−b)+4ω(t−t)−z8ω(t−t) .
Differentiating the firm’s expected payoff with respect to c reveals that the effect of de-
creasing expected tax-liability outweighs the effect of decreasing pre-tax profits whenever
the baseline level of book-tax conformity exceeds a critical threshold cF :
∂ΠF
∂c

> 0 if c > cF = 2µ(b−b)+2ω(t−t)−z4ω(t−t) and
< 0 if c < cF = 2µ(b−b)+2ω(t−t)−z4ω(t−t) .
In equilibrium, the tax authority’s expected payoff can be written as
ΠTA(a) =(acφ+ (1−a)(1− c)η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (tˆ=t)
t
+ (a(1− c) +ac(1−φ) + (1−a)c+ (1−a)(1− c)(1−η))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (tˆ=t)
t.
Inserting the optimal investment expenditure a∗ as well as the equilibrium probabilities
φ and η yields
ΠTA(a∗) =
1
z
(z(t− c(t− t)(1 + k
t− t+ δ−k ))
− (1−2c)(t− t)(µ(b− b) + (1−2c)ω(t− t))(1 + k
t− t+ δ−k )).
Differentating with respect to c reveals
∂E[ΠTA(a∗)]
∂c
= (t− t)(δ+ t− t)(2µ(b− b) + 4ω(t− t)(1−2c)− z)(t− t+ δ−k)z .
Rearranging gives
∂E[ΠTA(a∗[c])]
∂c

> 0 if c < cTA = 2µ(b−b)+4ω(t−t)−z8ω(t−t) and
< 0 if c > cTA = 2µ(b−b)+4ω(t−t)−z8ω(t−t) .
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
For comparison of the firm’s and the tax authority’s expected payoffs the order of both
critical thresholds is needed:
cF − cTA = 2µ(b− b)− z8ω(t− t)
with
cF − cTA
< 0 if z > 2µ(b− b) and> 0 if z < 2µ(b− b) .
Whenever the relevant thresholds (cTA , cF ) fall out of the feasible region for the
book-tax conformity (c ∈ [0.5,1) the baseline level of book-tax conformity exceeds or falls
below the critical threshold. One can show that depending on the investment costs z the
following holds:
cTA =
2µ(b− b) + 4ω(t− t)− z
8ω(t− t)

≤ 0.5 if z ≥ z = 2µ(b− b) and
∈ (0.5,1) if z ∈ (zTA = 2µ(b− b)−4ω(t− t), z) and
≥ 1 if z ≤ zTA and
cF =
2µ(b− b) + 2ω(t− t)− z
4ω(t− t)

≤ 0.5 if z ≥ z = 2µ(b− b) and
∈ (0.5,1) if z ∈ (zF = 2µ(b− b)−2ω(t− t), z) and
≥ 1 if z ≤ zF .
Comparison of the thresholds for z reveals that
zTA < zF < z.
Consequently, the following cases can be summarized:
1. z < zTA so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s expected
payoff increases and the firm’s expected payoff decreases,
2. zTA < z < zF with
(a) c < cTA so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s ex-
pected payoff increases and the firm’s expected payoff decreases or
(b) cTA < c so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s ex-
pected payoff decreases and the firm’s expected payoff decreases,
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3. zF < z < z with
(a) c < cTA so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s ex-
pected payoff increases and the firm’s expected payoff decreases or
(b) cTA < c < cF so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s
expected payoff decreases and the firm’s expected payoff decreases,
(c) cF <c so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s expected
payoff decreases and the firm’s expected payoff increases and
4. z < z so that with increasing book-tax conformity the tax authority’s expected
payoff decreases and the firm’s expected payoff increases.
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Chapter 5
International Transfer Pricing and Capacity
Planning†
Abstract
We study how international transfer pricing regulation affects multinationals’ capacity and
quantity decisions. Tight transfer pricing regulation curbs multinationals’ tax reporting
discretion. However, multinationals can realize tax-saving benefits by adapting strategic
and operational decisions which might be not pursued by tax authorities. We analyze the
impact of cost-plus transfer prices where multinationals can solely affect the cost basis
used to calculate the transfer price by its capacity decision. When market uncertainty
is present a multinational tends to exhibit excessive capacity because a higher transfer
price generates tax-saving benefits. We analyze the effect of taxes and tax regulation on
this tendency. We show that the absolute level of capacity is not informative about the
probability to exhibit excessive capacity without observing the multinational’s organiza-
tional form. Nevertheless, for any organizational form, our results show that taxes and
transfer pricing regulation increase the probability that multinationals display excessive
capacity and are thus, a potential antecedent for organizational slack. This highlights that
focusing solely on reporting aspects does not show the full impact of regulation, as real
effects remain in the dark.
† This chapter is joint work with Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten (Vienna University of Economics and
Business)
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5.1 Introduction
According to OECD estimates, about one-third of the international trade occurs within
multinational companies (MNCs) (Lanz and Miroudot, 2011). This creates a huge poten-
tial for MNCs to realize tax savings by means of transfer pricing. MNCs evidently use
transfer pricing schemes to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries (Blouin et al.,
2018; De Simone et al., 2017; Klassen et al., 2017). However, profit shifting deprives
governments of tax income so that in recent years, international transfer pricing has
been scrutinized by several governments and international organizations. Following the
OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project, substantially revised transfer
pricing guidelines have been published in 2017 (OECD, 2017). As a consequence, nowa-
days, MNCs have little scope to legally shift profits through exploiting transfer pricing
reporting discretion. Nevertheless, MNCs can still realize tax-saving benefits by adapting
strategic and operational decisions.25
We examine the impact of international transfer pricing regulation on an MNC’s ca-
pacity planning and subsequent quantity decision. We consider different organizational
forms of the MNC to derive inferences regarding the tax-induced capacity planning and
the interdependence with the resulting quantity decision. Empirical evidence by Baer-
sch et al. (2018) documents the predominant use of cost-plus transfer prices by MNCs.
Moreover, when no market for an intermediate product exists, the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines highlight the cost-plus method as the most useful (OECD, 2017). The guide-
lines demand the use of full costs plus an appropriate markup where the arm’s length
requirement needs to be considered. For an MNC with an upstream division in a low-tax
jurisdiction and a downstream division in a high-tax jurisdiction, the markup allows the
MNC to legally shift profits to the low-tax country while remaining perfectly compliant
with the transfer pricing regulation. Moreover, the OECD transfer pricing guidelines ex-
plicitly allow the consideration of costs of excessive capacity in the compliant transfer
price. We are particularly interested in the following research questions: Does the use of a
cost-plus transfer price considering costs of excessive capacity induce an MNC to install
excessive capacity? How is the capacity decision of the MNC affected by taxes and trans-
fer pricing regulation? Is the capacity decision informative regarding the MNC’s excessive
capacity?
We study the raised questions in an analytical model. The downstream division sells
a final product in a monopolistic market and purchases an intermediate product from the
upstream division as an input factor. The quantity of the intermediate product is chosen
after having the installed capacity observed. That is, at the time the quantity decision
25The statutory auditing literature posits that real earnings management does not violate generally
accepted accounting principles and is consequently not scrutinized (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al.,
2008). Similar, the adaption of operational decisions due to tax motives is in accordance with tax law
and therefore not pursued by tax auditors.
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is made, the costs for installing capacity are sunk (Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan,
2002). The intermediate product is transferred at a cost-plus transfer price. We study
the impact of tax and transfer pricing regulation on the MNC’s quantity and capacity
decisions for three different organizational forms. First, the headquarters makes both
the capacity and the quantity decision (centralization). Second, the headquarters decides
on the capacity and delegates the quantity decision to the downstream division (partial
delegation). Third, the headquarters additionally delegates the capacity decision to the
upstream division (full delegation).
We assume an exogenously given markup that cannot be manipulated and consider a
one set of books setting, i.e., the MNC uses a single transfer price for tax reporting and
internal decision making. An MNC can disentangle internal quantity decisions from the
external reporting using two different transfer prices (Baldenius et al., 2004). Nevertheless,
finding two sets of books might indicate that the reported transfer price is solely caused
by tax optimization. Therefore, firms that prioritize preventing disputes with the tax
authority above tax minimization increasingly refrain from keeping two sets of books. This
is reflected in a recent study by Klassen et al. (2017) which reports that only a minority
of large US multinationals calculates different transfer prices for external reporting and
internal decision making. Baersch et al. (2018) find similar results for German MNCs.
Furthermore, Haak et al. (2017) provide theoretical insights that using a single transfer
price for different tasks can present equilibrium behavior when the MNC considers the
threat of a potential tax audit.
The analysis shows that taxes and transfer pricing regulation are incorporated in an
MNC’s capacity planning and the subsequent quantity decision. In particular, excessive
capacity may comprise a profit shifting benefit. The markup is applied to the full costs
including costs of excessive capacity so that a higher share of the MNC’s profit is shifted
to the low-tax jurisdiction. However, wasted capacity is costly so that the tax-saving
effect is not strong enough to induce the MNC to install excessive capacity when no
uncertainty regarding the demand for the final product is prevalent. Nevertheless, when
uncertainty regarding the demand for the final product is present an MNC typically
exhibits excessive capacity. We investigate how this tendency is affected by taxation and
transfer pricing regulation. Our model shows that taxes and corresponding regulation
increase the probability to exhibit excessive capacity. Moreover, our results highlight that
the absolute level of capacity is not informative about the probability to exhibit excessive
capacity because this crucially depends on the organizational form of the MNC.
Under delegated capacity decision the arm’s length requirement provides investment
incentives to the upstream division because the markup leads to overcompensation of the
upstream division’s costs. Therefore, the upstream division installs the highest possible ca-
pacity which can be incorporated in the transfer price. This result confirms the common
complaint by downstream divisions that full costs include provisions for organizational
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slack (Eccles and White, 1988). In an extension of our model, we show that this effect
is mitigated when more than one downstream division asks for the intermediate prod-
uct. This occurs because a cost-plus transfer price induces interdependence between the
otherwise independent downstream divisions’ final product markets. Thus, the expected
quantities are lower. This is incorporated in the capacity decision.
Full-cost transfer pricing is usually associated with allowing inefficiency costs from
production to be passed on to the downstream division (Zimmerman, 2017, p.188). This
creates organizational slack (Cyert and March, 1956) which has a bad connotation be-
cause the MNC incurs costs without any apparent benefits. Our findings allow a different
view on organizational slack in the manifestation of excessive capacity. In the studied
setting, the MNC’s tendency to install excessive capacity is increased by taxation and
government’s intervention regarding profit shifting. That is, organizational slack may oc-
cur in response to taxes and transfer pricing regulation. This might be an unintended and
undesirable consequence. In particular, governments are concerned with inefficiencies like
organizational slack because the social welfare of an economy is affected.
Our findings contribute to the literature in three ways. First, by depicting the impact
of taxes and transfer pricing regulation on the MNC’s capacity decision, we address calls
for more research to better understand how tax incentives affect MNC’s real investments
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2017) find that real responses
of domestic firms to tax incentives abroad exist. Their results indicate that the possibility
to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions lowers the MNC’s cost of capital in the high-
tax countries and increases investment there. De Simone et al. (2018) investigate the
relation between tax-motivated income shifting and investment decisions. In particular,
they state that higher tax-aggressiveness is associated with greater investments and more
produced products but a lower investment efficiency. Reineke and Weiskirchner-Merten
(2018) show that profit shifting possibilities influence MNCs’ investment decisions related
to intangibles. In line with these findings, we highlight that international transfer pricing
regulation can induce MNCs to excessively invest in production capacity. Janeba (2000)
provides a related insight. He shows that MNCs might hold more capacity than necessary
to induce tax competition among governments. The MNC can threaten to serve the market
at least partially from a plant in a different tax jurisdiction. Janeba (2000) illustrates that
the MNC either underinvests or overinvests depending on the capacity costs. He considers
imperfect competitive markets and shows that MNCs may hold excessive capacity to
influence the entry or output choice of other oligopolists. In contrast to Janeba (2000), we
neither consider the possibility of the MNC to threaten the government nor oligopolistic
market conditions but incorporate uncertainty regarding demand in the analysis.
Second, we add to the literature on transfer pricing and capacity decisions (Balakr-
ishnan, 1995; Gavious, 1999; Wielenberg, 2000; Göx, 2001; Göx and Schiller, 2007; Dutta
and Reichelstein, 2010; Göx, 2010). While this literature studies the design of transfer
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prices when the headquarters or the upstream division decides on capacity, we study the
impact of cost-plus transfer prices as determined by transfer pricing regulation on the
MNC’s capacity decision.
Third, we contribute to the literature on organizational slack. Cyert and March (1956)
note that organizational resources in excess of the minimum required for maintenance of
the system give rise to a form of organizational slack. According to this, our finding of
excessive capacity is a form of organizational slack. Antle and Eppen (1985) establish
that rationing and slack with regard to investments are both manifestations of ex post
inefficiencies that arise in response to information asymmetry and divergent objectives
among members of the firm, i.e., when an agency problem exists. They examine a setting
with one manager who has private information about the investment project’s profitabil-
ity. Antle and Fellingham (1990) complement these findings showing that organizational
slack can be reduced in a repeated investment context using multi-period contracts. The
impact of a public information system on the setting examined by Antle and Eppen (1985)
is studied by Antle and Fellingham (1995). The additional information curbs the orga-
nizational slack. Arya et al. (1996) extend the model of Antle and Eppen (1985) to a
multi-manager setting and highlight that organizational slack might still occur as best
response. While our finding of excessive capacity is also an ex post inefficiency, the slack
increases in response to taxation and the transfer pricing regulation. Thus, we identify
another potential antecedent for organizational slack.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model is
described. In section 5.3 a benchmark case is presented. In particular, we consider the
first-best solution without uncertainty. Section 5.4 investigates the capacity and quantity
decisions for different organizational forms of the MNC whereas section 5.5 analyzes how
taxes and transfer pricing regulation affect these choices. The impact of several down-
stream divisions on the upstream division’s capacity decision under full delegation is
discussed in section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Model Description
We consider a divisionalized MNC operating in different tax jurisdictions. Specifically,
the MNC consists of an upstream division located in a low-tax jurisdiction where its
income is taxed at a rate t and a downstream division, which is in a high-tax jurisdiction
where an income tax rate t+h prevails, with 0≤ t, h≤ 1 and t+h≤ 1.
The upstream division produces and supplies an intermediate product to the down-
stream division which utilizes the intermediate product as an input in a final product sold
externally. No market exists for the intermediate product. The upstream division faces
variable production costs of c which are verifiable to all parties. The downstream division
pays the transfer price pr per unit to the upstream division. Without loss of generality,
the production costs of the high-tax downstream division for further processing the inter-
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Capacity
decision b is
made
t=0
Uncertainty
regarding
market
conditions is
resolved
t=1
Quantity
decision q is
made and in-
terdivisional
trade takes
place
t=2
Payoffs are
realized
t=3
Figure 5.1: Timeline
mediate product is set equal to zero. As depicted in the timeline in figure 5.1, we consider
a single period comprising four dates. Before producing the intermediate product and
transferring it to the downstream division, capacity needs to be installed at t = 0. After
the realization of the market conditions in t= 1, production and interdivisional trade take
place at t= 2.
When demand uncertainty is resolved, the downstream division faces a monopolistic
market for its final product with revenue function R(q) = (a− 12q)q. The market conditions
are represented by the realization a of a random variable A having density f(a) and
cumulative distribution function F . The support of A is a closed interval of the positive
real line and a is uniformly distributed in [a,a].
To ensure that our results do not depend on the considered organizational structure
of the MNC, we examine different organizational forms. In particular, we consider cen-
tralization, partial delegation, and full delegation. Depending on the organizational form,
either the headquarters or the divisions decide on the transferred quantity and the in-
stalled capacity. First, under centralization, the headquarters decides on the capacity that
is installed in the upstream division and on the quantity that is sold externally. Second, we
consider the case that the realization of the market demand is solely learned by the down-
stream division and is not verifiable to the headquarters. This informational advantage
of the downstream division provides a basic rationale for delegating the quantity deci-
sion to the downstream division (Dutta and Reichelstein, 2010). With partial delegation,
the headquarters decides on the capacity which is installed in the upstream division but
delegates the quantity decision to the better informed downstream division. Third, the
headquarters might not have the necessary technical expertise to decide on the installed
capacity (Dutta and Reichelstein, 2010). Since the major tasks of the upstream divi-
sion are providing, maintaining, and operating the production capacity which is needed
to produce the intermediate product, managers of the upstream division typically have
the necessary technical expertise. Therefore, under full delegation, the upstream division
decides on the installed capacity while the downstream division determines the quantity.
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Installing capacity is costly. In line with Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) and Wielenberg
(2000), we assume that k > 0 denotes the unit cost of capacity installed. Each unit of
capacity enables the production of one intermediate product. Each final product comprises
one unit of the intermediate product. The cash expenditure of installing b ≥ 0 units of
capacity is given by b ·k.
In line with the OECD guidelines, the transfer price pr is set using the cost-plus
method. Accordingly, the production’s full costs plus an appropriate markup γ > 1 meet
the arm’s length requirement. Typically, the intermediate product’s full costs include costs
of excessive capacity that may result because the market demand is uncertain when the
capacity is set up. This is reflected by the common practice of firms to treat setup costs
as a constant per unit and to include fixed costs in the applicable transfer price (Bolander
et al., 1999). Thus, the compliant arm’s length transfer price is given by
pr =
[
c+ k · b
q
]
γ,
where b ≥ q. Depending on the realization of the market conditions a and the installed
capacity b, q can either be produced or not. When the optimal q is smaller than b, the MNC
exhibits excessive capacity. Otherwise, the upstream division operates at full capacity so
that q = b. As a consequence, the transfer price pr is a function of the quantity transferred
to the downstream division (for further explanation, see Baldenius et al., 2004, footnote
18). That is, the transferred quantity affects the transfer price.
Since we are interested in MNCs’ transfer pricing when the reporting discretion is
restricted due to tight transfer pricing regulation, we assume that the MNC uses the
reported arm’s length transfer price also for internal decisions. Prior research has stated
that finding a different internal transfer price during a tax audit might indicate purely
tax-driven transfer prices. This is contrary to the situation where reporting discretion is
curbed. Therefore, following the findings of Klassen et al. (2017), Baersch et al. (2018),
and Haak et al. (2017), we focus on a one set of books transfer pricing regime.
5.3 Benchmark: First-Best without Risk
This section provides a benchmark to illustrate the role of uncertainty and delega-
tion of the capacity and quantity decision to the respective division. In particular, we
examine the capacity and quantity decisions and the resulting transfer price when the
headquarters observes the market conditions before the production capacity is installed.
Then, the headquarters sets the quantity that is sold on the external market. Moreover, it
determines the capacity which is installed in the upstream division, i.e., we consider the
first-best solution without uncertainty. The headquarters maximizes its overall after-tax
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profit which is given by
ΠHQ = (1− t−h)
(
a− 12q
)
q+hprq− (1− t)(cq+kb) . (5.1)
Through the transfer pricing scheme, the installed capacity affects the transfer price
which in turn influences the quantity decision. Therefore, the headquarters simultaneously
decides on the capacity which is installed in the upstream division and the quantity sold
by the downstream division. The headquarters’ quantity decision is as follows
qFB =
(1− t−h)a+hpr− (1− t)(c+k)
1− t−h , (5.2)
where qFB > 0 for a > (c+k)(1−t−hγ)1−t−h . Throughout the paper, we assume γ < (1− t)/h.26
From a pure tax perspective, the headquarters would prefer a high transfer price
because profits can be shifted from the high-tax to the low-tax country. Tight transfer
pricing regulation and enforcement avoid the use of reporting discretion to manipulate
the transfer price upwards. However, ceteris paribus an increasing capacity increases the
applicable arm’s length price because the cost-plus method requires full costs as the
cost basis to calculate the compliant arm’s length transfer price. Thus, excessive capacity
allows the MNC to shift more profits to the low-tax jurisdiction of the upstream division by
increasing the transfer price pr per unit transferred. Thereby, the tax liability is reduced.
However, installing excessive capacity is costly without obtaining any benefits from the
final product market. The costs exceed the profit shifting benefits from an increasing
transfer price so that in the first-best solution no excessive capacity is installed. The
headquarters installs the capacity bFB = qFB in the upstream division and produces qFB in
the downstream division. Therefore, the transfer price reduces to pr = γ(c+k) because the
upstream division operates at full capacity. Additionally, without any market uncertainty,
including costs for excessive capacity would hardly be justifiable in a tax audit because
tax auditors scrutinize transfer prices that are artificially high due to tax-saving motives.
Lemma 5.1 summarizes these results.
Lemma 5.1. In a situation without uncertainty, the headquarters installs no excessive
capacity, i.e., bFB = qFB, in the upstream division. The first-best quantity qFB is produced
and transferred at transfer price pr = γ(c+k) to the downstream division.
Proof. See appendix.
26Considering typical tax rates encountered in practice, having a markup γ larger than (1− t)/h seems
very unlikely. For example, for t= 0.2 and h= 0.1, the markup γ would need to be at least 8. This is
a 700% markup on the direct and indirect production cost. Given the examples stated in the OECD
transfer pricing guidelines (OECD, 2017) and the typical profitability rates of listed companies, a
markup higher than about 50% is most improbable meeting the arm’s length requirement.
112
5.4 Capacity Planning under Tax Regulation
As the benchmark case shows, in a world without market uncertainty no excessive
capacity is installed because the profit shifting benefit is not strong enough to outweigh
the costs for installing excessive capacity. However, real-world decisions are typically made
under uncertainty. For example, market conditions may depend on the success or failure of
an advertising campaign or on changing customer taste. Thus, in a more realistic setting,
capacity needs to be installed before the actual demand is known with certainty. Taking
uncertainty into account, the MNC’s capacity decision may either lead to rationing or
organizational slack in the form of excessive capacity. We are interested in the effects
caused by taxation and corresponding regulation, i.e., the arm’s length requirement, on
an MNC’s quantity and capacity decisions. In particular, we investigate if taxes and
transfer pricing regulation intensify an MNC’s tendency to install excessive capacity under
uncertainty for different organizational forms of the MNC.
As stated above, the costs of excessive capacity affect the applicable arm’s length price
and ultimately the allocation of profits between the participating tax jurisdictions. Thus,
the tax rate differential lowers the costs of excessive capacity because tax savings can
be generated by incorporating the excessive capacity in the transfer price. Nevertheless,
no tax auditor is willing to accept costs of excessive capacity which purely arise due to
tax-planning motives. Therefore, only reasonable levels of excessive capacity can be in-
cluded in the cost basis used to calculate the cost-plus transfer price. However, uncertainty
disguises the motives which have led to excessive capacity. Therefore, it might be hard
for a tax auditor to identify reasonable levels of excessive capacity that arise in response
to uncertainty. The remaining part of the excessive capacity is due to the profit shifting
effect realized through excessive capacity.
5.4.1 Centralization
First, we investigate centralization. After uncertainty is resolved and the market con-
ditions are observed by all parties, the headquarters dictates the quantity which is sold
externally to maximize the overall after-tax profit. Working backwards, the analysis starts
with determining the optimal quantity at date two when the capacity has been installed
and the market conditions have been observed.
The headquarters determines the quantity according to equation (5.1). Depending on
the realized market size a, two scenarios occur:
1. The realized market conditions are such that the installed capacity is sufficient to
produce the quantity that maximizes the overall after-tax profit of the firm, i.e.,27
qC(a) = a− c(1− t−hγ)1− t−h , (5.3)
27The superscripts indicate the organizational form throughout the analysis.
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where q≥ 0 for a > c(1−t−hγ)1−t−h . To ensure positive quantities throughout the analysis,
we assume a > c(1−t−hγ)1−t−h holds true. This quantity can be produced for a realization
of a that is within the interval a ∈
[
a,aC
]
, where aC = bC + c(1−t−hγ)1−t−h is obtained by
rearranging qC = bC .
2. Otherwise, the market conditions are such that the MNC would prefer to sell more
final products than the installed capacity allows. That is, the upstream division
operates at full capacity. Consequently, qC = bC results for a realization a ∈
(
aC ,a
]
.
Inserting these quantities and taking the expectation of the headquarters overall after-
tax profit with respect to the random variable a yields the expected profit at date zero:
E
[
ΠCHQ
]
=
∫ aC
a
(c(1− t−hγ)−a(1− t−h))2−2bk(1− t−h)(1− t−hγ)
2(1− t−h) dF (a)
+
∫ a
aC
b
(
(1− t−h)
(
a− b2
)
− (c+k)(1− t−hγ)
)
dF (a)
(5.4)
Then, the headquarters maximizes the expected profit depicted in equation (5.4) with
respect to the capacity b. Thus, the first order condition
∂E
[
ΠCHQ
]
∂b
= 1
a−a
b2
2 (1− t−h) + (1− t−hγ)
[
ka+ bc+ 1− t−hγ2(1− t−h)c
2
]
+a
[
(1− t−h)
(
a
2 − b
)
− (c+k)(1− t−hγ)
] (5.5)
determines a local maximum. Rearranging the first order condition with respect to b yields
the optimal capacity which the headquarters installs at date zero under centralization:
bC = a− c1− t−hγ1− t−h −
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h . (5.6)
Proposition 5.1 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 5.1. For k < (a−a)(1−t−h)2(1−t−hγ) =: k
C , and centralized decision making the head-
quarters installs bC in the upstream division whereas qC (bC) final products are sold
externally for a ∈
[
a,aC
] (
a ∈
(
aC ,a
])
. Excessive capacity occurs with the probability
F
(
aC
)
< 1.
Proof. See appendix.
5.4.2 Partial Delegation
Second, we consider partial delegation, i.e., the headquarters delegates the quantity
decision to the downstream division whereas the capacity decision remains in the head-
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quarters’ sphere of competence. Such an organizational form prevails when the down-
stream division is better informed compared to the headquarters. Typically, the market
conditions a which determine the market size of the downstream division’s final product
market may be difficult to observe by the headquarters because the headquarters is not
able to verify those market conditions (Wielenberg, 2000). After capacity is installed in
the upstream division and the uncertainty regarding the market conditions is resolved,
the downstream division determines demand according to
qP = argmax
q≥0
{
ΠD = (1− t−h)
[(
a− 12q
)
q−prq
]}
. (5.7)
Thus, the downstream division’s quantity decision is as follows:
qP = a− cγ. (5.8)
We assume that this quantity is always positive, i.e., a> cγ, and can either be fulfilled with
the installed capacity for market conditions a ∈
[
a,aP
]
, where aP = bP + cγ is obtained
by rearranging qP = bP . Otherwise, qP = bP results if the market conditions are such that
the capacity is not sufficient to produce the required quantity, i.e., for a ∈
(
aP ,a
]
.
Inserting these quantities and taking the expectation of the headquarters overall after-
tax profit with respect to the random variable a yields the headquarters expected after-tax
profit with partial delegation at date zero
E
[
ΠPHQ
]
=
∫ aP
a
[
1− t−h
2
(
a2− c2γ2
)
− (1− t−hγ)(c(a− cγ) +k · b)
]
dF (a)
+
∫ a
aP
[
(1− t−h)
(
ab− b
2
2
)
− b(c+k)(1− t−hγ)
]
dF (a).
(5.9)
Then, the headquarters maximizes the expected profit depicted in equation (5.9) with
respect to the capacity at date zero. Thus, the first order condition
∂E
[
ΠPHQ
]
∂b
= 1
a−a
a[(1− t−h)(a2 − b
)
− (c+k)(1− t−hγ)
]
− 1− t−h2
(
c2γ2− b2
)
+ (1− t−hγ)(c(b+ cγ) +ak)
 (5.10)
determines a local maximum. Rearranging the first order condition with respect to b yields
the optimal capacity which the headquarters installs under partial delegation
bP = 11− t−h[
a− c(1− t−hγ)−
√
(1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
]
.
(5.11)
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Proposition 5.2 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 5.2. For k < 2c(1−t)(γ−1)+(a−a)(1−t−h)2(1−t−hγ) , the headquarters installs capacity b
P
in the upstream division with partial delegation. The downstream division asks for qP units
of the intermediate product which can (not) be produced with the installed capacity for a
realization of the market conditions a ∈
[
a,aP
] (
a ∈
(
aP ,a
])
. Excessive capacity occurs
with probability F
(
aP
)
< 1.
Proof. See appendix.
5.4.3 Full Delegation
Lastly, we consider a setting with fully delegated decisions. Upstream divisional man-
agers may have more technical expertise than the headquarters because the production
technology is settled in the foreign division. In a situation where only the upstream di-
vision is in a position to install and maintain the production technology, the capacity
decision is necessarily delegated to the upstream division (Dutta and Reichelstein, 2010).
Maintaining the assumption that the headquarters is not able to verify the realized market
conditions, the downstream division decides on the quantity which is sold externally. Thus,
the downstream division’s quantity decision is depicted in equation (5.8). Depending on
the realized market conditions and the corresponding requested quantity, the upstream di-
vision operates at full capacity or exhibits excessive capacity. In particular, for a∈
[
a,aF
]
,
with aF = bF +cγ, the produced quantity is qP = qF whereas for a∈
(
aF ,a
]
, only qF = bF
can be produced. That is, the installed capacity is too low to fulfill the quantity which
maximizes the downstream division’s after-tax profit for the realized market demand.
Inserting these quantities and taking the expectation of the upstream division’s after-
tax profit with respect to the random variable a yields the upstream division’s expected
after-tax profit at date zero
E
[
ΠFU
]
=
∫ aF
a
(1− t)(γ−1)(c(a− cγ) +k · b)dF (a)
+
∫ a
aF
(1− t)(γ−1)(c+k)bdF (a).
(5.12)
The first order condition with respect to the capacity b
∂E
[
ΠFU
]
∂b
= (1− t)(γ−1)
[
k+ c
(
F (a)−F
(
aF
))]
> 0 (5.13)
is always positive. Consequently, the upstream division installs as much capacity as can
be considered in the transfer price. The upper bound of the considerable capacity is
determined by the transfer pricing guidelines. They only allow reasonable amounts of
excessive capacity to be incorporated in the cost basis to calculate the cost-plus transfer
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price. Installing capacity beyond the capacity which is needed to meet the requested
quantity for the best market conditions, i.e., a = a, will never be considered reasonable.
Thus, no tax auditor would be willing to accept costs for excessive capacity in the transfer
price when the capacity exceeds a−cγ. Without the possibility to incorporate the costs of
excessive capacity in the transfer price each additional unit capacity is detrimental for the
upstream division because installing capacity is costly. Thus, the foreign division installs
bF = a− cγ. (5.14)
The markup requirement stipulated in the transfer pricing regulation leads to over-
compensation of the foreign division because the upstream division earns the markup on
the excessive capacity. Moreover, the upstream division bears no risk related to its capac-
ity decision because the transfer pricing design compensates the upstream division for the
whole capacity including excessive capacity. Proposition 5.3 summarizes the findings for
full delegation.
Proposition 5.3. With uncertainty and full delegation of the quantity and capacity de-
cision, the upstream division installs the maximum capacity which can be considered in
the transfer price bF . This always leads to excessive capacity, i.e., F
(
aF
)
= 1. The down-
stream division sells qF externally.
5.4.4 Comparison of the Organizational Forms
We now turn to the comparison of the quantity and the capacity decisions resulting
under the different organizational forms. On the one hand, delegating the capacity deci-
sion naturally affects the extent of the installed capacity. On the other hand, delegating
the quantity decision also affects the installed capacity. Thus, the MNC’s choice of its
organizational form affects the probability to have excessive capacity.
Not surprisingly, delegating the quantity decision to the downstream division leads to
a lower quantity compared to a situation where the headquarters decides on the quantity,
i.e., qC > qP = qF . This well-known result occurs because we consider a one set of books
setting and we are interested in the MNC’s behavior when tight transfer pricing regulation
curbs its reporting discretion. The headquarters cannot affect the downstream division’s
quantity decision by using an appropriate transfer pricing mechanism. Therefore, the tax
rate differential is not internalized and goal congruence cannot be achieved. Hence, with
a delegated quantity decision the quantity sold externally is too low to maximize the
headquarters overall after-tax profit.
This, in turn, affects the installed capacity. In particular, with partial delegation, the
MNC installs less capacity compared to centralized decision making even though the ca-
pacity decision remains in the headquarters’ sphere of competence. However, the smaller
quantity qP lowers the optimal capacity necessary to produce the expected quantity of
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the intermediate product, i.e., bC > bP . For small costs of installing an additional unit of
capacity28, i.e., k < kCF , the headquarters installs a higher capacity with centralized deci-
sion making than the upstream division, i.e., bC > bF . This occurs because the centralized
quantity decision is higher due to the internalized tax rate differential, qC > qF . This is
reflected in the capacity decision. However, for high costs of capacity, i.e., k > kCF , the
headquarters installs a smaller capacity than the upstream division. The reason is that
the upstream division is not bothered by the costs of capacity because it gets fully com-
pensated for those costs. This is also the reason why the installed capacity with partial
delegation is always smaller than the capacity with full delegation, i.e., bP < bF .
Considering uncertainty regarding the market conditions, the capacity decision typi-
cally leads to a positive probability of excessive capacity. The headquarters finds installing
full capacity too expensive because it trades off the expected costs of excessive capacity
against the opportunity costs of lost sales in case of a capacity that is too low to serve the
realized demand. The organizational form influences the quantity and the corresponding
capacity decision and, thus, affects the probability to exhibit excessive capacity. In partic-
ular, proposition 5.3 shows that delegating the capacity decision to the upstream division
always induces excessive capacity whereas the headquarters’ capacity decision does not
necessarily induce excessive capacity, i.e., F
(
aF
)
> F
(
aC
)
and F
(
aF
)
> F
(
aP
)
. Inter-
estingly, the probability to exhibit excessive capacity is higher with partial delegation
compared to a situation with centralized decisions, i.e., F
(
aP
)
> F
(
aC
)
, even though
the capacity is smaller under partial delegation than with centralization. However, with
partial delegation the quantity sold externally is also lower due to the lacking internaliza-
tion of the tax rate differential. The headquarters compensates the too low quantity under
partial delegation by increasing the probability of meeting the quantity requested by the
downstream division. These results indicate that the absolute level of capacity is not in-
formative about the probability to exhibit excessive capacity unless the organizational
form of the MNC is known.
Proposition 5.4. The absolute level of capacity is not informative about the probability
to exhibit excessive capacity.
Proof. See appendix.
Since we are interested in the effects caused by taxation and the corresponding reg-
ulation we also consider the MNC’s quantity and capacity decision in a no-tax world.
This enables us to isolate tax effects that arise due to the tax-saving benefit of excessive
capacity. Without transfer pricing regulation the MNC is free to design its transfer prices.
Thus, no markup requirement needs to be considered. Then, in a world without taxes,
the MNC’s organizational form of centralization or partial delegation does not affect the
28The threshold kCF is stated in the appendix.
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MNC’s quantity and capacity decisions. The reason is that we assume the same infor-
mation endowment for each organizational form. With centralized decision making, the
headquarters also determines the quantity after observing the market conditions. Thus,
without taxes the resulting quantity decision and consequently the capacity decision co-
incide.
Corollary 5.1. In a world without taxes and tax-induced markup requirement, the quan-
tity decision reduces to qNT (a) = a−c. For centralization and partial delegation, an altered
quantity affects the capacity decision and the probability that market demand cannot be
fulfilled, i.e., bNT = a− c−
√
2k(a−a) and F (aNT )< 1, where aNT = a−
√
2k(a−a).29
In addition, there is no markup requirement which overcompensates the upstream
division for the installed capacity and, in turn, leads to the highest acceptable capacity.
A transfer pricing scheme that compensates the upstream division only for its costs is
not appropriate to incentivize the upstream division to install capacity. In particular, the
upstream division is indifferent between installing capacity or not because it can never earn
a positive income. This result is in line with prior research which shows that markups are
essential for the upstream division to have investment incentives (Baldenius et al., 1999;
Sahay, 2003). Corollary 5.1 summarizes these findings.
Corollary 5.2. In a world without taxes and a markup requirement, the upstream division
is indifferent among every possible level of capacity to produce the required quantity qNT
because it is fully compensated but does not earn rents. Thus, the markup requirement
stipulated in the transfer pricing regulation provides investment incentives for the upstream
division.
Proof. See appendix.
5.5 Excessive Capacity Created by Tax Regulation
In the following, we investigate how varying tax rates and markups affect the MNC’s
tendency to install excessive capacity. An increasing markup increases the transfer price
whereas increasing tax rates affect the after-tax profits of the divisions and thus, the overall
profit of the MNC. First, with centralization the headquarters decides on the quantity and
the capacity. An increasing markup or a higher tax rate differential affects the attractive-
ness of profit shifting to the low-tax country. Therefore, the quantity increases because
higher profit shifting benefits can be realized through internal trade. These tax-saving
benefits outweigh the price decline resulting from a higher quantity on the final prod-
uct market. Correspondingly, the installed capacity increases due to the higher expected
quantity of the intermediate product. Interestingly, an increasing tax rate t also increases
29The subscript NT highlights the no-tax case, whereas the absence of NT as subscript denotes tax
world considerations.
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the quantity with centralization. This result occurs because an increasing tax rate t low-
ers the marginal costs of producing an additional unit of the intermediate product since
the variable costs are tax deductible. Moreover, a higher t also lowers the after-tax costs
of installing capacity because of the tax deductibility. At the same time, the marginal
revenue of the downstream division decreases due to the increased tax rate but not to the
same extent. Therefore, the headquarters increases the quantity sold on the final prod-
uct market. This, in turn, leads to increasing capacity for an increasing tax rate t. The
probability to exhibit excessive capacity increases for both an increasing markup and for
increasing tax rates because the increase in the capacity is higher than the increase in the
expected quantity. This occurs because the capacity is affected twice. On the one hand,
the increased expected quantity is considered. On the other hand, installing capacity is
less costly.
Second, we consider the resulting effects for partial delegation. An increasing markup
increases the transfer price. Thus, the intermediate product becomes costlier for the down-
stream division. Therefore, the quantity decreases with an increasing markup. Conse-
quently, less capacity is needed to serve the expected demand for the intermediate prod-
uct. However, with an increasing markup, the capacity can either increase or decrease.
This occurs because the profit shifting benefits increase with an increasing markup so
that installing high capacity is less costly. Thus, if the tax-saving benefit dominates an
increasing capacity occurs in response to an increasing markup even though less capac-
ity is necessary to produce the expected demand for the intermediate product because
the quantity sold externally decreases. This happens for a large market size a. In this
case, the expected quantity is high and therefore, an increasing markup has hardly any
effect on the quantity so that the tax-saving benefit dominates. Otherwise, the decreasing
quantity becomes the driving force and the installed capacity decreases. However, the tax-
saving benefit is always present, so that for both an increasing and a decreasing capacity
the probability to exhibit excessive capacity increases for an increasing markup and for
increasing tax rates.
Lastly, full delegation is analyzed. Obviously, the quantity decreases, as stated for
partial delegation. Additionally, the upstream division does not consider the tax-saving
benefit. However, the capacity needed to meet the requested quantity for the best market
conditions decreases. This is the capacity installed by the upstream division. Therefore,
an increasing markup leads to a decreasing capacity under full delegation. The tax rates
do not affect the delegated decisions because the tax rate differential is not internalized
by the divisions and is, therefore, not considered.
The effects of taxes and transfer pricing regulation on the MNC’s quantity and capacity
decision as well as the corresponding probabilities of excessive capacity are summarized
in table 5.1.
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qC qP = qF bC bP bF F
(
aC
)
F
(
aP
)
F
(
aF
)
∂
∂γ > 0 < 0 > 0
> 0 for large a
< 0 otherwise
< 0 > 0 > 0 -
∂
∂h > 0 - > 0 > 0 - > 0 > 0 -
∂
∂t > 0 - > 0 > 0 - > 0 > 0 -
Table 5.1: Effect of marginal changes in tax rates and tax regulation (tax rate t, tax rate
differential h, and markup γ) on the quantity decision q, the capacity decision b, and on
the probability of excessive capacity F (a) under centralization, partial delegation, and
full delegation. The superscript indicates the organizational form.
The comparative statics depicted in table 5.1 and the findings in corollary 5.1 show
that the existence of taxes and the markup requirement stipulated in the transfer pricing
regulation lead to a higher probability of the MNC to exhibit excessive capacity under
centralization and partial delegation. For full delegation, corollary 5.2 illustrates that the
upstream division is indifferent among every possible level of capacity when no taxes
and transfer pricing regulation exist. Contrary, with taxes and the markup requirement,
the upstream division installs so much capacity that the MNC always exhibits excessive
capacity. That is, taxes and transfer pricing regulation induce a higher probability to
exhibit excessive capacity under full delegation.
Proposition 5.5. Taxes and transfer pricing regulation increase the probability to exhibit
excessive capacity for each considered organizational form of the MNC. Therefore, taxes
and transfer pricing regulation are a potential antecedent for organizational slack.
Proof. See appendix.
5.6 Discussion of Full Delegation with Several Downstream
Divisions
The above analysis illustrates that the upstream division installs the maximum needed
capacity so that the MNC always exhibits excessive capacity with a delegated capacity
decision. The installed capacity does not affect the downstream division’s quantity decision
because the fixed costs are not decision-relevant. That is, all fixed costs are transferred
to the downstream division irrespective of the quantity decision. When the intermediate
product is transferred to more than one downstream division, the portion of fixed costs
allocated to each downstream division by applying the cost-plus transfer price depends
on the downstream divisions’ quantity decisions. In particular, the transfer price with n
downstream divisions is
pr =
[
c+ k · b∑n
i=1 qi
]
γ, (5.15)
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where n≥ 2 is a natural number.
We consider the following adaptions to our model. Each downstream division faces a
monopolistic market for its final product. The revenue functions are R(qi) = (ai− 12qi)qi
for i = 2, . . . ,n. The market parameters ai capture the overall economic situation in all
final product markets so that a1 = . . . = ai = . . . = an = a.30 Therefore, we neglect the
indices. Each downstream division decides on the quantity to maximize its own after-tax
income. Therefore, considering the transfer price, the downstream divisions determine
demand according to
qi = argmax
qi≥0
{
ΠDi = (1− t−h)
[(
a− 12qi
)
qi−prqi
]}
. (5.16)
The transfer price of equation (5.15) creates interdependence among the downstream
divisions’ profits. If a single downstream division chooses a smaller quantity than all other
downstream divisions, this division has to bear a smaller portion of the fixed costs. This
reduction in the allocated fixed costs exceeds the negative effect resulting from a lower
quantity sold on the external market. However, the downstream divisions are considered
rational so that all downstream divisions produce a lower quantity than without the
interdependence created by the cost-plus transfer price. This finding is similar to a Cournot
competition, where the total quantity sold on the final product market does not equal
the monopoly quantity. In the Cournot competition, the producer rent would be higher
if the firms could enforceably agree on the monopoly quantity. Our finding regarding
the quantity with several downstream divisions is similar. Each downstream divisions’
profit would be larger if neither downstream division lowered the quantity due to the
interdependence created by the transfer price. However, considering the interdependence,
each downstream division produces the same small quantity and, thus, bears the same
portion of the fixed costs. This is depicted in figure 5.2 and reflected in each downstream
division’s first order condition and respective quantity decision. The first order condition
is
∂ΠDi
∂qi
= (1− t−h)
a− qi− cγ−
kbγ
∑
j 6=i
qi(∑
i
qi
)2
 , (5.17)
which leads to the following quantity decision q of each of the n≥ 2 downstream divisions31
q = 12
a− cγ+
√
(a− cγ)2− 4kbγ(n−1)
n2
 . (5.18)
30Comparable qualitative results can be obtained with different market parameters a1 6= . . . 6= ai 6= . . . 6= an.
However, the basic insights are also present with equal market parameters.
31The second order condition for a local maximum is met for b < (a−cγ)
2n2
4γk(n−1) .
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Marginal Revenue
Marginal Costs for n= 1
Marginal Costs for n= 2
q
p
Figure 5.2: Marginal revenue of a single downstream division, marginal costs for one
downstream division, and marginal costs of a single downstream division when the MNC
comprises two downstream divisions (plotted for t= 0.15, h= 0.2, a= 900, c= 300, k= 25,
γ = 1.5, and b= 1,014)
The interdependence created by the transfer price induces each downstream division’s
quantity choice to depend on the installed production capacity b. Note that for n = 1
the quantity in equation (5.18) equals the quantity for the setting with one downstream
division and delegated quantity decision (equation (5.8)). Interestingly, the quantity ef-
fect caused by the interdependence is strongest for two downstream divisions. With an
increasing number of downstream divisions, this effect decreases and for a large number
of downstream divisions, the quantity of each downstream division converges towards the
quantity with one downstream division.32
Depending on the realized market conditions these quantities can be produced with the
installed capacity if a< bn+cγ+
γk(n−1)
n =: a
n. For realizations of the market conditions a∈
(an,a], the installed capacity is not sufficient to produce the requested quantities. Since we
assume that all divisions face the same market conditions, the upstream division allocates
the capacity equitably between all downstream divisions. Thus, for a good realization of
the market conditions, each downstream division receives bn intermediate products.
For the capacity decision, the upstream division faces a trade-off. On the one hand, a
high capacity b results in a high upstream division profit due to the markup on the costs
of installing capacity, i.e., (γ− 1)bk. The upstream division always obtains the markup
on the fixed costs because of the cost-plus transfer price. On the other hand, a high
capacity b induces the downstream divisions to lower the quantity (see equation (5.18)).
32 ∂qn
∂n =
n−2
n3 · kbγ√
(a−cγ)2− 4kbγ(n−1)
n2
. q of equation (5.18) determines a local maximum for b < (a−cγ)
2n2
4γk(n−1)
so that ∂q
n
∂n is positive, zero, or negative for n > 2, n= 2, and n= 1, respectively.
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This negatively affects the upstream division’s profit resulting from the markup on the
variable costs, i.e., (γ − 1)nqc. This is depicted in the upstream division’s first order
condition with respect to b:33
∂E
[
ΠFU
]
∂b
= (1− t)(γ−1)
a−a︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
k(a−a) + c(a−an)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∫ an
a
nc
∂q
∂b
da︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 . (5.19)
Contrary to the setting with one downstream division, the upstream division also
encounters costs of installing excessive capacity. The following example illustrates that
this negative effect may induce the upstream division to install less than the maximum
capacity which can be incorporated in the transfer price. Consequently, the upstream
division does not always exhibit excessive capacity.
Example 5.1. For a tax rate t = 0.15 in the low-tax jurisdiction, a tax rate differential
h = 0.2, a minimum prohibitive price a = 800, a maximum prohibitive price a = 1,000,
variable costs c = 300, capacity costs k = 25, a markup γ = 1.5, and n = 2 downstream
divisions, the upstream division installs capacity of b = 1,014.34 The threshold for the
market condition capturing the extent of excessive capacity an is 976. That is, for a large
prohibitive price a, the MNC operates at full capacity.
Proposition 5.6. With more than one downstream division, full delegation does not
necessarily result in the MNC always exhibiting excessive capacity.
5.7 Conclusion
It is mandatory for MNCs to set tax-compliant transfer prices when they report their
taxable income. However, transfer prices are frequently used to shift profits from high-
tax to low-tax jurisdictions (Blouin et al., 2018; De Simone et al., 2017; Klassen et al.,
2017; Clausing, 2003; Jacob, 1996), so that transfer prices are scrutinized by governments
and international organizations. As a result, the profit shifting possibilities by means
of transfer pricing diminished because tight regulation devours most of the reporting
discretion inherent to transfer pricing. Thus, a promising way which is left to still realize
tax-saving benefits for MNCs is the adaption of strategic and operational decisions.
Our model highlights that without market uncertainty, excessive capacity is never
installed. However, in more realistic scenarios where the market conditions are not known
when the capacity needs to be installed, MNCs’ tend to exhibit excessive capacity. Taxes,
33 ∂q
∂b =
−kγ(n−1)
n2
√
(a−cγ)2− 4kbγ(n−1)
n2
. q of equation (5.18) determines a local maximum for b < (a−cγ)
2n2
4γk(n−1) so that
∂q
∂b is negative.34In this example, the downstream divisions’ second order condition regarding the quantity decision is
negative for b < 3,267.
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transfer pricing regulation, and its consequences are incorporated in MNCs’ capacity and
quantity decisions. Our results show that taxes and the transfer pricing regulation increase
the probability to exhibit excessive capacity. However, excessive capacity is costly and,
therefore, a manifestation of an ex post inefficiency that arises in response to taxation
and transfer pricing regulation. Thus, we identify taxes and transfer pricing regulation as
a potential antecedent for organizational slack.
Additionally, we show that the absolute level of capacity is not informative about the
probability to exhibit excessive capacity because this crucially depends on the organiza-
tional form of the MNC. Different organizational forms result in differences in the quantity
and capacity decisions. This finding might help tax auditors to evaluate the extent of the
excessive capacity that occurs in response to uncertainty and is therefore economically
justifiable. Typically, MNCs need to demonstrate in their transfer pricing documentation
that the excessive capacity is reasonable. For example, the excessive capacity needs to be
in accordance with that of comparable firms. However, the amount of capacity installed
in other firms might be also biased because of a potential tax-saving benefit and might
therefore provide a poor benchmark. Specifically, the capacity planning of MNCs facing
no or at least a small tax rate differential tends to be unbiased. These MNCs provide a
meaningful benchmark to show which part of the excessive capacity occurs in response to
uncertainty and is therefore economically reasonable.
Despite triggering higher probabilities of excessive capacity, transfer pricing regulation
provides investment incentives to the upstream division. In particular, the upstream divi-
sion installs the highest possible capacity because the markup requirement stipulated in
the transfer pricing guidelines leads to overcompensation of the costs of excessive capacity.
However, this effect is mitigated when more than one downstream division is considered.
Our results show that tax regulation affects MNCs’ behavior in a non-trivial way.
Therefore, considering solely reporting behavior in the context of counteracting profit
shifting seems myopic. In particular, transfer pricing regulation might have unintended
and detrimental effects on MNCs’ strategic and operational decisions. As a consequence,
the findings are highly relevant for tax auditors, legislators, and supranational units like
the EU and the OECD.
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5.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.1
The headquarters maximizes the total after-tax profit of the MNC as stated in equation
(5.1) with regard to q ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 while considering the constraint q ≤ b. Because of
the linearity of the constraint function, the constraint qualification is satisfied. Thus, the
Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions are necessary for an optimal solution. The total after-
tax profit of the MNC is differentiable and concave in the non-negative orthant. According
to the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem, capacity and quantity decisions satisfying the
Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions give a global maximum. In sum, the Kuhn-Tucker
maximum conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
For the quantities in equation (5.2) and b= qFB, all Kuhn-Tucker maximum conditions
are satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
The headquarters maximizes the total after-tax profit of the MNC as stated in equation
(5.1) with regard to q ≥ 0:
FOCqC : (1− t−h)
(
a− qC
)
+hcγ− (1− t)c= 0.
Solving this first order condition with respect to qC yields the quantity under centraliza-
tion stated in equation (5.3). The second order condition
SOCqC : (1− t−h)(−1)< 0
is negative so that qC determines a local maximum. Considering the uncertainty regarding
the market conditions the headquarters decides on capacity according to equation (5.5).
Solving this equation yields two possible capacity levels:
bC− = a− c
1− t−hγ
1− t−h −
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h ,
bC+ = a− c
1− t−hγ
1− t−h +
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h .
The SOC with respect to b is given by:
SOCbC : 1(a−a)
(
bC −a+ c(1− t−hγ)
)
.
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The SOC is negative (positive) for bC− (bC+) so that
bC = a− c1− t−hγ1− t−h −
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h
determines a local maximum.
To ensure a< aC the costs of capacity needs to be smaller than k < (a−a)(1−t−h)2(1−t−hγ) =: k
C .
Proof of Proposition 5.2
With delegated quantity decision, the downstream division maximizes its after-tax
profit according to equation (5.7):
FOCqP : (1− t−h)(a− qP − cγ) = 0.
Solving this first order condition with respect to qP yields the quantity the downstream
division implements as stated in equation (5.8). The second order condition
SOCqP : (1− t−h)(−1)< 0
is negative so that qP determines a local maximum.
Considering the subsequent quantity decision of the downstream division and taking
into account uncertainty regarding the market conditions, the headquarters decides on
capacity according to equation (5.10). Solving this equation yields two possible capacity
levels:
bP− =
1
1− t−h[
a− c(1− t−hγ)−
√
1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
]
,
bP+ =
1
1− t−h[
a− c(1− t−hγ) +
√
1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
]
.
The SOC with respect to b is given by:
SOCbP : 1(a−a)
(
(1− t−h)(bP −a) + c(1− t−hγ)
)
.
and negative (positive) for bP− (bP+) so that
bP = 11− t−h[
a− c(1− t−hγ)−
√
(1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
]
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determines a local maximum. bP > 0 if and only if k < 2c(1−t)(γ−1)+(a−a)(1−t−h)2(1−t−hγ) .
Proof of Proposition 5.4
The capacity that is installed under centralized decision making exceeds the capacity
installed with a partial delegation organization if and only if:
a− c1− t−hγ1− t−h −
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h >
1
1− t−h[
a− c(1− t−hγ)−
√
1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
]
⇐⇒ k < kC .
Thus, bC > bP holds true.
The capacity installed under centralized decision making exceeds the capacity installed
with full delegation if and only if:
a− c1− t−hγ1− t−h −
√
2k(a−a)(1− t−hγ)
1− t−h > a− cγ
⇐⇒ k < c
2(1− t)2(γ−1)2
(1− t−h)2(1− t−hγ)(a−a =: k
CF
Thus, for small cost of capacity, i.e., k < kCF , the capacity with centralized decision
making is larger compared to the capacity that is installed with delegated decisions,
i.e., bC > bF > bP whereas with high costs of capacity, i.e. kCF < k < kC , the capacity
decision of the upstream division is higher because the decision of the upstream division
is not affected by the costs of capacity, bF > bC > bP . However, with full delegation the
MNC exhibits always excessive capacity whereas the probability for excessive capacity for
centralized decision making is smaller than with delegated decisions, i.e.,
F (a) = F
(
aF
)
> F
(
aP
)
> F
(
aC
)
> F (a) .
The order of the organizational forms’ installed capacity and the order of the organi-
zational forms’ probability for excessive capacity do not correspond. Consequently, the
absolute level of capacity is not informative about the probability to exhibit excessive
capacity.
Proof of Corollary 5.2
As stated in equation (5.13) the first order condition of the foreign division is always
positive. Thus, the foreign division installs the highest acceptable capacity. However,
considering the no-tax case, i.e., t = h = 0 and γ = 1, the foreign division’s first order
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condition with respect to b is:
∂E
[
ΠFU,NT
]
∂b
= 0.
Thus, the upstream division is indifferent among any possible level of capacity because
it cannot earn positive rents. Hence, the markup requirement stipulated in the transfer
pricing regulation provides investment incentives for the upstream division.
Proof of Proposition 5.5
With centralization, the derivative of the quantity with respect to the markup is:
∂qC
∂γ
= ch1− t−h > 0,
with respect to the tax rate differential:
∂qC
∂h
= c(1− t)(γ−1)(1− t−h)2 > 0,
and with respect to the tax rate t:
∂qC
∂t
= ch(γ−1)(1− t−h)2 > 0.
With centralization, the derivative of the capacity with respect to the markup is:
∂bC
∂γ
= ch1− t−h +
(a−a)kh√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0,
with respect to the tax rate differential:
∂bC
∂h
= c(1− t)(γ−1)(1− t−h)2 +
(a−a)k(1− t)(γ−1)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0,
and with respect to the tax rate t:
∂bC
∂t
= ch(γ−1)(1− t−h)2 +
(a−a)kh(γ−1)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0.
With centralization, the derivative of the probability to exhibit excessive capacity with
respect to the markup is:
∂F
(
aC
)
∂γ
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· ∂a
C
∂γ
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· (a−a)kh√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0,
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with respect to the tax rate differential:
∂F
(
aC
)
∂h
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· ∂a
C
∂h
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· (a−a)k(1− t)(γ−1)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0,
and with respect to the tax rate t:
∂F
(
aC
)
∂t
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· ∂a
C
∂t
=
∂F
(
aC
)
∂aC
· (a−a)kh(γ−1)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h)
> 0.
With a delegated quantity decision, the derivative of the quantity with respect to the
markup is:
∂qP
∂γ
=−c < 0,
whereas the tax rates do not affect the downstream division’s quantity decision:
∂qP
∂h
= ∂q
P
∂t
= 0.
With partial delegation, the derivative of the capacity with respect to the markup is:
∂bP
∂γ
= ch1− t−h +
(a−a)kh(1− t−h)− c2(1− t)2(γ−1)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h) + c2(γ−1)2(1− t)2
≷ 0,
with respect to the tax rate differential:
∂bP
∂h
= c(1− t)(γ−1)(1− t−h)2 +
(γ−1)
(
(a−a)k(1− t−h) + c2(1− t)2(γ−1)
)
(1− t−h)2
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h) + c2(γ−1)2(1− t)2
> 0,
and with respect to the tax rate t:
∂bP
∂t
= h(γ−1)(1− t−h)2
c+ k(a−a)(1− t−h)− (1− t)2c2(γ−1)√
(1− t)2c2(γ−1)2 + 2k(1− t−hγ)(a−a)(1− t−h)
> 0.
With partial delegation, the derivative of the probability to exhibit excessive capacity
with respect to the markup is:
∂F
(
aP
)
∂γ
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
· ∂a
P
∂γ
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
·
 c(1− t)
1− t−h −
c2(1− t)2(γ−1)− (a−a)kh(1− t−h)
(1− t−h)
√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h) + c2(γ−1)2(1− t)2
> 0
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with respect to the tax rate differential:
∂F
(
aP
)
∂h
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
· ∂a
P
∂h
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
· (1− t)(γ−1)(1− t−h)2
c+ c2(1− t) + (a−a)k(1− t−h)√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h) + c2(γ−1)2(1− t)2
> 0
and with respect to the tax rate t:
∂F
(
aP
)
∂t
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
· ∂a
P
∂t
=
∂F
(
aP
)
∂aP
· h(γ−1)(1− t−h)2
c− c2(1− t)(γ−1)− (a−a)k(1− t−h)√
2(a−a)k(1− t−hγ)(1− t−h) + c2(γ−1)2(1− t)2
> 0.
With full delegation the derivative of the capacity with respect to the markup is:
∂bF
∂γ
=−c < 0.
whereas the the tax rates do not affect the upstream division’s capacity decision:
∂bF
∂h
= ∂d
F
∂t
= 0.
With full delegation, the derivative of the probability to exhibit excessive capacity is
not affected by an increasing markup and increasing tax rates:
∂F
(
aF
)
∂γ
=
∂F
(
aF
)
∂h
=
∂F
(
aF
)
∂t
= 0.
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